Mertz surprise visit to Kyiv, and increased German support for Ukraine, is a potential game-changer, writes Dennis Sammut, in this week's "Monday Commentary". German Chancellor, Friedrich Merz, made a surprise visit to Ukraine over the weekend. He visited the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, on Sunday and called on Russian President Vladimir Putin to stop his "barbaric attacks" and end what he called a "senseless war." This was the fourth such visit to Ukraine by a German chancellor since the full-scale Russian invasion began in February 2022. Merz visit to Kyiv this weekend came at a very significant moment, and was full of symbolism, but not only. It was very significant also in terms of content. Merz arrived in Kyiv by train early on Sunday morning, accompanied by the German Economy Minister and a delegation of leading figures from German business, including executives from Siemens Energy, Hensoldt, Diehl Defence and Quantum Systems. "If Russia is not stopped, it will turn its war machine against us sooner or later," Merz said upon arrival. During the visit of the German Chancellor air raid sirens blared across the Ukrainian capital throughout the morning, as Kyiv's mayor announced one of the city's bridges had been hit by a Russian drone. Sunday's visit comes just days after Merz had assured Ukraine of Germany's support, despite isolated resistance and criticism at home. Merz said earlier  'If Germany wavers, Europe wavers;  if Europe wavers, Ukraine wavers” The German broadcaster Deutche Welle said that  “Germany remains Ukraine's most important backer, both militarily and financially, but state elections in September saw significant gains for parties at both ends of the political spectrum who are critical of expenditure on Ukraine: the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) in Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and the socialist Left Party in Berlin.” Speaking before his visit to Ukraine, Merz called out in particular "the AfD and their Russian backers" and promised Ukraine that Germany would not be divided.” Merz visit and Germany’s stronger support is a game-changer The visit of the German Chancellor to Ukraine this weekend came  at crucial moment for Ukraine and for Europe. Germany's strong and tangible support for Ukraine can be a game-changer, (click image to read the Commentary in full)

Government forces in Ethiopia, have taken control of the town of Mekelle, capital of the Tigray region. Earlier, Ethiopia's federal military said it had recaptured the main airport in the capital of the northern Tigray region, dealing a major setback to an ​opposition alliance in its stronghold. Clashes pitting a rebel alliance led by Tigray's ruling party ‌against the government and its allied forces broke out in northern Ethiopia last week, in the most serious escalation of violence since a 2020-2022 civil war. The fighting has stoked fears that it could escalate into a wider regional conflict, potentially drawing in neighbouring ​countries in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf. In recent days Ethiopia and Eritrea broke off diplomatic relations amid mutual accusations. In Washington, State Department spokesman Tommy Pigott ​said the United States strongly urged Ethiopia and Eritrea to "exercise maximum restraint and return ⁠to dialogue and cooperation as agreed in their 2018 peace framework." "The Horn of Africa cannot sustain another ​military conflict and humanitarian crisis," Pigott said. "A conflict jeopardizes ongoing U.S. collaboration on shared interests with both countries." The ​federal government in Addis Ababa accused Eritrea of supporting the rebel alliance alongside Sudan and Egypt. The three countries deny this. Troops from the Ethiopian National Defence Forces had regained control of Alula Aba ​Nega Airport in Tigray's capital Mekelle,   A Mekelle resident who asked not to be named for security reasons, confirmed the ‌taking of ⁠the airport by government forces and added they could hear gunfire outside the city centre. This source said they had seen some Tigrayan Defence Force fighters abandoning their posts and heading home, and that there was looting of government facilities taking place in the city. Mekelle's airport, which ​is around 10 km (6 miles) from the centre of the city, was ​one of three ⁠airports in the region that were seized by the opposition forces at the start of the fighting on September 23. The taking of Mekelle by government forces would be a major setback for the opposition alliance, although analysts say ⁠it ​would be unlikely to end the conflict. In 2020, federal forces captured ​Mekelle within the first month of the two year war before the TPLF reclaimed it seven months later.

Dr Farid Shafiyev is the Chairman of the AIR Center (the Center of Analysis of International Relations and Multiculturalism), one of Azerbaijan's leading government-affiliated foreign policy think tanks. Trained as a historian and ethnographer, he began his career at Azerbaijan's Academy of Sciences before joining the Foreign Service in 1996, where he spent over two decades representing the country abroad, including as Ambassador to Canada and later the Czech Republic. He returned to Baku in 2019 to lead the Center, bringing together his academic background and his years of diplomatic experience. In this Interview, he discusses how the AIR Center balances independent research with its ties to government, what the Center's priorities look like as Armenia and Azerbaijan move toward peace, and why he thinks Western observers often misread the region.

Members of the Armenia-Azerbaijan Strategic Expert Platform, met on line on 30 September 2026. This was their first meeting since they met in person in Brussels and Antwerp, Belgium, on 27 February 2026. The Armenia-Azerbaijan Strategic Expert Platform was set up in 2024, with the help of LINKS Europe, to provide a continuous space where Armenian and Azerbaijani experts can hold direct discussions and analysis, in compliment with wider processes involving governments, experts and civil society. The current members of the platform, all of who serve in a personal capacity, attended the meeting: from Armenia, Dr Stepan Grigorian, Dr Benyamin Poghosyan and Mr Johnny Melikyan; and from Azerbaijan, Dr Anar Veliyev, Mr Mehman Aliyev and Mr Ramazan Samadov. Mr Murad Muradov also attended the meeting as a guest. A team from LINKS Europe also attended the meeting, including: Dr Dennis Sammut, Director, George Simonishvili, Deputy Director, Maximiliaan van Lange, Counsellor and Santiago Ferbel-Alazcarte, Senior Editor. (1) The members of the Strategic Platform welcomed progress that has been made in Armenia-Azerbaijan relations since their last meeting in February, and particularly tangible actions increasing economic interaction between the two countries. (2) The members of the Strategic Platform remain committed to long term peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but are also aware that the peace process remains fragile and incomplete. The members of the platform encourage all stakeholders to remain positive and engaged, and to refrain from actions or statements that may harm the process. (3) The members of the Platform continue to support all civil society initiatives that contribute towards peace in the region (4) The members of the Strategic Platform heard reports about the 3rd South Caucasus Regional Dialogue Forum, and welcomed the convening of the first session of the 3rd Forum on line on 6 November 2026. The members of the Strategic Platform welcome plans to convene the second session in person soon after. They also welcome the commitment of the organisers to ensure that participants from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are able to participate in these meetings. (5) The members of the Strategic Platform urge the international community to remain committed to the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and urge all stakeholders, in particular the European Union, to intensify their support in a more focused and targeted manner. We urge more support for track 2 and track1.5 initiatives that are more important than ever. (6) The members of the Strategic Platform wish to once more thank LINKS Europe for its consistent and valuable work in support of regional peace, despite obstacles and adversity. Members of the Strategic Platform remain committed to continue their work going forward.

Until recently, the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) could best be understood in terms of identity, language, culture, and economic collaboration. This is changing. On September 17, Baku played host to the Fifth Meeting of the Secretaries of the Security Councils of the OTS countries. In his message to the meeting, the president of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, noted that cooperation among the Turkic peoples no longer consisted of political, economic, and cultural matters only but had gained a “long-term strategic nature.” More importantly, he referred to the consultations of the national security councils as a factor facilitating the emergence of a “common security architecture.” Clearly, it does not mean that the OTS is evolving into a military organisation of the NATO kind: there is no commitment of collective defence similar to that of NATO’s Article 5, and there is no evidence of this desire on the part of all members of the organisation. Yet, the September meeting means something different: security collaboration within the Turkic context is becoming more regular and operational. This process has been quite gradual. The OTS started organising meetings of national security council secretaries since 2022. As of September 2026, the mechanism had attained its fifth meeting. The organisation itself considers security cooperation to be an increasingly important area of interest in relation to both conventional and non-conventional threats. This includes such areas as terrorism, transnational organized crime, drug trafficking, extremism, hybrid threats, and critical infrastructure protection. (click image to read the op-ed in full)

The war in Ukraine rages on, and the constant pounding of Kyiv by Russian drones and missiles, is a reminder that this is not a war being fought in some far away border region. The war turned out very different from the one Vladimir Putin had envisioned when he launched his full scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Thousands of young Ukrainians have died defending their country. Ukraine has been able to optimize its drone capability in order to take the battle back to the Russians, including to Moscow and St Petersburg. But to defend itself and its cities and citizens from sophisticated Russian weaponry Ukraine needs western support. This has not been as forthcoming as the Ukrainians hoped. Certainly Donald Trump has been less enthusiastic in helping Ukraine than his predecessor. Maybe this is now changing too. Europe’s support needs to remain high and consistent, and ambivalence must be avoided. Last week, Germany’s foreign minister held talks with his Russian counterpart in the first face-to-face meeting between top officials of the two nations since Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Johann Wadephul said he used the “intense conversation” with Sergei Lavrov in New York to warn Moscow against further escalation after a drone laden with explosives was discovered at Leipzig airport last month in an incident that Berlin has blamed on Russia. He said that he “gave Russia a clear warning” not to continue in the same vein, adding: “We can defend ourselves, we can fight back and we will do so.” Wadephul told German public broadcaster ZDF that he had also offered Lavrov “a chance to de-escalate” in Ukraine, adding that it had “fallen on deaf ears”. “I also made it very clear to Russia: we stand with Ukraine, Ukraine has our full support, and economic pressure on Russia will continue,” he said. “I said that again to Lavrov and called on him finally to be prepared to enter talks.” The meeting lasted around 20 minutes and ended with a handshake between the two men. I support diplomacy and dialogue as a means of resolving issues. But I am also aware that isolating Russia diplomatically is an important way of putting pressure on Russia to end the mayhem it unleashed in Ukraine. The German Foreign Minister has to ask himself if the 20 minute meeting with Lavrov was worth easing that pressure. The last time Lavrov met a German foreign minister was in January 2022, the month before Putin launched his full-scale assault on Ukraine. Europe must continue supporting Ukraine, and isolating Russia should be part of that strategy. On the other hand engaging with Russia as part of a search for a solution is necessary. Balancing the two considerations is a difficult business, and Europe is best acting in a united fashion on this matter too. (click image to read the Monday Commentary in full).

In this analysis for commonspace.eu, Anna Szedlacsek argues that Kazakhstan and Armenia, two countries that Russia had considered in its sphere of influence, appear increasingly eager to ensure that Moscow is no longer their only option. Armenia and Kazakhstan both reached their strategic turning points between 2020 and 2022, driven by security failures, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and severe economic vulnerabilities.  Among these reasons, the war in Ukraine sheds a particularly long shadow. In Kazakhstan, Russia’s “special military operation” substantially damaged Moscow's image among ordinary Kazakh citizens and reignited anxieties about revanchist Russian rhetoric regarding northern Kazakhstan. Almaty is heavily challenged by having to navigate its deep economic and transit interdependence with Russia. Kazakhstan is aggressively developing alternative transport links, such as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor) through Baku, Azerbaijan, to reach European and global markets without crossing Russian territory. This also reflects a move away from Russia as its main trading partner – this position has been earned by China, or, if considered as a bloc, the European Union (EU). Armenia, on the other hand, began its pivot away from Moscow’s orbit after the 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and reached a point of no return following Azerbaijan's final capture of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023. This is due to the fact that despite hosting a Russian military base and belonging to the CSTO, Armenia received no military assistance from Russia during either of these conflicts. Moscow remained neutral – and thus turned untrustworthy in the eyes of Armenians – because it wished to safeguard its expanding economic, energy, and transit partnerships with Azerbaijan and Turkey. The Armenian parliament also passed a law to initiate the EU accession process, while ministries are recruiting Western-educated professionals to restructure the civil service away from the Kremlin. The question, is not simply whether Russia is losing its allies. It is whether Russia is losing its ability to make those allies dependent on it. As of September 2026, the evidence does not point to a definitive answer. Russia has not been pushed out of either country – but both Kazakhstan and Armenia appear increasingly eager to ensure that Moscow is no longer their only option. (click the image to read the analysis in full)