Since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have gone through a series of ups and downs that often resemble a rollercoaster. Periods of heightened optimism have been followed by abrupt breaks in talks, as seen in late 2022 and 2023. After Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a joint statement in December 2023, early 2024 brought renewed hope to the process. In March-April 2024, Yerevan accepted Azerbaijani demands concerning four villages along the northern part of their shared border. Azerbaijan announced its intention to make the COP29 United Nations Climate Summit in Azerbaijan in November 2024 a “COP of peace,” fostering a growing belief that an agreement might be reached by that date. However, the new or reinforced sine qua non-preconditions by President Aliyev—such as amendments to the Armenian constitution and the dissolution of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group established to seek a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict—have significantly dampened expectations that even a framework agreement outlining basic principles could be signed by the end of 2024.
Several factors contribute to these fluctuations. The South Caucasus is increasingly entangled in great power competition, while middle powers such as Turkey and Iran have heightened their interests. The region’s potential as a critical crossroads—connecting Russia with the Middle East and South Asia, China and India with Europe—adds further complexity, making regional geopolitics hostage to conflicting geopolitical and geo-economic interests.
Meanwhile, it is important to recognise that, regardless of the influence of global and regional actors on Armenia–Azerbaijan negotiations, normalisation between two states—and ideally, between their peoples—cannot be achieved solely by signing agreements. The 36 years of the conflict, marked by four major wars and numerous escalations, have left deep scars in the perception of both populations. These wounds will not vanish the day after leaders sign documents in Europe, Russia, or the United States. This does not imply that an agreement is meaningless or should not be welcomed. However, it underscores the fact that an agreement alone cannot initiate a genuine healing process. Without a humane dimension to conflict resolution, any deal will likely lose its impact over time, setting the stage for renewed conflicts.
In this context, a singular issue for Armenia and Armenians is the fate of Armenian prisoners of war (POWs) and other detainees held in Azerbaijan. Article 8 of the November 10, 2020, trilateral agreement stipulated that an exchange of prisoners of war, hostages, and other detainees, as well as of the remains of the deceased, should be carried out. However, nearly four years after the statement was signed, Armenians remain in captivity in Azerbaijan, including eight members of the political-military leadership of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. Azerbaijan has acknowledged holding 23 of these individuals, but according to Armenian sources, there are more Armenian detainees, although officially Baku denies their existence. Since the end of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, Azerbaijan has released Armenian POWs in several waves. In June 2021, 15 POWs were freed through Georgian mediation and the active involvement of the US in exchange for Armenia providing Azerbaijan with maps of minefields. In July 2021, another 15 Armenians returned home through Russian mediation. In October 2022, another 17 POWs were released with US mediation, and in line with the December 2023 joint statement, 32 more were repatriated.
The continued detention of Armenians in Azerbaijan—and the denial of this —adds to negative perceptions of the peace process and prospects for normalisation among Armenians. It reinforces the view that Azerbaijan is negotiating in bad faith, with conflict and containment the only viable forms of interaction rather than the cooperation and respect of previously consented agreements.
It is important to acknowledge that humanitarian concerns exist on both sides. According to official Azerbaijani data, 3,961 Azerbaijanis were registered as missing as of August 1, 2024. Of these, 3,953 went missing during the First Karabakh War, and eight during the 2020 War and its aftermath. There are also hundreds of Armenians missing from the First Nagorno Karabakh War, and 195 Armenians are missing from the 2020 Nagorno Karabakh War. The fate of these individuals should not be forgotten.
It is clear that the issue of missing persons, particularly those from the first Nagorno-Karabakh War in the early 1990s, requires significant time and effort to resolve.
In contrast, the fate of Armenian POWs and other detainees held in Baku could be resolved more swiftly. Their release ahead of COP29 would show that the climate summit can justify its label as the COP of peace and contribute significantly to confidence and trust-building between the two sides. The international community, including the US, the European Union, Russia, the United Nations, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe, also play a role. They should urge Azerbaijan to seize the opportunity presented by COP29 to make a genuine humanitarian gesture, which could pave the way for advancing the normalisation process between the two nations.
