Yemen

Stories continue to emerge of ongoing gross abuses by the Yemeni Houthi movement against Yemeni civil society activists in the capital Sanaa, and in other areas under their control. This week, three well-known Yemeni YouTubers have been kidnapped by Houthis in Sanaa, as the militia steps up its crackdown on online influencers who expose its leaders’ flaws, according to the newspaper Arab News, published on Wednesday,(4 January). Activists reported that Houthis abducted Mustafa Al-Mumari, Hamoud Al-Mesbahi, and Ahmed Elaw for posting videos on social media which support prominent YouTuber Ahmed Hajar, who was seized from a Sanaa street more than 10 days ago. The social media posts also criticized widespread corruption and the failure to address famine. Al-Mumari is a popular social media personality in Yemen with more than 2 million YouTube subscribers and tens of thousands of Facebook fans. The Houthi's, a militant group supported by Iran, seized control of the Yemeni capital Sanaa, and large swaths of the country's territory in 2014 and unseated the legitimate government, resulting in a civil war that neither side appears able to win.

In this first article in a series of three pieces about different aspects of the Yemeni diaspora, Hisham Almahdi discusses the history, development and nature of the global Yemeni diaspora, and notes how its varying waves and changes have impacted all three. There are about 6-7 million Yemenis spread across the six continents, at least according to Mohammed Al-Adil, Yemen's deputy minister of expatriates, and several other official and unofficial sources. Compared to Yemen’s total population of over 30 million, the size of the diaspora is indeed significant, although it is unclear whether the diaspora is included in the overall population count. Almost half of the diaspora (3 million Yemenis) live in Gulf countries, mostly Saudi Arabia, where Yemenis, alongside their South Asian counterparts, make up the backbone of the oil producing nations' labour force. Other estimates report that the number of Yemenis in Egypt is somewhere between 500-900 thousand, with another 58,600 and 12,000 Yemeni nationals in the US and UK respectively. This is not to mention second- and third-generation migrants who have been abroad for decades, as well as tens of thousands in countries like Djibouti, Malaysia, Turkey, and Jordan. 

Fighting has broken out across different parts of Yemen after Houthi rebels, who at the moment control large chunks of the country, including the capital, Sanaa, refused to agree to a renewal of a UN brokered truce which lapsed on Sunday (2 October). The fiercest battles took place outside the central city of Marib and in Al-Fakher area of Dhale province, where the Houthis barraged government forces with mortar rounds, cannonballs, tanks and drones fitted with explosives. UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg said on Sunday that the UN-brokered truce, which went into effect on April 2 and was renewed twice, would not be renewed a third time. The failure to renew it sparked outrage and criticism, primarily directed at the Houthis, as the truce has significantly reduced violence in Yemen, allowed Sanaa airport to reopen and made it possible for dozens of fuel ships to dock at Hodeidah port. There is also fear that the end of the truce will also renew Houthi attacks on neighbouring Arab countries. The Houthi military spokesman, Yahya Saree, has already issued a warning to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have been targeted in the past with missile attacks. “The [Houthi] armed forces give oil companies operating in the UAE and Saudi Arabia an opportunity to organise their situation and leave,” Saree tweeted.

One of the several, often overlooked, challenges facing Yemen is the supremacist and divisive ideological basis of the Houthi movement. The movement’s ideology has rebellion and violence at its core, a recipe that can perpetuate crises within a society. In this analysis for commonspace.eu, Noman Ahmed and Mahmoud Shamsan shed light on the ideological fault lines that fuel the current conflict in Yemen, highlighting the nature of this ideology, which suggests that Ahl al-Bayt — descendants from the family of the Islamic Prophet — are, by divine decree, considered to be more deserving of the right to greater political and religious rule than other socio-political components. The analysis then looks into the background of the Houthis and argues that the ideology is a catalyst for conflict rather than peaceful political competition, and that so long as the Houthi political goal of Hashemite dominance remains unrealised, Houthi desire for conflict will not recede.

The UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy to Yemen Hans Grundberg has intensified contacts with all local and regional parties to support the implementation of the remaining clauses in Yemen's soon to expire truce. Grunderberg hopes that the truce can be extended beyond the current term which ends on 2 August.  Grundberg acknowledged that there were shortcomings in the full implementation of the truce but stressed repeatedly that the truce helped make a significant impact on people's lives. Read the full press release here.  On the thorny question of the opening of the Taiz road, Grunderb noted that dialogue and coordination between the two sides needs to continue. He added that unilateral actions do not help provide a safe passage for goods and travellers.  Sources speaking to the publication The New Arab suggested that the UN is seeking a six month extension of the truce. The Special Envoy, however, has to first address complaints from both sides. It is expected that he visits both Muscat and Aden in the coming days.  On another note, forces loyal to Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) which heads the internationally recognised Yemeni government, are said to be preparing for the next wave of battles. Around 14 thousand fighters, divided into three brigades and supported by Saudi Arabia, have completed training and are on stand by in areas under the government's control. The brigades, known as 'Happy Yemen Brigades' are believed to be an extension to forces that engaged in battles in early 2022 before the truce went into effect.  Currently, those brigades are tasked with security and protection missions and it is not clear if they will be assigned any frontline duties.