South Caucasus

The territorial conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has never been a purely inter-state matter between the two countries. Since the beginning of the conflict in its post-Soviet period, neighboring big powers like Russia and Iran sought to manipulate the conflict and use it as an instrument for their parochial regional interests. It is a well-documented fact that Armenia succeeded to occupy the Azerbaijani territories thanks to military and political support of Russia. Likewise, it was thanks to the Russian support that Armenia was able to consolidate its control over the Karabakh region and adjacent Azerbaijani districts. The conflict has always been a critical tool for Russia to exert influence on Azerbaijan and keep Armenia under control.

"It seems that talks over the future of Nagorno Karabakh have reached an impasse. Azerbaijan claims there will be no Nagorno Karabakh inside Azerbaijan, and Armenians should live as ordinary Azerbaijani citizens. At the same time, those who do not want to accept this option should leave. Armenians of Nagorno Karabakh categorically reject this option, meanwhile stating that they will not leave their homeland", says Benyamin Poghosyan in this op-ed for commonspace.eu "Currently, it is challenging to offer an option that may more or less satisfy both Azerbaijan and NKR. However, one thing is clear: new large-scale war in Nagorno Karabakh will make long-term peace and stability in the South Caucasus a pipe dream. Thus, all actors interested in a stable region should message Azerbaijan that a new war against Nagorno Karabakh is not the best option to move forward. Otherwise, the region will plunge into another decade of instability, destruction, and human suffering", Poghosyan argues 

Despite the sweltering heat, officials in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia appeared to have taken little if any vacations this summer. The usual exodus to the beaches, or to cool mountain resorts, sometimes stretching from mid-July to mid-September, simply did not happen. In one capital, one observer commented that officials were at their desks throughout the summer. An air of uncertainty prevailed over the region. Low-intensity border clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan threatened the fragile peace process. More dead and injured were added to the long list of victims of this conflict. Azerbaijan’s decision to assert its control over the Lachin corridor that connects the Armenian population of Karabakh to Armenia created hardships for the Karabakh Armenians, who on their part refuse to be supplied through alternative Azerbaijani routes. Inside Karabakh the political turmoil finally ended the fate of the de facto president, Arayik Harutyunyan, who resigned this week, adding to the instability. A meeting of the UN Security Council on 16 August discussed the Lachin issue. Concern was expressed by UNSC members, and most called on Azerbaijan to restore unhindered movement across the Lachin Corridor. But there was no consensus on a resolution, or even a Statement. In Georgia, summer ended as it started, with a permanent stand-off between the governing “Georgian Dream” party and the fractured opposition. The issue of whether or not Georgia will get EU candidate status before the end of the year continued to dominate the political discourse. Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili, whose constitutional powers are mostly ceremonial, defied government advice and travelled to Europe at the beginning of September for talks with European leaders, who rolled out the red carpet to her. But in Tbilisi, the governing party started impeachment proceedings against her. They are likely to fail because the government is not able to muster the necessary votes needed in the parliament. Some simply dismiss the summer shenanigans as part of the usual South Caucasus political fare. Unfortunately, there is more to it than that, and the restless summer may be the harbinger of a very difficult autumn.

Georgia has long been an obvious choice for hosting most Track II initiatives that bring Armenians and Azerbaijanis together on neutral ground. Despite this, however, it rarely gets the credit it deserves for doing so. Bordering both Armenia and Azerbaijan, not only is it perfectly situated geographically, keeping travel and accommodation costs lower, but it also keeps such initiatives in the region.

The first South Caucasus Youth Peace Summer School (SCYPSS) was held successfully in Kachreti, Georgia from 21-31 August 2023. Thirty young participants aged between 21 and 29, ten each from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia participated in the Summer School. At the end of the Summer School participants also attended the South Caucasus Regional Dialogue Forum. The School and the Forum were organised by LINKS Europe, with the support of the European Union and the Government of Norway.

The South Caucasus has consistently occupied a pivotal position within Turkish foreign policy. This significance has been underscored by Türkiye's deepening influence in the region, a trend that has gained momentum especially in the wake of the Second Karabakh War. With the recent re-election of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to the Presidency of the country, it is certain that Ankara will continue its active engagement in the South Caucasus. However, a nuanced analysis is imperative to fully grasp the multi-pronged approach that Türkiye has adopted in its dealings with this region. This strategy involves complex engagements with Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, offering a perspective through which the intricate web of geopolitical challenges can be unraveled. In this op-ed for commonspace.eu, Simona Scotti says that "this dynamic foreign policy stance also underscores the significance of the South Caucasus in extending Turkish influence to Central Asia.  In recent years, the growing importance of this region has garnered significant attention, not only for Türkiye but also for Europe. Situated at the crossroads of continents, Central Asia has emerged as a hub of economic potential, strategic significance, and cultural exchange. Türkiye, with its historical ties and shared Turkic heritage, recognizes the value of strengthening its relations with Central Asian countries. Consequently, the South Caucasus assumes a pivotal role in Türkiye's efforts to foster deeper diplomatic, economic, and cultural connections with Central Asia, ultimately benefiting both Türkiye and Europe by promoting regional cooperation and diversification of partnerships."

Delays in signing an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement open the prospects that the process may be derailed as a result of domestic politics. Next month, Yerevan will go to the polls to indirectly elect a new mayor. The parliamentary opposition is boycotting the vote, and a large number of voters remain apathetic or undecided, but the vote can still be seen as demonstrative enough ahead of the 2026 national parliamentary elections. In this op-ed for commonspace.eu, Onnik James Krikorian argues that Pashinyan foes are already attempting to turn the 17 September 2023 vote into a ‘referendum’ on Armenia-Azerbaijan talks and former de facto State Minister of Karabakh Ruben Vardanyan has called for the same. If Karabakh does dominate the campaign trail, and if Pashinyan’s Civil Contract can emerge victorious with no major abuse of administrative resources recorded, then there would hardly be any political reason not to sign a peace agreement in the nearest future. But if the government were to lose City Hall as 2025 and 2026 approaches, then that would look even less certain. For now, that does not appear likely, but what happens next month could greatly influence Pashinyan’s options in the weeks, months, and years ahead.