Sunday, 25 September 2011
Traditionally, developments in Russia tend to both impact and influence events in Armenia. Across a wide range of areas, from military and security issues to economic and political trends, Russia exerts significant influence over Armenia. The relationship between Armenia and its “strategic partner” is deeply rooted in both historical memory and modern necessity, although Armenia struggles to maintain some degree of flexibility within the constraints of its mounting over-dependence on Russia.
Yet most Armenian leaders and nearly all politicians tend to mimic, or at least emulate their counterparts in Russia. And it is this adulation of Russia that is most visible in Armenian politics today. And there are two specific aspects of recent Russian political developments that may exert even greater influence over Armenian politics over the coming two years.
The Impact of Russian Politics on Armenia
This looming impact of Russian political developments on Armenia stems from the recent announcement that Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin will seek to return to the presidency. During a party congress of the ruling “United Russia” party on 24 September, speculation finally came to an end with the nomination of Putin as the party’s candidate in the March 2012 presidential election. Although confirming what many saw as inevitable, Putin’s return marks a new stage in the drama of Russian politics, following the orchestrated handover of power to current President Dmitry Medvedev in 2008.
While that move was prompted by the constitutional ban on a third consecutive presidential term, former two-term President Putin continued to exert a dominant role over Russian decision-making as prime minister, despite the occasional perception of apparent differences or divisions over policy between Putin and Medvedev.
Given the closed nature of the Russian political system, and bolstered by both his personal popularity and the absence of any serious rivals, Putin’s path to the presidency seems widely assured. His return would also provide an opportunity for him to serve another two six-year terms as president, theoretically through 2024, earning Putin a chance to surpass the 18-year rule of former Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, although he would be keen to avoid the negative association with the economic decline and general malaise that came to define the Brezhnev period of Soviet leadership.
The Putin Parallel
Interesting, the return of Putin may exert significant influence over the course of Armenian politics, as it may encourage a similar return to power by former Armenian president Robert Kocharian. Unlike the carefully constructed Russian model of political succession, as in the cases of both the Yeltsin-Putin handover and the Putin-Medvedev arrangement, former President Kocharian has been increasingly distressed over recent shifts in Armenian politics, for several reasons.
First, Kocharian’s personal selection of successor, current President Serzh Sarkisian, did not go as planned. Although Sarkisian was seen as a loyal defense minister, and later as compliant prime minister through the Kocharian Administration, from the very start of the Sarkisian presidency, a potent rivalry and potential rift quickly emerged between the two men. Having assumed the presidency during a violent post-election crisis in February 2008 marked by serious opposition protests, Sarkisian inherited both a damaged presidency and a legacy of distrust.
Amid an escalation of tension as opposition protests triggered a crackdown by police and security forces that left at least ten people dead and many wounded on March 1, 2008, outgoing President Kocharian introduced a sweeping state of emergency. Such a heavy-handed response to the domestic post-election crisis by Kocharian ushered in a pronounced degree of polarization even prior to Sarkisian’s assumption of office.
On the one side, Kocharian’s repressive response polarized society even further and ushered in a new crisis of confidence, with Kocharian facing an unforeseen wave of profound unpopularity. For president-elect Sarkisian, this period of polarization also crippled his incoming government with a serious lack of legitimacy, forcing him to attempt to balance the irreconcilable demands of supporting the government while recognizing the necessity to distance himself from Kocharian.
Against the backdrop of this legacy and amid a genuine lack of legitimacy as a result of the post-election crisis, Sarkisian faced a nearly insurmountable challenge to his very political survival even before his inauguration as president.
The second factor contributing to the rivalry between Kocharian and Sarkisian was rooted in the economic crisis facing Armenia. After several years of seemingly impressive double-digit economic expansion, a sudden halt to economic growth revealed the structural weakness and vulnerability of the Armenian economy.
This inherent fragility of the Armenian economy became apparent in several ways. First, an over-reliance on remittances became glaringly obvious after a downturn in the Russian construction and service sectors led to a severe decrease in the flow of money into the country from Armenians working in Russia, who traditionally account for some two-thirds of all remittances to Armenia. Second, the weakness of Armenia’s statistical economic growth, which was largely fueled by the expansion of the construction sector, was also compounded by a sudden downturn in demand, as the level of interest and investment in the real estate market from Iranians and the Armenians from the Diaspora also peaked, in large part due to the onset of the global economic crisis.
But it was the third factor, the evaporation of the mirage of Armenia’s economic vitality, which posed the most serious burden. Throughout the Kocharian Administration, the increasingly restricted nature of the country’s economic system stifled competition and imposed serious impediments to market-based reforms. The evolution, or devolution, of Armenia’s closed economic system was tied to the rise of powerful business interests that went unchecked, and can be traced to the emergence of powerful “oligarchs” or businessmen holding inordinate power and position over the import and export of key goods and services. Exerting their dominant position over the market through the formation of several commodity-based cartels and semi-monopolies, the timing of their accumulation of power and the onset of a fresh economic crisis posed a significant challenge to the new Sarkisian Administration. The threat stemmed from their underpayment of taxes, depriving the state of much-needed revenue and undermining the government’s authority and credibility, already plagued by a political lack of legitimacy, and exacerbated by the end of several years of economic growth and expansion.
Politics of Personality, not Policy
In terms of the Russian-Armenian political context, although the Sarkisian presidency has differed greatly from the subservience of Russia’s Medvedev model, there is a stronger, but more troubling, parallel between Kocharian and Putin.
Kocharian, who served for a decade as the Armenian president, from 1998-2008, has long idolized Putin. The relationship between Kocharian and Putin, which was viewed as friendly and close during their time as presidents, is also linked to their shared worldview, being born less than two years apart, and personal experience, each having adapted to the post-Soviet system after making their mark within the waning Soviet system. In fact, Kocharian did much to lock Armenia ever more firmly within the Russian orbit and after leaving office, was duly rewarded with a lucrative position working for a Russian corporation. After his personal sense of disappointment with Sarkisian as his anointed successor, Kocharian may once again imitate his role model by seeking a similar return to politics, likely hoping and expecting that a return of his idol to the Russian presidency would ease his own comeback. Thus, for both Armenia and Russia, and for Kocharian and Putin, this is politics of personality, not policy.
But unlike Putin, Kocharian faces new challenges, ranging from the plummeting of his personal popularity to the difficulty in returning to the political arena. The difficulty for Kocharian is that unlike Putin, who remains fairly popular and even more popularly respected, a large number of Armenians blame Kocharian for the events of March 2008, one of the few cases of violence and bloodshed between Armenians. Many more now see his policies as discredited and also blame him for allowing the “oligarchs” to accumulate power and wealth unchecked and unchallenged.
Moreover, another key difference is one of position. As present Russian premier, Putin continues to overshadow his successor, while the former Armenian president is widely seen as just that- former. In this context, Kocharian’s political standing and power has eroded over time, and his past power, as the president of Nagorno-Karabakh from 1994-1997 and as Armenian premier from 1997-1998, is just that- past.
The Impact on Nagorno-Karabakh
Nevertheless, developments in Russian politics, as well as the corresponding impact on Armenian politics, will undoubtedly influence the course of the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. For Armenia, the possible return of Robert Kocharian may trigger a shift in Armenia’s diplomatic strategy regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Clearly, Kocharian is known for a more hard-line, muscular and assertive diplomatic style, something that has been most evident in the obvious contrast with the approach of President Sarkisian and the performance of his underwhelming, yet unchallenging, foreign minister, Eduard Nalbandian. It can also be assumed that Kocharian will adopt a more aggressive diplomacy toward both Azerbaijan and Turkey, driven by a predictable desire to demonstrate a policy difference with Sarkisian, and seeking change merely for the sake of change, for both personal and political reasons.
Just as significant, the return of Putin may alter what has now become a lead role for Russian diplomacy, both within the OSCE Minsk Group format and as an element of wider US-Russian relations. For one, it remains unclear whether Putin will replace, reject or simply return to the Russian-led initiatives over mediating the Karabakh conflict. And as much as it has been a demonstration of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s personal diplomatic initiative, the next stage of mediation may reflect a new (or an old) policy shift once Putin re-assumes the Russian presidency. Thus, it seems that the Putin parallel promises a wide range of implications, well beyond the Kremlin and certainly within Armenia.
Richard Giragosian is the director of the Regional Studies Center (RSC), an independent think tank in Yerevan, Armenia (director@regional-studies.org)
