In any peace process, or inter-national reconciliation process, certain idioms and adjectives often pop-up to describe a possible bright future. “The light at the end of the tunnel” is one of the most quoted. Of course, any channel of communication, any walkable path, i.e. tunnel, should have its “happy end”. Keeping in mind the obvious failure of the Kazan Summit on June 24, I wonder what if there is any tunnel at all, or if the negotiators are in different tunnels, or, worst of all, if they entered a dark labyrinth. Putting on my hat of realist, sometimes I think this is what we have today in the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiating track. Nearly everything on the issue is under a thick veil of propaganda.
There is indeed much room for being discouraged. Despite internationally-driven, high expectations in the run-up to Kazan Summit, it failed short of reporting any meaningful progress. Prof. Ed Garcia – an experienced peace-maker from the University of Philippines - in a private discussion lately claimed that a breakthrough is always possible when preparedness meets an opportunity. Indeed, the Kazan round seems a disgraceful end of another opportunity.
Unfortunately enough, the international public opinion-shapers on the issue still use ambiguous and somewhat “false-balanced” sentiments to draw the assumed reality on the ground. There are still major commentators who speak for “mutual” concessions, whereas any unbiased observer would have noted the language of Armenian and Azerbaijani Presidents speaking to Euronews on June 23. Even 24 hours before that, the President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan, speaking at the Council of Europe, outlined it very much straightforwardly that he intended to seal the deal in Kazan, as it was agreed in prior negotiations on the ministerial level. However, media reports claimed, and Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov himself confirmed, that President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev came out with a dozen new “ideas” on a previously agreed text – to the total frustration of others around the table. The best illustration of the troubled situation after Kazan was the military parade in Baku two days later, not the least - with the unfading rhetoric of Mr Aliyev, who still agitated for revenge against Armenians.
Given the gravity and importance of the issue in domestic politics, to his credit, President Sargsyan managed to create an emerging political dialogue with main opposition parties at home in order to secure “less damage” to his political image and leadership, though as he admitted in his PACE speech – it would have been “very difficult for anyone”.(1)
However, in the new realities of mid-July, the leadership in Armenia, most possibly, will be pushed into radicalization on Karabakh issue and more concentration on domestic agenda as parliamentary elections are scheduled for May 2012. Those of us aware of the hot political landscape in Armenia, realize that it would be pricey for anyone to take any more steps forward in a few months from now. Being on the same page, the European brokers (to the extent that they are able to) now speak of another “last” deadline for general agreement on Karabakh – the margins of the forthcoming EU Eastern Partnership Summit in Warsaw (September 2011).
However, Mr Aliyev continues to repeat that (a) the balance of power between Armenia and Azerbaijan shifted dramatically; (b) the ceasefire is very fragile and (c) “the whole military budget for Azerbaijan is more than the total budget for Armenia and this is a reality” (e.g. Euronews interview, June 23). With this belligerent public rhetoric here and elsewhere, Mr Aliyev has successfully created a virtual image of certain “deadline” or “bottom line”, which will cause a new, allegedly “necessary” war. Undoubtedly, the major part of skirmishes on the Line of Contact is to support this scenario. Speaking before the European Parliament, EU High Representative on Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton reported that the parties “have re-committed themselves to the diplomatic process and to finding a peaceful solution”. This plays in the hand of Mr Aliyev. It is not clear how Baroness Ashton also came to the conclusion that a framework agreement on Nagorno-Karabakh “is within reach”.
In an attempt to get back on constructive track, Russian FM Sergey Lavrov has now successfully delivered the once-more-updated Road Map to Armenian and Azerbaijani Presidents. So far everything is calm in Yerevan and Stepanakert, while mutually excluding statements pop-up from Baku. Hence, Foreign Minister Mammadyarov assured a Russian news agency that Azerbaijan is now ready to seal a “legally binding framework agreement”, oddly leaving the remaining disagreements for future talks. Yet in his usual warlike stance, Mr Aliyev briefed his Cabinet that Azerbaijan is ready “to grant” Nagorno-Karabakh an interim status, which was, in his own understanding, a major concession. (2) The same was supported by Ali Ghassanov from Aliyev Administration. (3) Whereas another regular official commentator, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Elhan Poluhov (just minutes after his bosses) totally rejected the sole idea of “interim status”. All this comes to support the assumption that there is a growing nervousness inside the “power corridors” of Baku.
Earlier in the week, President Sargsyan went on the record saying, in essence, the current agenda prescribed that “free and legally binding expression of will” should be at some point recognized by Armenia and Azerbaijan, while the so-called “interim status”, unlike what is today, shall be “internationally recognized” at next stage. (4) Although not everyone is happy with these settings in either in Yerevan or Stepanakert, the need of “compromise solution” is generally recognized both in public and among leading Armenian politicians. To grasp the streamline from Baku – you just have a brief look at the media headlines!
I tend to be joining those who see much in common with Madrid-Oslo Process on Palestine-Israel issue early 1990s. The Oslo Accords seemed to strike a fair balance for all stakeholders, but soon it crashed with lots of damages to the peace process as such. The leaders just failed to sell the Accords in public. The same largely smells from Madrid document in whatever wrapper it is.
How did the Good Friday Agreement, in as far as is known, work out in UK and Ireland? Essentially, three factors played a vital role there – the leaders were prepared for peace; international (mainly – American) pressure was enough; and, most importantly, the two sides were tired of bloodshed. On contrast, a heavy military buildup has been accelerating around Karabakh, with international community playing “false empathy”.
While there may or may not be a framework agreement on Nagorno-Karabakh in the current settings, the conflict-affected societies are totally estranged from the peace process, making them heavily dependent on propaganda. What should be on the spotlight of international peace and security providers is how the relations between Armenians and Azeris as nations can be restored. Any document without such reconciliation will be just impossible to implement regardless of any international guarantee. The recent report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance showed that there is a considerable level of Armenophobia in Azerbaijan. Shouldn’t this be an alarm bell for international community?
Under these circumstances, the role of public intellectuals becomes incredibly important. They should be the voice of reason in the respective societies and should agitate for peace and reconciliation, instead of supporting the government-driven propaganda of violence in the media. Unfortunately, we heard no objection from any human rights watchdog organization or any intellectual from Azerbaijan when quite recently the Bloomberg's journalist of Armenian origin was denied entry to Baku just because of her Armenian roots.
The “army of intellectuals” should work hard to marginalize those agitating for violence. And Europe here has an incredibly important role to play – with its liberal values, human rights advocacy and institutionalized support of peace-making organizations.
This is the right tunnel to enter, if anyone is interested to find the light.
Dr. Hovhannes Nikoghosyan is a research fellow from Yerevan, Armenia. He may be contacted at hnikoghosyan@rau.am.
(c) commonspace.eu
(1) http://president.am/events/statements/eng/?id=91
(2) http://ru.president.az/articles/2755
(3) http://regnum.ru/news/1424973.html
(4) http://www.golosarmenii.am/ru/20147/home/12200/
