Tensions between Azerbaijan and Russia have been on an escalatory track since the crash of the Azerbaijani Airlines commercial airplane in December 2024. In the past, similar disputes were usually resolved quickly, leaving little lasting impact. This time, however, the crisis is far more complex and shows no signs of de-escalation. On the contrary, almost every month since the crash has marked new record lows in Baku–Moscow relations and appears likely to have a lasting impact on future bilateral ties. The situation has become so intricate and unpredictable that further deterioration cannot be ruled out.
Since the airplane crash, relations have been marred by a series of negative developments: Russian cyberattacks on Azerbaijani media, the closure of the Russian Cultural Center and Sputnik’s office in Baku, the last-minute cancellation of President Ilham Aliyev’s trip to Moscow’s Victory Parade, raids targeting ethnic Azerbaijanis in Russia, and Baku’s furious response to those raids. The new round of tensions has been triggered by Russia’s drone attacks against the Azerbaijani energy facilities in Ukraine.
On August 5, the Orlovka gas compressor station, key for reverse-flow gas to Ukraine, was hit by a Russian drone strike. A couple of days later on August 8, Iranian-supplied Shahed drones struck SOCAR’s storage facility in Ukraine’s Odessa region, sparking a large fire and damaging a diesel pipeline. On August 10, Presidents Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Aliyev spoke by phone to condemn the attacks, and Aliyev soon signed a decree providing $2 million in humanitarian aid to help rebuild the damaged facilities. This was followed by another, more sizeable attack on August 18, when a Russian drone strike completely destroyed the oil depot of SOCAR, with 15 drones launched at the facility, according to various reports.
Beyond the immediate material damage, these attacks signaled Moscow’s willingness to strike Azerbaijani-linked assets abroad, sending a geopolitical message of intimidation at a moment when Baku has deepened its engagement with the West. For the Azerbaijani media, it was no coincidence that the second attack took place several hours after the Washington meeting of Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders via the mediation of President Donald Trump on August 8. In the meantime, Azerbaijani media outlets close to the government as well as some parliamentarians floated the idea of sending weapons to Ukraine – at least to provide protection against the energy facilities of Azerbaijan.
Indeed, Azerbaijan’s role in Ukraine’s energy security has grown in recent months. In addition to operating around 60 petrol-filling stations in Ukraine, SOCAR has recently reached an agreement to export natural gas to the country. While the volume of Azerbaijani gas imports is relatively small, it will play a critical role in Kyiv’s efforts to ensure energy security amid ongoing attacks from Russia. The Russian drone strikes on Azerbaijani energy facilities appear intended to intimidate Azerbaijan and discourage such cooperation with Ukraine. In parallel, Russia’s security services continue to detain and arrest ethnic Azerbaijanis with different declared reasons.
It is clear that the current state of Russia-Azerbaijan relations is not beneficial to either country. Azerbaijan has traditionally maintained balanced relations between major powers, particularly between Russia and the West. Baku carefully preserved this balance following the military operations in Karabakh in 2020 and 2023, successfully restoring the country’s territorial integrity and securing the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the formerly occupied territories in 2024. This balanced geopolitical stance has enabled productive cooperation with Moscow across various sectors, including the North-South transport corridor, which remains critical for Russia amid disruptions in other transportation routes.
However, the developments over the past 8 months since the airplane crash and Russia’s perceived inadequate reaction have pushed Azerbaijan away from Russia. In an interview with American media on August 8, President Aliyev reiterated Azerbaijan’s earlier demands. “The only thing that we demanded was to admit that, punish those who committed that crime, even if it was not intentional, and pay compensation to the victims and to the airline,” he underlined. The fact that Russia dismissed these demands rather negatively affected bilateral relations and paved the path for further deterioration.
It is therefore no coincidence that Baku agreed with the American proposal concerning the Zangezur corridor and the involvement of the United States as the security provider to the corridor rather than Russia as envisaged in the earlier agreements. The distrust between the two countries cannot be easily overcome without a genuine commitment from Russia to a mutually respectful and equal partnership. While official interactions – such as the potentially upcoming intergovernmental commission on economic cooperation – are important to maintain dialogue, it is unlikely that Baku and Moscow will resolve the current crisis without addressing its root causes.
The cumulative effect of these developments has led Azerbaijan to accelerate its diversification of security and economic partnerships. Baku has increasingly strengthened ties with the United States, the European Union, and China, seeking assurances that go beyond rhetoric. At the same time, Azerbaijan has expanded its cooperation with Ukraine in energy and logistics, signaling that it will no longer allow Moscow’s actions to dictate its foreign policy choices. This realignment, while pragmatic from Baku’s perspective, is likely to further strain the already fragile Russia-Azerbaijan relationship.
In response, Russia appears to be recalibrating its approach, oscillating between punitive measures and limited engagement, but with little indication of a long-term strategic shift that could restore trust. Moscow’s attempts to maintain influence through economic leverage (e.g. imports of Azerbaijani agricultural products) have thus far failed to produce meaningful results, and its hard-power demonstrations – such as the drone strikes and pressure on ethnic Azerbaijanis in Russia – have only reinforced Baku’s wariness. The lack of mutual understanding and the perception of one-sided expectations make it increasingly improbable that normal relations can be restored in the near term.
That said, Russia-Azerbaijan relations are entering a prolonged period of instability with deep structural challenges. Unless both sides engage in a serious reassessment of the relationship with respect for sovereignty and equality, the downward trajectory in bilateral ties is poised to continue, with consequences for regional stability and the broader geopolitical balance in the South Caucasus.
