The Armenian opposition had up to now failed to come up with a leader who could unite it in its quest to overthrow Nikol Pashinyan. "That could change if a new political force led by a charismatic and populist alternative were to emerge. This month, the opposition hoped they have such an alternative in Bagrat Galstanyan, Archbishop of the Tavush Diocese of the Armenian Apostolic Church, write Onnik Krikorian for commonspace.eu. Leading protests against the recent delimitation and demarcation of the Gazakh-Tavush section of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, the cleric managed to rally up to 30,000 people in Yerevan’s Republic Square earlier this month, the largest public gathering since Pashinyan’s own in 2018.
When Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract took power in Armenia in 2018 it did so with 70 percent of the vote. By the time snap elections were held in June 2021 that had fallen to 53.95 percent. Later, in Yerevan municipal elections last year, it was just 32.6 percent. Most recently, in December, a survey conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI) showed that only 20 percent of respondents would vote for Civil Contract if elections were held that weekend. This month, in another by local pollster MPG, that had dropped further to 12.8 percent.
Not to say that the opposition has fared any better. Their ratings combined still roughly match those of the government in both surveys, leaving the vast majority of the electorate stuck in-between, undecided and/or disillusioned following Armenia’s defeat in the 44-day war and the loss of Karabakh. Taken separately, Robert Kocharyan and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation – Dashnaktsutyun (ARF-D), united in the Hayastan alliance, stood at just under 4 percent. Even if many have lost faith in Pashinyan, few want to see the return of the old regime.
That could change if a new political force led by a charismatic and populist alternative were to emerge. This month, the opposition hoped they have such an alternative in Bagrat Galstanyan, Archbishop of the Tavush Diocese of the Armenian Apostolic Church. Leading protests against the recent delimitation and demarcation of the Gazakh-Tavush section of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, the cleric managed to rally up to 30,000 people in Yerevan’s Republic Square earlier this month, the largest public gathering since Pashinyan’s own in 2018.
In this month’s poll, Galstanyan garnered 3.9 percent support, second only to Pashinyan. That might seem low but he has also only just emerged as a revanchist and nationalist rival. Though claiming to be non-partisan, Galstanyan appears to have strong links with Dashnaktsutyun and has also managed to unite otherwise disparate parliamentary and extra-parliamentary political forces around him. In a country such as Armenia where political divisions run deep, that is no mean feat.
Former Kocharyan-era foreign minister Vartan Oskanyan and Dashnaktsutyun MP Garnik Danielyan even back Galstanyan as prime minister should the current protests succeed in either forcing Pashinyan’s resignation on the streets or by impeachment in parliament. However, two other rallies held by Galstanyan immediately after the first only attracted around 11,000 and 9,000 respectively. A parliamentary vote of no confidence continues to look unlikely.
Lacking the necessary votes to table let alone win such a motion, the opposition would also need to nominate their own candidate. Naturally, in this month’s survey, Galstanyan led the pack of opposition potentials at 6.7 percent, but 50.5 percent were against all options on offer with 31 percent unable or unwilling to answer. Kocharyan was at 2.5 percent, slightly higher than Arman Tatoyan at 2 percent, while even Ruben Vardanyan, Karabakh's former de facto State Minister, garnered 1 percent despite his ineligibility and pre-trial detention in Baku.
Galstanyan is also constitutionally unable to be considered given that he holds dual Armenian-Canadian citizenship, but this hasn't deterred those behind him.
But even if they could impeach Pashinyan, that in itself would not trigger new elections. The Civil Contract dominated parliament could simply vote for its own candidate unless the opposition adopts the same tactics Pashinyan used in 2018. Back then, nominated without competition, he made sure to be rejected by the former but still incumbent government so parliament could be dissolved so new elections oust the previous regime. That is so far not on Galstanyan’s immediate agenda though sparking a political crisis to frustrate the normalisation process is.
Galstanyan’s next rally is set for 26 May though many are skeptical that it will prove decisive. To prove otherwise, the opposition will need to gather at least the 30,000 it managed on 9 May. But with summer coming up, a period not traditionally conducive to protests, that will also be insufficient without a clear plan of action, something lacking to date. Nonetheless, Pashinyan’s diminishing support should be of concern if recent momentum in the normalisation process is to continue.
Moving forward, he will have to tangibly demonstrate how the dividends from his peace agenda are bearing fruit in practical terms rather than simply words, cardboard cutouts of maps, and glasses of water spilt in TikTok videos. Though the European Union appears to have offered its own symbolic support, including financial assistance, its main focus remains on removing Russia from the region. Baku could also tone down its own domestic rhetoric and take a more magnanimous approach to resolving whatever sticking points remain in any peace agreement.
That might already be happening, or it might not be, but it does need to be visible. Though Pashinyan is likely to survive the latest attempt to overthrow him, his predicament looks increasingly precarious as the 2026 parliamentary elections approach. There has never been room for complacency in the South Caucasus.
