Region

Global

Stories in this section cover various issues and stories from all around the world.

Editor's choice
Opinion
Opinion: The US strikes Venezuela, Consequences for Ukraine and Europe

Opinion: The US strikes Venezuela, Consequences for Ukraine and Europe

This is a Flash Analysis published on 3 January 2026 by the European Policy Centre in Brussels. Chris Kremidas-Courtney is a Senior Visiting Fellow at the European Policy Centre. As 2026 barely takes its first breath, we are already drifting back into an age where great powers manage their own neighbourhoods and look away from everyone else’s. It’s a world order that prizes control over legitimacy and stability over justice until neither one survives. The most immediate consequence of the US strike on Venezuela may be felt not in Latin America, but first in Ukraine. As foreshadowed in the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy, Washington is intent on rooting its power firmly in the Western Hemisphere while potentially leaving Russia and China greater freedom of action in their ‘backyards’. Seen through this lens, the strike on Venezuela looks more like part of a broader reversion to regional spheres of influence. The emerging message is that the United States will enforce primacy close to home but its willingness to underwrite security beyond its hemisphere is increasingly transactional and politically fragile. This is a 21st century version of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, in which US hemispheric dominance was paired with strategic disengagement from Europe’s wars. It is also the world Putin has long argued for. It is hard to see an upside for Europe, but there may be one small silver lining. Prior to the strike, Caracas had been demonstrating how a sanctioned regime could survive and adapt by embedding itself into alternative economic and financial networks backed by China, Russia and Iran. That resilience was undermining the credibility of sanctions as a systemic tool, on which the EU relies far more heavily than the United States. By decapitating the Maduro regime, Washington has reasserted that sanctions are not an end state, but a step on an escalation ladder that can still culminate in the use of force. Yet this restoration of the credibility of sanctions comes at a great cost. It risks signalling to other revisionist or embattled regimes that force is the ultimate arbiter. All eyes are now on Moscow, since, as former US National Security Council official Fiona Hill testified in 2019, Russia had informally offered to end its support for Venezuela in exchange for US acquiescence on Ukraine.  Meanwhile, online advocates in China are calling on their regime to emulate the US and take similar steps against Taiwan. Worse still, Venezuela is now politically hollowed out. Any opposition figure who emerges now could be instantly labelled a US proxy. It is not yet clear what the thinking is in Washington about the day after, but the precedents of Iraq and Afghanistan are not encouraging. Once again, Washington has demonstrated its ability to act decisively – but also reminded us of its lack of staying power. For Ukraine, that distinction may prove fatal unless Europe can step up and support Kyiv more decisively in 2026.

Filter archive

Publication date
Editor's choice
Opinion
Opinion: The future of the China-US-Russia triangle after Pelosi's visit to Taiwan

Opinion: The future of the China-US-Russia triangle after Pelosi's visit to Taiwan

Since February 24, 2022, the international community's focus was concentrated entirely on the war in Ukraine and the growing Russia – West confrontation. It seemed that nothing could change the situation until the end of hostilities in Ukraine. However, on August 2 and 3, almost everyone’s attention shifted from Ukraine to Taiwan. As the Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, stated her intention to visit Taiwan, up to half a million people were watching the trajectory of her plane on air flight tracking sites. The negative reaction of China, including the warning of President Xi during his conversation with President Biden that those who played with fire would be perished by it, created hype around this visit. Many were discussing the possibility of Chinese military jets closing the airspace over Taiwan and preventing Pelosi’s plane from landing in Taiwan, while some enthusiasts were even contemplating the possibility of a US-China direct military clash. As Pelosi landed in Taiwan and met with the Taiwanese President, the global social media was full of amateur assessments about the strategic victory of the US and the confirmation of the US global hegemony. However, as the dust settles down, and information noise and manipulation eventually decreases, a more serious assessment is needed to understand the real consequences of this visit.
Editor's choice
Opinion
Opinion: The US strikes Venezuela, Consequences for Ukraine and Europe

Opinion: The US strikes Venezuela, Consequences for Ukraine and Europe

This is a Flash Analysis published on 3 January 2026 by the European Policy Centre in Brussels. Chris Kremidas-Courtney is a Senior Visiting Fellow at the European Policy Centre. As 2026 barely takes its first breath, we are already drifting back into an age where great powers manage their own neighbourhoods and look away from everyone else’s. It’s a world order that prizes control over legitimacy and stability over justice until neither one survives. The most immediate consequence of the US strike on Venezuela may be felt not in Latin America, but first in Ukraine. As foreshadowed in the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy, Washington is intent on rooting its power firmly in the Western Hemisphere while potentially leaving Russia and China greater freedom of action in their ‘backyards’. Seen through this lens, the strike on Venezuela looks more like part of a broader reversion to regional spheres of influence. The emerging message is that the United States will enforce primacy close to home but its willingness to underwrite security beyond its hemisphere is increasingly transactional and politically fragile. This is a 21st century version of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, in which US hemispheric dominance was paired with strategic disengagement from Europe’s wars. It is also the world Putin has long argued for. It is hard to see an upside for Europe, but there may be one small silver lining. Prior to the strike, Caracas had been demonstrating how a sanctioned regime could survive and adapt by embedding itself into alternative economic and financial networks backed by China, Russia and Iran. That resilience was undermining the credibility of sanctions as a systemic tool, on which the EU relies far more heavily than the United States. By decapitating the Maduro regime, Washington has reasserted that sanctions are not an end state, but a step on an escalation ladder that can still culminate in the use of force. Yet this restoration of the credibility of sanctions comes at a great cost. It risks signalling to other revisionist or embattled regimes that force is the ultimate arbiter. All eyes are now on Moscow, since, as former US National Security Council official Fiona Hill testified in 2019, Russia had informally offered to end its support for Venezuela in exchange for US acquiescence on Ukraine.  Meanwhile, online advocates in China are calling on their regime to emulate the US and take similar steps against Taiwan. Worse still, Venezuela is now politically hollowed out. Any opposition figure who emerges now could be instantly labelled a US proxy. It is not yet clear what the thinking is in Washington about the day after, but the precedents of Iraq and Afghanistan are not encouraging. Once again, Washington has demonstrated its ability to act decisively – but also reminded us of its lack of staying power. For Ukraine, that distinction may prove fatal unless Europe can step up and support Kyiv more decisively in 2026.
Editor's choice
Event
Happy New Year 2026

Happy New Year 2026

The Editorial Board and contributors of commonspace.eu extend their best wishes for the New Year 2026 to all our readers and subscribers across the world. It has been our pleasure to provide you in 2025 with news, opinions and analysis. In 2026 commonspace.eu celebrates its 15th anniversary. We will continue to be a platform for diverse views and opinions, but always committed to work for peace and justice across the world. Happy New Year
Editor's choice
Opinion
John Simpson: "I've reported on 40 wars but I've never seen a year like 2025"

John Simpson: "I've reported on 40 wars but I've never seen a year like 2025"

John Simpson is the BBC's World Affairs editor, and one of its most experienced journalists. In this sombre and candid article for BBC InDepth Simpson says "I've reported on 40 wars but I've never seen a year like 2025". commonspace.eu is republishing the article in full because of its importance:
Editor's choice
News
Not quite there yet!

Not quite there yet!

The presidents of Ukraine and the United States were both upbeat after their talks on Sunday (28 December), but clearly there is yet no agreement on how to end the war in Ukraine. Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky said progress had been made during Florida talks but the US president admitted the problem of territory remained "unresolved". While both the US and Ukrainian presidents described the talks as "great", Trump said "one or two very thorny issues" remained outstanding - most notably on the issue of land. Addressing reporters at Mar-a-Lago, Zelensky said they had come to an agreement on "90%" of the 20-point peace plan, while Trump said a security guarantee for Ukraine was "close to 95%" done. Zelensky later said US and Ukrainian teams would meet next week for further talks on issues aimed at ending Russia's nearly four-year war in Ukraine. "We had a substantive conversation on all issues and highly value the progress that the Ukrainian and American teams have made over the past weeks," Zelensky said in a statement on the Telegram messaging app. Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and Moscow currently controls about 20% of Ukrainian territory. A proposal to turn the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine, which Russia largely controls, into a demilitarised zone remains "unresolved", Trump said. "Some of that land has been taken," he told reporters after the meeting. "Some of that land is maybe up for grabs, but it may be taken over the next period of a number of months." Moscow currently controls about 75% of the Donetsk region, and some 99% of the neighbouring Luhansk. The regions are collectively known as Donbas. Russia wants Ukraine to pull back from the small part of the territory it still controls in Donbas, while Kyiv has insisted the area could become a free economic zone policed by Ukrainian forces. The US president has repeatedly changed his own position on Ukraine's lost territories, and in September stunned observers by suggesting that Ukraine might be able to take it back. He later reversed course. "[That] is a very tough issue," he said. "One that will get resolved." Security guarantees for Ukraine are "95% done", Trump said, without formally committing to logistical support or troop deployment to help protect Ukraine from future attacks. Trump floated the possibility of trilateral talks between the US, Russia, and Ukraine, saying it could happen "at the right time". Immediately after their bilateral talks, Trump and Zelensky held a one hour meeting with European leaders. European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, wrote on X "We had a good hour-long conversation with President Trump and Zelensky. Several European leaders were present and discussed future peace talks. Good progress has been made. Europe stands ready to work with its partners to consolidate this."