OPINION: Gayene Novikova - “It is obvious that Russia is not interested in a clear definition of its position on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict” .

ARMINFO News Agency interviewed Dr. Gayane Novikova, Director of the Center for Strategic Analysis Spectrum in Yerevan and Visiting Scholar at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University

Dr. Novikova, several analysts, including the Azerbaijani, argue that only Russia is able to influence the parties to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict and to push forward its own option of the conflict resolution. In your opinion, should such a vision of the problem be considered as well-grounded?

At a glance, the vision that Russia is the only state able to resolve the Nagorno Karabakh conflict has some reasons. Russia is a major actor in the South Caucasus. It considers this region as an area of its interests (I would like to remind you that there was even a saying “the area of privileged interests”); it has a certain leverage of influence upon internal and external developments in each of the states and the state entities of the region. It builds relationships with both Armenia and Azerbaijan exclusively pragmatically, on the basis of its strategic interests.

I doubt that Russia has its special plan for resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. However, it is obvious that it is not interested in a clear definition and the introduction of its position on this issue, because otherwise it comes down on the side of either Armenia or Azerbaijan, thereby narrowing its strategic space. Taking into consideration the level of the Russian-Georgian relations, Russia cannot allow itself to have another “reluctant” neighbor as a result of a choice between the states involved in the above-mentioned Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Thus, Russia is in favor of the status quo established in the area of the conflict.

Let me remind you that the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, as well as the Presidents of Russia, the USA, and France, have been issued several statements pointing out that the Nagorno Karabakh conflict can be – and should be – resolved only by its direct participants. In general, they are right.

In your opinion, are Armenia and Azerbaijan able to stop the meaningless bloodshed along the borders without any external assistance? Or, maybe we should apply for help to the international community, taking into consideration that there is a threat that subversive acts will turn into a resumption of full-scale war?

Most probably, subversive acts in the absence of the comprehensive peace agreement are unavoidable. The problem is that the number of these acts is increasing, and in parallel the number of victims from both sides is growing. The so-called international community has its own array of other problems, and the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict is not among its priorities. Thus, the proverb “people in trouble are left to themselves” is applicable in the case of this conflict. Furthermore, to stop the bloodshed along the contact line there should be not only good will of the parties directly involved in the conflict, but also their recognition of the meaningless of this bloodshed.

In the case of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict it has not happened because Azerbaijan must demonstrate its firm commitment to return the territories that are currently under the Armenian control at all costs. Тhat is, for Azerbaijan the tactic of provoking the two Armenian parties to the conflict to respond is not meaningless: on the one hand, Azerbaijani authorities stress the priority of the conflict resolution while simultaneously intensifying the militaristic mood in their society. On the other hand – when Armenia acts in response – they acquire an opportunity to blame our state for its “aggressive behavior.” The Armenian side repeatedly has suggested, and still suggests, a withdrawal of the snipers from the contact line. However, Azerbaijan, in line with the above-mentioned approach, cannot take even this step - because it will be evaluated throughout the Azerbaijani society as a concession to Armenia and a reversal of the national goal. Moreover, Azerbaijan comprehends also a threat of a further escalation as a consequence of a tough response of the two Armenian state entities and the negative reaction of the international community.

The military actions along the border with Armenia cannot give rise to a withdrawal of Armenian forces from the territories which Azerbaijan considers as its own. At a glance, Baku could not be interested in an escalation of tensions in the northern side of the Armenian-Azerbaijani state border – for the reason that it could be evaluated by Armenia as good reason to apply for help to the CSTO member-states, and to Russia in particular. Why, in your opinion, does Azerbaijan increase provocations in this direction, but not along the contact line between the Karabakhi and Azerbaijani military forces?

I suppose that on the one hand Azerbaijan is probing the defense line of Armenia; on the other hand it is checking Russia’s reaction – as the leading state in the CSTO – in the event of a possible large-scale military operation against Armenia. (I exclude any support for Armenia from the Central-Asian states and Kazakhstan; most probably they will stay neutral if military actions resume directly between Armenia and Azerbaijan.) As another factor I would mention the joint military maneuvers of the CSTO Collective Operational Reaction Forces (CORF) “Cooperation 2012.” They will take place on Armenian soil in early September and will be focused upon the repulson of a possible military attack against Armenia. These maneuvers increase nervousness not only in Georgia, but in Azerbaijan, as well. The latter “warns” Armenia and demonstrates its operational readiness.

In your opinion, is there any possibility that Moscow can repeat the August 8, 2008 scenario if the Nagorno Karabakh conflict develops into a full-scale war between Armenia and Azerbaijan?

No, none. However, currently Russia focuses upon mechanisms to prevent escalation of the conflict that could have unpredictable consequences. First, it will be very difficult for Moscow to decide which of the parties to the conflict to support. Second, in the August war of 2008, it had two pretexts to intervention: the Russian peacekeepers in the area of the South Ossetian conflict, and the approximately 96-97% of the South Ossetia population holding Russian citizenship.

Among the negotiation themes during the recent visit of Hillary Clinton to Armenia and Azerbaijan was the Nagorno Karabakh problem. The US Secretary of State mentioned also that there are some positive shifts occurred after the Paris meeting of the Armenian and Azerbaijani Ministers of Foreign Affairs. However, there have been no visible changes or shifts in regard to conflict resolution. What is the purpose of the American diplomacy in regard to this kind of statements?

On the eve of the presidential elections and with growing internal tension in the USA, American diplomacy needs to demonstrate success in the foreign policy area safeguarding some stability in the overt and latent “hot spots.” Turkey was in the focus of Mrs. Clinton’s regional visit; the stopover in Yerevan and Baku was rather a PR-action to confirm Washington’s interest in stability in the South Caucasus and to balance the Kremlin activity in this region.

What trends can you mention in the current foreign policy of Armenia in regard in particular to the European integration and the integration to the Eurasian Union initiated by Vladimir Putin?

Armenia faces the difficult task of preserving the essential balance in its foreign policy. The European and the Russian initiatives (the Free trade zone, and the Eurasian Union and Customs Union, respectively) have their pluses and minuses. European integration does not assume membership of our state in the European Union, which conducts soft power initiatives in the South Caucasus and is not ready to implement and support high cost economic projects. However, intensification of cooperation with the EU will enable Armenia to enlarge its political and economic opportunities and contribute to the further democratization of the country. It can play also an indirect role in the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.

As for the Russian initiatives, let me remind you that Armenia’s decision not to participate in the Customs Union with Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus fits fully with the desire to correct and balance, above all, the political priorities of Armenia. The level of bilateral relations between Armenia and these three states, all of which are members of the Customs Union, is very high, especially with Russia. And, finally, all have signed agreements on free trade areas in the CIS.

Most probably, Russia will pressure Armenia hard, trying to involve it in these projects. To achieve this goal Russia will use not only its economic leverage (such as energy supplies), but also the factor of unresolved Nagorno Karabakh conflict, as well as the state of Armenian political forces in the 2013 presidential elections.

source: ARMINFO NEWS AGENCY

Latest

Editor's choice

Monday Commentary

Monday Commentary: PEACE IN OUR TIME?

19 October 2026

Making peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan was never going to be simple, nor easy, nor quick. It is taking time, writes Dennis Sammut in this Monday Commentary. “There is a sense of realism coming from the leaders of the two countries – President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan and prime minister Nikol Pashinyan of Armenia, that frankly, is necessary and welcome”, he writes. At a time when conflicts are raging all over the world – from Ukraine to the Gulf, from Africa to South Asia, the prospect that Armenia and Azerbaijan had finally, after decades of conflict that left thousands of dead and many more displaced, decided on embarking on a journey of peace was welcomed. Peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan can be top-down up to a point. Both leaders have spent political capital preparing for a peace deal. But both are aware that their people are not ready for peace yet. In fact, in Armenia, most of the elite are negative toward a peace deal with Azerbaijan. Pashinyan needs time to persuade his countryfolk. That is why 2031 is realistic. Ilham Aliyev runs a tighter shop, but he is also not immune to public opinion. Every time someone hits a landmine in Karabakh, which unfortunately happens often, peace comes into question. Which is why Aliyev chooses to sound hardline, more often than not. In pursuing the peace agenda, both Aliyev and Pashinyan need to proceed cautiously. But they are right in making peace the central issue in their agenda. It is the main issue, and the one that will define them in history. So forward, cautiously but resolutely! In pursuing the peace agenda, Aliyev and Pashinyan need to be supported clearly and unambiguously. There are too many people in Baku and Yerevan who are sitting on the sides, waiting. The international community is not doing enough. It is time to be counted. Otherwise, the spoilers will win, and the region will go back to its bad habits. (Click the image to read the full commentary).

Dennis Sammut

Editor's choice

News

COP 31 Update: A Summit Focused on Implementation, Electrification and Climate Finance

9 November 2026

Anna Szedlacsek

Popular

Editor's choice

Monday Commentary

Monday Commentary: European-Azerbaijan relations need an intensive and multifaceted dialogue that is frank and honest

7 September 2026

Last week I visited Baku, Azerbaijan. My visit was relatively short, but very intensive, and had many meetings with stakeholders and colleagues. When I arrived in Baku first time in 1996, Azerbaijan was a different country: weak, poor, and shaken by defeat in war. For thirty year the Karabakh issue dominated the agenda: the political agenda but also the popular mindset. Now, thirty years later, Azerbaijan has returned to Karabakh, and peace with Armenia is on the horizon. It is a new era for Armenia-Azerbaijan relations, for the South Caucasus, but also for Europe. But we cannot be complacent: the Peace agreement has been initialed but not signed; borders remain closed; TRIPP is ambitious but remains an idea; and there are spoilers who want to turn the clock back. We must not allow them, and in this Europe and Azerbaijan must work together. Europe’ vanguard organization is the European Union – it is a free union of 27 member states; it is a strong global economic force, and increasingly a diplomatic and military force too. But it remains “work in progress” and can often appear dysfunctional. It often lacks collective and institutional memory. In its dealings with Azerbaijan the EU has made many mistakes – not least opening the delegation here late – in 2008. It sometimes appears condescending. Some utterances from the European Parliament and from some quarters in some member states are not understandable even for me. They irritate the Azerbaijanis, but serve no other purpose But Azerbaijan has also not handled relations with the EU well. It has failed to respond when the hand of friendship reached out; and it confused irritating actions, sometimes by well-meaning people; sometimes by outright spoilers, with strategic action. In short, EU-Azerbaijan relations have suffered from a lack of proper dialogue. This dialogue must be frank, honest and multi-faceted involving different segments of society on both sides. Is Azerbaijan Europe? When Azerbaijan applied to join the Council of Europe in the 1990s, there were some who opposed, saying this was not Europe. I was one of the people who argued that Armenia and Azerbaijan may be on the periphery of the continent geographically, but were European in essence. Certainly their elites. During the discussion on 4 September in Baku, my friend Farhad Mammedov, mentioned that Azerbaijan is not interested in joining the EU, and was now close to the Central Asian countries in the 5 plus 1 format. Neither things mean that Azerbaijan is not Europe. There are several European countries that are not in the EU, and do not want to be, for example Norway and Switzerland. Iceland has recently voted to stay out of the EU. The UK was a member and left. Europe is bigger than the EU, and the holding of the European Political Community summit in Baku in 2027 proves that. Despite all the rhetoric, I never heard the president of Azerbaijan saying that Azerbaijan is not Europe, nor have I heard any European president say it either. Not wanting to join the EU and forging close relations with neighbouring regions does not make Azerbaijan any less European. It is only logical that when Europeans talk to Azerbaijan they talk like family. The conversation is often frank. It must also be honest, and Europeans need always to remember this too. A frank, honest and multi-faceted dialogue A frank, honest and multifaceted dialogue will contribute to relations between Azerbaijan and the rest of Europe: it will avoid misperception, which unfortunately is very common on both sides; it will provide a forum where problems can be discussed and resolved, and it will increase mutual trust, so that together common problems can be addressed. (click image to read the full Monday Commentary)

Dennis Sammut

Editor's choice

Monday Commentary

Monday Commentary: “The barren rocks of Aden” and “These lands of Yemen are so ruthless”

21 September 2026

There are two early 20th-century tunes that mark foreign attempts to occupy and “pacify” Yemen. The Scottish tune “The barren rocks of Aden” marks the mobilisation of Highland soldiers, enlisted to be deployed to the Yemeni port of Aden, that in 1837 became the last colony to be incorporated into the British Empire. The tune talks of the harshness of the terrain, but is celebratory, It was even played as a farewell tune to Sir William Luce at the parade in Sharjah celebrating his end as “British Viceroy” in the Middle East in 1966. The second tune is an Anatolian lament. As Ilker Sezer reminded us this weekend, in his weekly feature on “Turkiye Today”, it “mourns the tragic fate of Ottoman soldiers dispatched to the harsh, remote deserts of Yemen during the fall of the empire, young men who marched away from their villages and never returned home. Most of their names, and numbers, were never recorded. Yet, their fate left a mark on the Turkish psyche.” Subsequent invaders have discovered that Yemen is a grave that cannot be overcome by the strength of modern technology, and that whilst Yemeni society is splintered and divided, building a reliable alliance with Yemeni factions is difficult. These are the harsh lessons facing Saudi Arabia, as the Kingdom faces its biggest challenge in its modern history. The leadership of the Kingdom now has to respond decisively. At stake is their very credibility. This is likely to be a long and messy conflict. Saudi military objectives need to be focused: to box in the Houthis rather than destroy them. This is likely to include: (a) regaining territory lost on the Red Sea coast; (b) control over Bab el Mandeb Strait; (c) some kind of cordon sanitaire on the Saudi-Yemeni border; and if things go well (d) the capture of Sanaa. All this would not eliminate the Houthi problem, but it will contain it. In the end the Saudis will have to continue managing Yemen with a mixture of carrot and stick. For the moment, the stick is likely, but the carrot cannot be forgotten either. (click the image to read the Monday Commentary in full)

Dennis Sammut