Diplomacy

 Pope Leo XIV has begun the first overseas trip of his pontificate, a six day visit to Türkiye and Lebanon, which started yesterday (27 November) and ends on Tuesday (2 December). According to Vatican Radio, the visit "carries a strong ecumenical character and places interreligious dialogue at its centre. It will also be a moment of closeness to Christian communities and local populations across the region".   During nearly a week in the region, Pope Leo XIV will meet civil and religious authorities, visit mosques and ancient churches, pray at Beirut’s port in memory of the victims of the 2020 explosion, and hold private meetings with Presidents Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Joseph Aoun.   A highlight of the visit will be a visit Nicaea, where the Pope will mark the anniversary of the Council of Nicaea. Christians of many traditions recognise the Council of Nicaea as a foundation of shared faith. One of the most anticipated moments will be the Pope’s encounter with Lebanese youth in Bkerké, at the Maronite Patriarchate, a meeting expected to carry strong messages of hope in the Jubilee Year. A central event will be the ecumenical celebration in İznik, where the Pope and Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew will walk together toward the ruins of the Basilica of St Neophytos. The prayer, held before icons of Christ and the Council, will conclude with the lighting of a candle—a symbolic gesture of unity. The journey will also highlight interreligious engagement.   Memorable moments are expected throughout the trip: a wreath at Atatürk’s mausoleum, prayer inside the Blue Mosque, Mass at Istanbul’s Volkswagen Arena, the planting of a cedar at the presidential palace in Beirut, and prayer at the tomb of St Charbel in Lebanon. The Vatican said that "Pope Leo XIV’s pilgrimage to Türkiye and Lebanon aims to offer a voice of peace, unity, and hope at the heart of the Middle East."

In this analysis,  veteran Azerbaijani journalist and political commentator, Mehman Aliyev, draws lessons from the 1994 Armenia-Azerbaijan ceasefire, to assess what can be possible impact of ceasefire in Ukraine. According to diplomats, a negotiating format or a partial ceasefire based on a modified version of the twenty-eight points is entirely plausible in 2026. A frozen line of contact, monitored by international mechanisms while talks drag on, is more likely than a fully implemented peace treaty by early that same year. “This document opens a window,” said political commentator Farid Gakhramanov. “Whether it means the end of the war or the beginning of a new frozen conflict will depend on the decisions of Moscow, Kyiv, Washington, and Brussels — not on the document itself.” (You can read the full analysis by clicking the image)

Talks were held in Geneva on Sunday (23 November) between the United States and Ukraine. Also present in Geneva were representatives of the key European countries, France, Germany and UK, and the EU. The talks are expected to continue today. The future if Ukraine is at stake, and so is the future of Europe. There should be no doubt that Putin’s ambitions do not stop in Kiev. The talks are expected to continue today (24 November), and Ukraine’s de facto capitulation is not an option for Europe. The scandalous draft of the plan called “the US plan”, but probably written by the Russians, appears to have been put aside. Officially it is still called the “US plan”, that is what the ego of US president, Donald Trump, requires. But it started to look increasingly like the plan put forward by the Europeans, which is much closer to the Ukrainian position. The Europeans were not represented in Geneva by Ministers and politicians, but by their national security advisors, somber men who are cool and calculating. They have a difficult task: on the one hand they understand very well that Ukraine’s war is Europe’s war, and they know better than anyone else how big the threat of Putin’s Russia is to European peace and security. The risks of the “original US plan” are obvious to them. But they also understand that Ukraine, and up to now Europe, depend on the US for their security. So, they cannot alienate the American president too much. US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, well understands the European dilemma. He finds himself in the unenviable position of needing to reconcile his president’s views, with the Ukrainian and European one. At stake is Ukraine’s future as a state. Ukrainian president Vlodomyr Zelenkiy quaintly calls it “Ukraine’s dignity”. But it is much more than that. Russia does not want Ukraine to exist as a state in any meaningful way. It should either have a puppet government, as it wanted to impose on Kiev when it launched the invasion in February 2022; or be so weak and dismembered that it will be in all but name a vassal of Russia. Whatever is finally agreed in Geneva, and whatever Donald Trump finally decides, 2026 is going to be a crucial year for Ukraine. European support has so far been steady, but must become steadier, regardless of Trumpian shenanigans. 2026 must be the year of European Ukraine. For this to happen their must be more resolve in Europe, and a stronger determination to support Ukraine fully. (read the full commentary by clicking on the image).

Central Asian leaders have been busy the last month, forging new ties in a changing geopolitical landscape. The presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan travelled to the White House to meet with U.S. President Donald Trump in the C5+1 format. The format, established in 2015, aims to deepen U.S. collaboration with Central Asia, emphasising security and economic cooperation. The U.S. is not the only power looking to maintain its influence in the region. The European Union, Russia, China, and increasingly, India, have all shown their interest in securing economic cooperation and inking energy and trade deals, recognising Central Asia’s strategic position as a key energy and transfer hub situated between East and West. Central Asian states are keenly aware of their leverage and have not only engaged in multi-lateral diplomacy with all of the aforementioned external actors but also adopted a pragmatic regional approach to increase cooperation amongst themselves and taken concrete steps to foster a more unified ‘Central Asian Community’. This was evident by last weekend’s Seventh Consultative Meeting of Heads of State, also known as the C5, where Central Asian leaders officially admitted Azerbaijan as a full member, effectively transforming it into the C6. However, although Central Asia has the unique opportunity to multilaterally engage with all of the world’s biggest economic and security powers, while continuing to shape regional politics and cooperation on its own terms, new security and economic issues are arising that may well reshape Central Asian states’ connections to external actors and potentially strain intra-regional relations. (Read the full commentary by clicking on the picture).

An alert issued to MPs, peers and parliamentary staff by security services identified two LinkedIn profiles, which it says are used on behalf of the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS). It says they act as "civilian recruitment head-hunters", targeting individuals working in British politics to solicit "insider insights". UK Security minister Dan Jarvis has said the government will not tolerate "covert and calculated" attempts to interfere with the UK's sovereign affairs, after MI5 warned MPs of the risk from Chinese spies. Jarvis announced a package of measures in the House of Commons to tackle espionage threats to the UK.

Unlike earlier drafts, the resolution references a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood. It is language several council members pushed for. Israel strongly opposes the creation of a Palestinian state - a significant hurdle in the path to future statehood. Key Arab states had pressured drafters of the resolution to include Palestinian self-determination in the text. The UN secretary general's spokesperson stressed that the resolution needed to "translate... into concrete and urgently needed steps on the ground" and lead to "a political process for the achievement of the two-state solution". The US, the Palestinian Authority, and several Arab and Muslim-majority nations including Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have called for the quick adoption of the resolution. The Palestinian Authority (PA) said in a statement that the resolution's terms needed to be implemented "urgently and immediately". Russia and China did not exercise the vetoes they possess, but abstained to allow the resolution to pass, largely because the PA and eight other Arab and Muslim nations backed it.

Countries that want to work together usually establish collaborative platforms, which enable them to meet regularly, co-ordinate positions and, if necessary take common action. The G7 is one such platform.  It is made up of the seven leading industrialized  countries: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as the European Union, and has been going since 1975. For a short time (1997 – 2014) there was also a G8 – which brought Russia in together with the G7. However this was ended when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. Ahead of his meeting with the Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, on 29 October, Trump wrote on Social Media “The G2 will be convening shortly”. There was therefore surprise when Donald Trump last month started talking of the G2. So why is Trump talking about a G2? Trump wants, if possible, to avoid war with China under his watch. It will be too costly and unpredictable. Offering China the role of joint hegemon may win time, despite its risks. None of the actual problems will go away, in fact they may be exacerbated. In the meantime Trump wants to show China that the US has teeth, and it will use them if necessary. The rebranding of the Department of Defence into Department of War may seem like an expensive and reckless act of folly. But it sends a signal. Other more tangible actions like missile tests, withdrawal from test ban treaty, etc, do so too. Will there be a G2. It is highly unlikely. The Chinese have their own vision of the world in which so far Trump has been an irritant, rather than a problem. Their view of things is much longer than Trump’s. They will remain engaged, and they will talk. They are happy that the US president now looks at them as an equal. But they will not formalise the relationship. In the meantime, Donald Trump will continue sending contradictory signals hoping to confuse the Chinese. It is also unlikely.