The Yemeni Diaspora: An analysis of its history, development, and nature

In this first article in a series of three pieces about different aspects of the Yemeni diaspora, Hisham Almahdi discusses the history, development and nature of the global Yemeni diaspora, and notes how its varying waves and changes have impacted all three. The second article can be read here, and the third article in this series will be published in due course.

There are about 6-7 million Yemenis spread across the six continents, at least according to Mohammed Al-Adil, Yemen's deputy minister of expatriates, and several other official and unofficial sources. Compared to Yemen’s total population of over 30 million, the size of the diaspora is indeed significant, although it is unclear whether the diaspora is included in the overall population count. Almost half of the diaspora (3 million Yemenis) live in Gulf countries, mostly Saudi Arabia, where Yemenis, alongside their South Asian counterparts, make up the backbone of the oil producing nations' labour force. Other estimates report that the number of Yemenis in Egypt is somewhere between 500-900 thousand, with another 58,600 and 12,000 Yemeni nationals in the US and UK respectively. This is not to mention second- and third-generation migrants who have been abroad for decades, as well as tens of thousands in countries like Djibouti, Malaysia, Turkey, and Jordan. 

This article will attempt to offer a new analytical perspective on the nature of this widely-spread diaspora, and discuss how in the past decade it has been linked to and continues to interact with its original community back home, and how the diaspora is structured and operates. This analysis will navigate the subject by taking into account the complicated socioeconomic circumstances that the diaspora finds itself in - and at times even caused by it - as well as looking at the various organisational groups that make up the Yemeni diaspora.

Before exploring the role of the diaspora, however, this analysis needs to establish some basic details, and from three main angles: firstly, how many migrants there are and where they are located; secondly, who are the ones to have made it across international borders and what were the circumstances surrounding their various immigration waves; and finally, what were the important distinctions between the periods of these migrations, and how they affected the behavioural tendencies of the migrants.

Image
Yemenis

History and Nature

A relatively important distinction to make is between the different eras of migrations in Yemen’s recent history, as they affected migrants’ nature as well as their destinations. A pivotal year was 2014, when the Houthi militia took over the country after a coup that ignited the war that has now lasted for eight years. The distinction here is not between refugees and migrants, but rather the type of people who migrated and their host countries.  

Until 2014, Yemeni migrants were mainly workers, mostly traders and labourers (or economic migrants, as some might say) who preferred countries like Saudi Arabia, where they could spend years doing hard and even humiliating work but all the while benefitting from favourable currency exchange rates, sending almost all their money back to their families in Yemen. This money was and still is an important asset for the Yemeni economy as it amounts to anything between 4 and 8 billion dollars yearly, and provides income for millions across the country. Those who considered moving to the western hemisphere preferred countries like the US and the UK, largely due to language, the countries’ general societal reputation or people’s perception of them, and the relative ease with which one could acquire citizenship. The latter made it easier to invite other family members, or even to give citizenship to other families through “economic marriage”; that is to say, money in exchange for a new passport. Other migrants with different backgrounds existed as well, but this general case shows how the nature of the diaspora was unique back then, especially compared to how it became after the war.

Things started to change dramatically after 2014. Political activists, politicians, professionals (especially doctors and engineers), as well as the upper classes started to flee the country, first heading to Malaysia and Jordan, as they were two of the few countries to offer Yemenis visa-free entry after all embassies shut their doors in 2015. This wave then reached Turkey, Europe, Egypt, Canada, and many other countries all over the world. This change was mainly due to the difficulties that accompany fleeing and residing in a different country, both on the financial and bureaucratic levels.  

On the one hand, the outside world was not accessible for most Yemenis, not only because of the economic situation placing half the country under the poverty line, or even because most of the population (about 62%) resides in rural areas with little to no public services and seriously limited social mobility. Any potential ways out were hard in themselves and made harder due to changes seen throughout the years, before and after the war. Rather, the geographic location of Yemen locks it between Gulf countries (who are parties in the war themselves), other Arab countries that have conflicts of their own, and the Red Sea. Any destinations beyond the immediate neighbourhood became even harder to reach due to visa acquisition regulations so complicated that it was sometimes even impossible to get a visa.  

The Trump administration, for example, placed Yemen on a list of seven Muslim-majority countries that were banned from the US, separating families and causing great economic losses for those who could not return. Europe, on the other hand, already had a very complicated visa-application procedure, which became even harder after transferring Yemeni cases to the embassies in Oman and several other countries, which then only accepted certain types of visa applications, like those for students. Even then, students needed a blocked bank account with about 10,000 euros, which is not something anybody could pull off, let alone take the risk of travelling to a different country just to apply for a visa which has a high refusal rate. Tourist and medical visas were, mostly, not even taken into consideration for a long time, mainly due to the fear that Yemenis could apply for asylum once they arrived in Europe.  

Moreover, the cost of flights skyrocketed as the national airline “Yemenia” was the only operating airline from 2015, a monopoly that the company exploited by making a simple five-hour trip cost well over a thousand dollars. Adding to all that is the decline of the currency (the Yemeni Rial) as the black market took over, doubling exchange rates and halving the value of local income, pushing up inflation.

All of this means that even if a single Yemeni individual, let alone a family, decides to flee the country, they will most likely not have any viable countries to go to. The road to Europe is too far to take a boat or to pay a smuggler to get in, and too expensive to even consider applying for and travelling to, not to mention even living in. The same goes for Canada and many other “developed”  countries. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia, which hosts about half of all Yemeni migrants, is gradually kicking them out and making their lives there sometimes impossibly difficult. Policies that expelled tens, and even hundreds of thousands of Yemenis after the Gulf war in 1991, continue today in the form of hostile nationalisation of the labour market and capital, forcing Yemenis to flee either back to Yemen, or along with their capital to countries like Turkey that welcome foreign investments.

As a result, Yemenis found themselves cornered. The majority that did not have or could not afford the means or the ways to flee found themselves among an estimated 4 million internally displaced Yemenis, in addition to thousands who had nowhere to go but East Africa, or had to stay put and suffer in silence. The minority that did have the means, however, went on to take over the diaspora and almost completely reshape its nature and behaviour. An important side note here is that the youth, especially students, were the main exception in this case, as many of them preferred sacrificing and selling everything they had for a chance of a better, safer future. Basing our analysis on these numbers and incidents helps us understand how this diaspora thinks and acts, and how its relationship to its home and people is formed.

Image
Yemen Protest Germany
Yemenis in Germany organise a sit-in demanding Houthis to allow access to safer tanker, August 2020

Organisational Bodies:

It is indeed essential to have a closer look at how Yemeni communities abroad tend to organise themselves, as organisational patterns seem to influence any role these groups could play. These organisational bodies tend to be similar among Yemeni communities throughout different countries, all sharing experiences, and regulating their activities using various organisational methods, thus allowing for a broader analysis. Among the most prevalent organisational methods, the following provide a general description that is true for most of the communities in the diaspora:

Communities:  

This broad term is often used to describe both organised entities as well as the collective  diaspora in a country, which can easily lead to confusion. In this case, we mean the former. Communities usually focus on connecting members of the diaspora, and in some cases acting as their representative with the authorities, as well as organising events and helping those in need. Contrary to common belief, there is no certainty of a unified Yemeni community in any given host country. A single country could have a couple of  communities that may or may not work together under a unified organisational entity. The main reason for this is usually when the various communities arrived in certain parts of a country, leading to the formation of communities local to their regions within a single country. However, what strengthens such separation is usually political partition and disputes, leading to communities working independently, and even countering the efforts of each other, especially on a political level, but also on organisational and service levels.

Unions:

Although mainly student unions, there are other unions for doctors, engineers, and others. These unions usually try to serve their members (and even non-members) by providing a wide range of services attending to their immediate needs, providing consultation, communicating with official institutions in the host countries, and organising events and courses. Unions have shown throughout the recent decade a potential exceeding that of communities, especially because of the new young blood regularly pumped into it, and thanks to a relative openness to the new society and country with which they engage. It must be mentioned, however, that this potential remains mostly untapped and very limited in its effect for similar reasons as the communities.

(Political) movements: 

These are the least organised of all. These movements are usually motivated by a wide range of causes, from supporting certain political parties, to creating new ones usually in the name of peacemaking, as well as feminist, nationalistic, humanitarian, and cultural movements. What sets these apart from unions and communities is their fragility and even absence of any organisational structures, the ambiguity of their goals and working mechanisms, idealism, and the frequency of their rise and fall.  

Political movements usually try to achieve some form of an impact on the ground. This could be through influencing public opinion, trying to influence the policymakers in the host countries, organising summits and discussions, and sometimes even starting some aid campaigns.  

Clubs: 

These are mostly intellectual and cultural, sometimes even athletic. These clubs are the smallest and most limited form of organisation for Yemenis in the diaspora. Clubs usually encounter more difficulties in attracting members, as there is a certain reluctance from the public to get involved in intellectual, academic and artistic activities for reasons that will be mentioned in subsequent pieces.  

The activities of clubs are mostly limited to regular meetings and intellectual cultural discussions in the best cases, and rarely produce any material deliverables like research papers, artworks, or informational/educational material etc.

source: Hisham Almahdi is a Yemeni national studying electrical engineering and IT in Munich, Germany
photo: Middle East Institute

Latest

Editor's choice
Monday Commentary
Monday Commentary: PEACE IN OUR TIME?

Monday Commentary: PEACE IN OUR TIME?

Making peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan was never going to be simple, nor easy, nor quick. It is taking time, writes Dennis Sammut in this Monday Commentary. “There is a sense of realism coming from the leaders of the two countries – President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan and prime minister Nikol Pashinyan of Armenia, that frankly, is necessary and welcome”, he writes. At a time when conflicts are raging all over the world – from Ukraine to the Gulf, from Africa to South Asia, the prospect that Armenia and Azerbaijan had finally, after decades of conflict that left thousands of dead and many more displaced, decided on embarking on a journey of peace was welcomed. Peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan can be top-down up to a point. Both leaders have spent political capital preparing for a peace deal. But both are aware that their people are not ready for peace yet. In fact, in Armenia, most of the elite are negative toward a peace deal with Azerbaijan. Pashinyan needs time to persuade his countryfolk. That is why 2031 is realistic. Ilham Aliyev runs a tighter shop, but he is also not immune to public opinion. Every time someone hits a landmine in Karabakh, which unfortunately happens often, peace comes into question. Which is why Aliyev chooses to sound hardline, more often than not. In pursuing the peace agenda, both Aliyev and Pashinyan need to proceed cautiously. But they are right in making peace the central issue in their agenda. It is the main issue, and the one that will define them in history. So forward, cautiously but resolutely! In pursuing the peace agenda, Aliyev and Pashinyan need to be supported clearly and unambiguously. There are too many people in Baku and Yerevan who are sitting on the sides, waiting. The international community is not doing enough. It is time to be counted. Otherwise, the spoilers will win, and the region will go back to its bad habits. (Click the image to read the full commentary).
Editor's choice
News
Ukraine Peace Talks Set to Expand as Russia and Europe Clash Over Post-war Security

Ukraine Peace Talks Set to Expand as Russia and Europe Clash Over Post-war Security

Ukraine and Russia could see European countries join the next round of peace negotiations, following talks between US special envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on Thursday (November 12). However, conflicting positions over European military involvement, Ukraine’s territorial future and the continent’s security arrangements highlight the difficulties facing the diplomatic process. Speaking after the meeting, Witkoff said European participation would be an important development, describing the countries concerned as key partners. Kushner also indicated that Washington had noticed a shift in European attitudes and believed their involvement would not obstruct progress. In a statement published on X, he said the expanded discussions would address broader European security arrangements alongside territorial disputes between Russia and Ukraine. The US envoys subsequently travelled to Dublin, where they met Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during a European summit. Zelenskyy welcomed the possibility of European participation and expressed hope that the negotiations would include measures to reduce tensions and establish ceasefires. He also reiterated the importance of European representation in decisions concerning the continent’s security. Moscow, however, has offered a more cautious interpretation of the proposed expansion. Putin's aide, Yuri Ushakov, suggested that European countries should first reconsider their military assistance to Kyiv, arguing that their current actions demonstrated an unwillingness to pursue peace. Putin similarly called on Washington to work with its European allies to establish whether they genuinely wanted peace or continued confrontation with Russia. The Russian president also rejected the prospect of European peacekeeping troops being deployed to Ukraine following a potential agreement, describing such a presence as a continuation of the war. His position reflects wider disagreements over the future European security architecture, with Moscow seeking discussions on the continent's broader security arrangements, while European leaders insist that such negotiations cannot replace a settlement of the war. Simultaneously, Zelenskyy raised concerns about disruptions to Starshield, the US-made satellite communications service used by Ukrainian forces. He described Washington’s discussions with Moscow about Europe's future security as unusual and warned against decisions that could undermine Ukraine's sovereignty. Despite the diplomatic activity, fighting continued. Russian drone attacks killed two people in Ukraine's Sumy region and injured five in Rivne, while a separate attack in Russia's Belgorod region killed one person and injured four. Ukrainian agricultural company Kernel Holding also suspended operations at all its oilseed extraction facilities following repeated Russian attacks.

Popular

Editor's choice
Monday Commentary
Monday Commentary: European-Azerbaijan relations need an intensive and multifaceted dialogue that is frank and honest

Monday Commentary: European-Azerbaijan relations need an intensive and multifaceted dialogue that is frank and honest

Last week I visited Baku, Azerbaijan. My visit was relatively short, but very intensive, and had many meetings with stakeholders and colleagues. When I arrived in Baku first time in 1996,  Azerbaijan was a different country: weak, poor, and shaken by defeat in war. For thirty year the Karabakh issue dominated the agenda: the political agenda but also the popular mindset. Now, thirty years later, Azerbaijan has returned to Karabakh, and peace with Armenia is on the horizon. It is a new era for Armenia-Azerbaijan relations, for the South Caucasus, but also for Europe.  But we cannot be complacent: the Peace agreement has been initialed but not signed; borders remain closed; TRIPP is ambitious but remains an idea; and there are spoilers who want to turn the clock back. We must not allow them, and in this Europe and Azerbaijan must work together. Europe’ vanguard organization is the European Union – it is a free union of 27 member states; it is a strong global economic force, and increasingly a diplomatic and military force too. But it remains “work in progress” and can often appear dysfunctional. It often lacks collective and institutional memory. In its dealings with Azerbaijan the EU has made many mistakes – not least opening the delegation here late – in 2008. It sometimes appears condescending. Some utterances from the European Parliament and from some quarters in some member states are not understandable even for me. They irritate the Azerbaijanis, but serve no other purpose But Azerbaijan has also not handled relations with the EU well. It has failed to respond when the hand of friendship reached out; and it confused irritating actions, sometimes by well-meaning people; sometimes by outright spoilers, with strategic action. In short, EU-Azerbaijan relations have suffered from a lack of proper dialogue. This dialogue must be frank, honest and multi-faceted involving different segments of society on both sides.   Is Azerbaijan Europe? When Azerbaijan applied to join the Council of Europe in the 1990s, there were some who opposed, saying this was not Europe. I was one of the people who argued that Armenia and Azerbaijan may be on the periphery of the continent geographically, but were European in essence. Certainly their elites. During the discussion on 4 September in Baku, my friend Farhad Mammedov, mentioned that Azerbaijan is not interested in joining the EU, and was now close to the Central Asian countries in the 5 plus 1 format. Neither things mean that Azerbaijan is not Europe. There are several European countries that are not in the EU, and do not want to be, for example Norway and Switzerland. Iceland has recently voted to stay out of the EU. The UK was a member and left. Europe is bigger than the EU, and the holding of the European Political Community summit in Baku in 2027 proves that. Despite all the rhetoric, I never heard the president of Azerbaijan  saying that Azerbaijan is not Europe, nor have I heard any European president say it either. Not wanting to join the EU and forging close relations with neighbouring regions does not make Azerbaijan any less European. It is only logical that when Europeans talk to Azerbaijan they talk like family. The conversation is often frank. It must also be honest, and Europeans need always to remember this too. A frank, honest and multi-faceted dialogue A frank, honest and multifaceted dialogue will contribute to relations between Azerbaijan and the rest of Europe: it will avoid misperception, which unfortunately is very common on both sides; it will provide a forum where problems can be discussed and resolved, and it will increase mutual trust, so that together common problems can be addressed. (click image to read the full Monday Commentary)
Editor's choice
Monday Commentary
Monday Commentary: “The barren rocks of Aden” and “These lands of Yemen are so ruthless”

Monday Commentary: “The barren rocks of Aden” and “These lands of Yemen are so ruthless”

There are two early 20th-century tunes that mark foreign attempts to occupy and “pacify” Yemen. The Scottish tune “The barren rocks of Aden” marks the mobilisation of Highland soldiers, enlisted to be deployed to the Yemeni port of Aden, that in 1837 became the last colony to be incorporated into the British Empire. The tune talks of the harshness of the terrain, but is celebratory, It was even played as a farewell tune to Sir William Luce at the parade in Sharjah celebrating his end as “British Viceroy” in the Middle East in 1966. The second tune is an Anatolian lament. As Ilker Sezer reminded us this weekend, in his weekly feature on “Turkiye Today”, it “mourns the tragic fate of Ottoman soldiers dispatched to the harsh, remote deserts of Yemen during the fall of the empire, young men who marched away from their villages and never returned home. Most of their names, and numbers, were never recorded. Yet, their fate left a mark on the Turkish psyche.” Subsequent invaders have discovered that Yemen is a grave that cannot be overcome by the strength of modern technology, and that whilst Yemeni society is splintered and divided, building a reliable alliance with Yemeni factions is difficult. These are the harsh lessons facing Saudi Arabia, as the Kingdom faces its biggest challenge in its modern history. The leadership of the Kingdom now has to respond decisively. At stake is their very credibility. This is likely to be a long and messy conflict. Saudi military objectives need to be focused: to box in the Houthis rather than destroy them. This is likely to include: (a) regaining territory lost on the Red Sea coast; (b) control over Bab el Mandeb Strait; (c) some kind of cordon sanitaire on the Saudi-Yemeni border; and if things go well (d) the capture of Sanaa. All this would not eliminate the Houthi problem, but it will contain it. In the end the Saudis will have to continue managing Yemen with a mixture of carrot and stick. For the moment, the stick is likely, but the carrot cannot be forgotten either. (click the image to read the Monday Commentary in full)