"The signing of the framework agreement between Armenia and the United States on the Trump Route for Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) on June 4, 2026, and the ruling Civil Contract party’s victory in Armenia’s June 7 parliamentary elections have opened a window of opportunity to advance Armenia-Türkiye normalization. Türkiye, in coordination with the United States, is well positioned to seize this moment and help move the region from frozen conflict toward normalization", write Dr Benyamin Poghosyan, in this article for the Turkish publication, "Global Panorama". He adds, "TRIPP emerged from the August 2025 Washington meeting, where Armenia and Azerbaijan also initialed a peace agreement, giving fresh momentum to regional normalization. Since then, TRIPP has been moving toward implementation. The framework agreement signed on June 4 established the basis for developing and operating the route. This was followed in early July by a visit from engineers from the U.S. consulting firm AECOM, who surveyed the proposed site for rail and other infrastructure development. On July 16, the Armenian government approved a draft law to ratify the framework agreement and submitted it to the Constitutional Court. These steps were encouraging for both the Armenia-Azerbaijan and Armenia-Türkiye normalization processes, as all sides view TRIPP as part of the region’s broader transition from conflict and isolation toward connectivity and cooperation. Yet normalization has not proceeded as some may have expected, and the momentum generated in Washington is fading. The main hurdle to signing the peace agreement is Azerbaijan’s insistence that Armenia amend its constitution. The dispute centers on the preamble’s reference to Armenia’s 1990 Declaration of Independence, which cites a 1989 decision supporting the reunification of Soviet Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia’s prime minister had stated that amending the constitution had been part of the ruling party’s election platform and promised to publish a draft of the new constitution by the end of 2026. But despite its victory, the Civil Contract party did not secure the two-thirds majority in parliament needed to approve a new constitution. Even if the ruling party can persuade some opposition MPs to support it, final approval would still require a nationwide referendum, whose outcome is far from guaranteed given significant public opposition. That, in turn, has complicated Armenia-Türkiye normalization, as Ankara considers a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan a prerequisite for progress. Relations between Yerevan and Ankara have improved since 2022. In July 2022, the two sides agreed to open their border to third-country nationals and diplomatic passport holders as a first step toward full normalization. Since then, their special representatives have met several times, discussed rehabilitating the Gyumri-Kars railway, and agreed to permit direct trade. But the talks have produced no major breakthrough, and four years later, the border remains closed. This has created a vicious circle: without constitutional change, there is no Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement; without that agreement, Armenia-Türkiye normalization cannot advance; and without progress on either track, the momentum generated by the August 2025 Washington summit risks being lost. Meanwhile, the U.S. midterm elections in November may shift the Trump administration’s attention toward domestic politics, leaving roughly four months to break the deadlock and restore momentum. Breaking this vicious circle will require sustained diplomatic engagement. Given the domestic political constraints in Armenia, there are only two realistic paths forward. Either Azerbaijan drops its demand that Armenia amend its constitution, sign and ratify the peace agreement, and stop blocking Armenia-Türkiye normalization, or Türkiye implements the July 2022 agreement and then proceeds toward full normalization without waiting for the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement to be signed. As Azerbaijan continues to insist on constitutional changes despite Armenia’s domestic political constraints, the fate of the momentum generated in Washington now depends largely on proactive U.S. engagement and Türkiye’s next steps in advancing the normalization process. By opting for the second pathway, namely, opening its border with Armenia and normalizing relations, Türkiye stands to gain in a number of ways. It would strengthen its position as a regional energy and transport hub, a role Ankara considers strategically important. It is hardly tenable to claim to be a fully functioning hub while maintaining a closed border with one direct neighbor. Additionally, normalization would also expand Türkiye’s overall presence in the South Caucasus. Ankara has an alliance with Azerbaijan and a strategic partnership with Georgia. Relations with Armenia remain the missing link in Türkiye’s regional policy. Such steps by Türkiye would also give Armenia greater maneuvering space in its relations with Russia, an outcome that aligns with Türkiye’s regional goals. Normalization with Yerevan could also strengthen Türkiye’s relations with the United States and the EU, both of which would likely view such a step favorably at a time when Ankara seeks to improve ties with them." (click the image to read the article in full)

The road across the South Caucasus could become not only a transport route but also a system of mutual commitments that makes another war prohibitively costly for all involved, writes Mehman Aliyev in this article that was first published by Turan Analytical Service. In Nakhchivan, separated from the rest of Azerbaijan by Armenian territory, the old railway served for decades as a reminder of the disintegration of a once-unified South Caucasus. The rails remained, but regional links were severed by war, blockade and mutual distrust. Now it is here that one of the most consequential infrastructure experiments in the post-Soviet space may begin. During a visit to Nakhchivan on August 11, President Ilham Aliyev said an international consortium could be created to reconstruct the Nakhchivan railway. The controlling stake, he stressed, should belong to the Azerbaijani state, but foreign companies and organisations could be among the investors. According to the president, the European Union and several countries have already shown interest in the project. The plan concerns 194 kilometres of railway in Nakhchivan. It is expected to be modernised so that annual freight capacity can rise from the current 1.5 million tonnes to 15 million tonnes. The Armenian section of the future route is considerably shorter, at 42 kilometres. Aliyev said its construction should begin in 2026. The full text of the president’s interview shows that the consortium proposal relates primarily to the Nakhchivan railway, not to placing the Azerbaijani part of TRIPP under foreign control. That distinction matters. In official documents, TRIPP — the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” — refers to communications passing through Armenian territory. Aliyev’s proposal, however, effectively broadens the idea of international participation itself: different but interconnected models of infrastructure governance are taking shape on either side of the border. In Armenia, the leading role is assigned to an Armenian–American company. In Azerbaijan, a consortium may emerge in which the state retains control. Together, these arrangements could transform the road from the subject of a territorial dispute into an international economic asset. The project could evolve from two national sections with different management models into a single international transport organism. If Azerbaijan and Armenia take their places as co-operators and key players, the corridor could become not only a road between East and West but also the first major joint system created by the two states after decades of conflict. (click image to read article in full)

It is not often that people in Russia speak openly against Vladimir Putin. But the Nobel Peace Prize winner, and former editor of Novaya Gazeta, Dmitry Muratov, has broken this silence, in an interview with Steve Rosenberg, the BBC Russia correspondent, which was aired on the BBC news channel. Rosenberg says that at the Moscow offices of newspaper Novaya Gazeta, the corridors are silent. There is an overwhelming sense of emptiness  "There is no newspaper anymore," former chief editor Dmitry Muratov  says. Mr Muratov co-founded Novaya Gazeta more than 30 years ago. It became the flagship for hard-hitting independent journalism in Russia, shining a light on human rights abuses and high-level corruption. In 2021 Mr Muratov was joint winner of the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts "to safeguard freedom of expression." The Nobel Committee noted that "six of [Novaya Gazeta's] journalists have been killed, including Anna Politkovskaya who wrote revealing articles on the war in Chechnya." It was recognition for courageous reporting. But it didn't protect the paper. "Putin issued a decree and the newspaper's printing presses were nationalised," Mr Muratov explains. "Its registration was revoked." Novaya Gazeta does retain a presence online. But only just: the authorities have blocked access to its website. It can only be accessed from abroad, or with the help of VPNs – virtual private networks used to circumvent restrictions. The newspaper's difficulties reflect the broader crackdown on free speech in Russia which has accelerated since the Kremlin's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. "Most opinion leaders have been declared 'foreign agents', 'extremists' or 'terrorists'. Several hundred," says Dmitry Muratov. "Figures vary, but at a conservative estimate, since the start of Russia's 'special military operation' [in Ukraine] at least 1,500 people are now in prison having spoken out against current state policy. That's three times more than during the savage days of the KGB in the USSR." In his 1975 Nobel Peace Prize lecture dissident Andrei Sakharov listed the names of more than 120 political prisoners he was aware of in the Soviet Union. A decade later what the Kremlin had assumed in 2022 would be a short, successful "military operation" has become the bloodiest conflict in Europe since the Second World War. Yet a confident President Putin continues to predict victory for Russia. But Muratov insists: "There will never be 'victory', because what has been going on for nearly five years – no matter how it ends – can no longer be considered a victory. It cannot be a victory when two Slavic nations have ripped a million people to shreds. Or more than a million. It seems to me that the situation with Ukraine now is this: you can destroy it, but you cannot conquer it. What do I mean by destroy? Continued escalation all the way to the use of a nuclear weapon." Does he really believe the Kremlin leader would use nuclear weapons in this war? "All those political experts who say 'Putin thinks this' or 'Putin is scared of that'…they're all charlatans," claims Dmitry Muratov. "It's in the same league as astrology. Nobody knows what's going on in Vladimir Putin's head. And I don't know. "I see things only as a journalist. I study big data. And since the beginning of the year the need to use nuclear weapons has been mentioned more than 500 times. When wackos say this, I pay no attention. But I've heard it discussed on state TV. And at the St Petersburg International Economic Forum, a state-run event, one of the speakers talked up the use of nuclear weapons as something favourable, something good." When he announced the mass invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, President Putin spoke of "ensuring the security of Russia." "Tell me, has security increased?" Dmitry Muratov asks. "With Ukrainian drones now attacking warehouses of [Russia's largest online retailer] Wildberries; with the petrol crisis, the disruption to mobile internet, the political prisoners? Has security increased, or not?" Despite opinion polls registering a fall in Vladimir Putin's domestic approval ratings, Russia's president – Mr Muratov believes - retains a tight grip on power. "Sorry, I don't believe all this talk about a split among members of the elite, about secret conspiracies. The country is run by Vladimir Putin. They're frightened of him. "And this fear is reinforced in every way by his main support base: the Federal Security Service (FSB)." As critical as he is of his own government, he has few illusions about the West. "[Putin] knows very well the true value of European leaders. On the one hand they talk to him about human rights. He laughs out loud because, with the other hand, they sign agreements – or used to sign agreements – with Russia on trading oil, gas, diamonds…all that stuff. When they talk to Putin about European values, he truly laughs out loud. He knows the true value of people who preached to him those values." (click image to read more)