As the US presidential election approaches, many are assessing the implications of a Donald Trump or Kamala Harris administration in different parts of the world. Commentators on the South Caucasus are no exception. The Biden administration established a Washington format to facilitate Armenia–Azerbaijan negotiations and took steps to further US–Armenia relations, making a decision to upgrade the status of a strategic dialogue launched in 2019 to a strategic partnership commission. The Biden administration also invested efforts in thawing relations between Armenia and Turkey, viewing this as essential for regional stability. US officials view normalising Armenia–Turkey relations as crucial for reducing Russian influence and decreasing Armenia’s dependency on Russia.
This push was part of the broader US strategy to reduce Russian influence in the region by helping Armenia and Azerbaijan normalises relations and promoting regional stability. Meanwhile, Washington has reacted negatively to the recent actions of the Georgian government, such as adopting a law on transparency of foreign influence and making overtures toward China and Russia. The US imposed personal sanctions on some Georgian officials and cancelled joint drills.
However, the US presidential campaign is not the only election to attract attention in the South Caucasus. On October 26, parliamentary elections will take place in Georgia, undoubtedly influencing the future of that country and of the entire region. The ruling Georgian Dream party aims to secure a constitutional majority, while opposition parties hope to end its 12-year rule. The elections in Georgia are likely to have significant geopolitical implications, as the opposition accuses the Georgian Dream of abandoning Georgia’s Euro–Atlantic integration aspirations set in its constitution and aligning the country with Russia. Meanwhile, the ruling party argues that the opposition is seeking to drag Georgia into a war with Russia, making it “the second Ukraine.”
While Armenia has no elections scheduled for 2024 or 2025, its government, expert community, and political circles are closely watching developments in the US and Georgia.
What will the implications of the US and Georgian elections be for Armenia? There are four main possible scenarios: 1) a victory for the Georgian Dream and Kamala Harris, 2) a win for the Georgian Dream and Donald Trump, 3) a victory for the Georgian opposition and Kamala Harris, and 4) a victory for the opposition and Donald Trump. Each scenario has specific implications for Armenia, and the Armenian government must prepare for all outcomes.
In the first case, of a Georgian Dream victory and Kamala Harris becoming US president, we might expect Georgia to continue drifting away from the West, deepening economic cooperation with China and seeking to normalise relations with Russia. Georgia–West future ties would depend on the West’s reaction to the election outcome: Would they increase the pressure on the Georgian government while expanding support to civil society or try to prevent the further deterioration of relations with Georgia? In either case, these relations would continue to deteriorate, probably decreasing Georgia’s role as Armenia’s “gateway to Europe.” Meanwhile, the Harris administration would likely continue Biden’s policies in the South Caucasus. Armenia would then face two choices.
Armenia could become the region’s new focal point of Western attention, similar to Georgia under Mikheil Saakashvili’s presidency in 2004–2012. This could lead to additional Western economic support for Armenia but also isolate Western-leaning Armenia, surrounding the country with not-so-well-disposed neighbours in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Russia, and Turkey. In the worst-case scenario, Azerbaijan might exploit this situation to receive “tacit approval” by regional powers to escalate against Armenia.
Alternatively, Armenia might reassess its deepening ties with the EU and US, seeking instead to find a viable new relationship with its neighbours and regional powers.
If the Georgian Dream wins and Donald Trump returns to the White House (second scenario), US involvement in the South Caucasus might decrease. Georgia would continue drifting away from the West. In this scenario Armenia might have to readjust its foreign policy and relations with regional powers, perhaps considering cooperation with non-Western organisations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS (the intergovernmental organisation consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates).
A Georgian opposition victory combined with a Kamala Harris presidency (third scenario) could see Georgia resetting its relations with the West, reverting to the situation as it was prior to recent developments triggered by adopting the law on foreign influence. In this scenario, Armenia might continue its deepening engagement with the EU and US, possibly with a Western-oriented Georgia-Armenia partnership. For the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia could face two South Caucasus states drifting away from its influence, leaving Azerbaijan as its only regional ally. In response, Russia might seek to destabilise both Georgia and Armenia, potentially encouraging Azerbaijan to launch a military escalation against Armenia with the hope of taking control of enclaves or forcing Armenia to accept Azerbaijani demands on the establishment of “Zangezur corridor.”
If the Georgian opposition wins and Trump becomes president (fourth scenario), US involvement in the region would likely decline while Georgia attempts to restore its partnership with the West. As the US decreased its engagement in the region, the continuation of Armenia’s current trajectory of developing relations with the West would depend on the EU’s ability to continue to offer economic support to Armenia and other guarantees. If Brussels succeeded in doing that, Armenia could continue its Western-leaning course and form greater ties with Georgia.
The upcoming elections will have a profound impact on the geopolitical future of the South Caucasus for the next four years and beyond. As Armenia continues to grapple with the aftermath of its 2020 military defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan’s military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023, and potential new escalation by Azerbaijan in 2025 as a peace agreement between the sides remains elusive, the region’s evolving dynamics will be critical for Yerevan’s strategic calculations.
