Next year’s parliamentary elections in Armenia will not focus on the economy or other domestic issues, but rather on the country’s place in the surrounding region and relations with its neighbours. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, down but not out following military defeat and political upheaval, has staked his future on reaching what would prove to be a historic peace agreement with Azerbaijan. But with public trust at an all-time low, disillusionment among the electorate could make this the most unpredictable vote since independence was declared in 1991. Armenia will hold parliamentary elections on 7 June 2026, its first regularly scheduled national vote since April 2017. In this analysis for commonspace.eu, Onnik James Krikorian argues that "ten months before the vote, the outcome still remains difficult to predict. Though it still seems most likely that the incumbent will win, a great deal will also be determined during the official campaign period itself, and new developments on the ground. If peace with Azerbaijan is finally within reach, and there are signs that this is the case, it will be difficult for voters to reject stability instead of insecurity and the further risk of war. Ultimately, the 2026 election will determine not just who governs Armenia, but whether the country can finally emerge from decades of conflict and semi-regional isolation, or if it is destined to remain trapped by it." He adds, "that might prove enough to sway even reluctant support for Pashinian at the ballot box. The opposition has still yet to offer any viable alternative – or even one at all."

“You must be glad to be here,” the bartender told my friend, a journalist for a major international media outlet just arrived that evening in Yerevan from Baku via Tbilisi. He raised an eyebrow in response as the bartender slowly poured our drinks. “Why?” he asked, clearly confused. “Because Azerbaijanis are Muslims, they don’t drink, and there are no bars in Baku,” she replied, somehow absolutely convinced that she was correct. The exchange was almost comical, but revealed something deeper. Three decades of conflict had turned former neighbours into strangers. In Tbilisi, where ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis live side by side, it would be met with ridicule. Only last October I sat at a table where the vodka flowed as a local Armenian sang in Azerbaijani and ethnic Azerbaijanis expressed their appreciation in Armenian.

It is now 31 years since I first travelled from London to the South Caucasus to report from what was then Nagorno Karabakh. Since then, I’ve covered almost every dimension of the conflict. From the Azerbaijani POWs and civilian hostages I encountered on my first trip to Karabakh in 1994, through the ethnic Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan struggling to rebuild their lives in Armenia that same year and then from 1999, and the lingering danger of landmines and unexploded ordnance that plagued the seven formerly occupied regions of Azerbaijan surrounding Karabakh throughout the 2000s. They still claim lives today.

As diplomatic efforts to resolve the long-running conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan once again make headlines, the real challenge lies not in high-level meetings or momentary gestures, but in the unfortunate disconnect between the elites and the populations they represent. For almost thirty years, press release after press release declared that talks inched towards peace. Hopes were premature. The sides will next month mark the anniversary of the last war fought five years ago.

Uncertainty has again emerged along the Armenia-Iran border as the risk of the long-standing conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan turning into further geopolitical competition continues. What was once a post-war localised disagreement over territory and sovereignty is now entangled in a web of regional interests and strategic manoeuvring. Increasingly, peace risks being shaped less by the needs of local populations but more by the calculations of distant capitals. External interference has rather delayed progress almost five years since the 2020 war. If peace is the objective, then the region needs inclusive not selective diplomacy and definitely not new geopolitical fault lines.

For the first time in 31 years of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, the situation feels more unpredictable than ever. In the past, there was a grim certainty that another war would erupt just as it did in September 2020 while peace, on the other hand, always seemed distant. In recent weeks, comments from U.S. President Donald Trump that it was almost a done deal simply solicited disagreement among analysts and political commentators.  As if that wasn’t confusion enough, and although both Baku and Yerevan have said that the 10 July meeting between the leaders in Abu Dhabi was constructive, another issue has emerged unexpectedly to distract and deflect attention.

Depending on whom you ask, last week’s meeting between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Abu Dhabi was either a historic development or simply another routine step in the still-fragile peace process. In an interview with Slovak media prior to the talks last week, Azerbaijani presidential advisor Hikmet Hajiyev even claimed the conflict between the sides is now over. Both sides believed that they were now the closest to formalising a peace treaty than at any time before.

Bagrat Galstanyan, the hardline cleric who led street protests against the start of border demarcation between Armenia and Azerbaijan and called for the resignation or impeachment of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, has been placed in pre-trial detention for two months. More than a dozen others have also been detained, with that number expected to rise. They are accused of plotting a coup ahead of next year's parliamentary elections, following the publication by pro-Pashinyan media of an alleged seven-page document detailing the plan.