Europe has grown uncomfortably familiar with Russia’s policy towards its “near abroad”: the former Soviet states that Moscow continues to treat as part of its rightful sphere of influence. Sheltered by NATO and still invested in managing relations with Russia, Western capitals responded to the 2008 war in Georgia and the 2014 annexation of Crimea as serious but containable shocks: the first largely through mediation and monitoring, the second through non-recognition and sanctions. That sense of distance has since collapsed. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 turned the post-Soviet space into a central theatre of European security, while Donald Trump has further unsettled confidence in the NATO umbrella itself. Few observers are better placed to make sense of this moment than Régis Genté. A French journalist based in Tbilisi for more than two decades, he has covered the South Caucasus and the wider post-Soviet world for Le Figaro, Radio France Internationale, and France 24, alongside policy work for think tanks including IFRI. In his book Notre homme à Washington: Trump dans la main des Russes, he argues that the US president's posture toward Moscow is neither erratic nor accidental, but the product of a four-decade Russian cultivation that has tied Trump to the Kremlin more tightly than Washington or Brussels yet admits. In this conversation, he traces those ties, explains how Putin keeps Russia's elites bound to the Kremlin, and reads Georgia's political crisis as a case study in Russian post-imperial influence. (To read the full interview, click on the image above.)

A week remains until Armenia’s parliamentary elections. The campaign is in full swing, political forces are attacking one another in increasingly harsh terms, investigations into hybrid attacks against Armenia appear almost daily, and statements interfering in Armenia’s internal affairs continue to come from Moscow. The June 7 elections are arguably the most geopolitically significant in Armenia’s modern history. Their outcome will shape the country’s trajectory for years. Campaign narratives suggest that Armenian voters will effectively answer several strategic questions: whether to continue normalization with Azerbaijan and Turkey or revise existing understandings; whether to deepen ties with the EU or strengthen dependence on Russia; whether to continue democratic reforms or return figures associated with the previous political system. According to an IRI survey conducted in mid-May, Armenians’ top concerns are national security and border issues, the economy and unemployment, and peace. Unsurprisingly, the Armenia–Azerbaijan normalization process has become the central issue of the campaign. Against this backdrop, political and expert circles are again debating the idea of “guaranteed peace” and international security guarantees. The debate is not new. Since the launch of peace treaty negotiations in 2022, the Armenian government has repeatedly emphasized the need for “international support” and “international legitimacy.” At the time, negotiations were mediated simultaneously by the EU, Russia, and the United States, while Nagorno-Karabakh had not yet been emptied of its Armenian population. However, after the involuntary displacement of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenians amid the inaction of Russian peacekeepers and the weak international response, official Yerevan gradually revised its approach. The idea of external guarantors increasingly appeared unrealistic, and the negotiation process became more bilateral in nature. (To read the full article, click on the image above.)

Empires tend to self-destruct. They peak to greatness and military might, and then gradually decline, either as a result of military defeats, or internal discord, or more likely a mix of both. Decline can take along time. The Roman Empire, first split in  two and the Eastern part survived until the fall of Constantinople in 1453. The British and French empires, that dominated the world in the last part of the 19th and early 20th centuries never recovered from WWII. They emerged victorious but weakened. The formal end of the British empire happened with the withdrawal from the Gulf and South Yemen in the 1970s. The British left because they simply could not afford to stay. The emerging states, roughly the six GCC states and Southern Yemen (an independent country until 1991), did not even bother to join the British Commonwealth. These days we call empires superpowers, and for 30 years there has only been one – the United States. It remains the richest and best armed country n the world, but its ability to act as global arbiter and policeman is fading away. The current Iran war has exposed the limits of American power, to the incredulity of friends and foe alike. The international system does not like vacuums. What is left empty is often quickly filled by something else. People look at China as the new superpower, that will fill whatever space US decline will empty. It will not happen. China’s economic resurgence is nothing short of miraculous. It has the second largest economy in the world, and growing. Its armed forces have gone through a major transformation, and are designed primarily to deal with a confrontation with the United States. Under president Xi, in the “new era”, China is ready to make its mark on the world. It will, or is already, a global player that must be taken seriously. But it lacks the ability to be a global hegemon. There are several reasons: first, it will always been seen by the US as the primary threat, and even a weakened US can still take on China. China will spend much of its effort at managing this. Second, China is boxed in, not only through its maritime arteries, but also through its two strong Asian neighbours: Japan and India. The Chinese navy, and a robust and assertive Chinese policy in the South China Sea is trying to mitigate this weakness, but  with mixed results.  This means that China cannot even become a hegemon in Asia, let alone the world; Third is the issue of Taiwan, which remans China’s priority, and which will always be a distraction; and fourthly, last but not least, the Chinese political model is unattractive to everyone else. The reaction of most nations when confronted by the Chinese model is, “Thank you, but No thank you”. In this situation the likely scenario for the rest of this century is likely to be the absence of a global hegemon, and the rise, or consolidation of strong big powers, assisted by smaller but not insignificant regional powers, with areas of competition, where conflict is likely as big powers, assisted by regional powers, fight each other through proxies.  One can argue that Artificial Intelligence and other high tech developments might change all these consideration, but this is an area where big powers and important regional powers are already competing aggressively. Finally, despite all the justified pessimism can one still have hope in international institutions. On Tuesday (26 May), the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will hold a high-level open debate on “Upholding the Purposes and Principles of the UN Charter and Strengthening the UN-Centred International System”. It is a Chinese initiative, coinciding with their chairmanship of the Council in May. Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi will chair the meeting, during which UN Secretary-General António Guterres is expected to brief. It is good that countries ponder this topic, but world opinion must be more vocal in making the case for multilateralism. The empire system must not be reconstructed in any form. (click the image to read the full Monday Commentary)