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The war in Ukraine rages on, and the constant pounding of Kyiv by Russian drones and missiles, is a reminder that this is not a war being fought in some far away border region. The war turned out very different from the one Vladimir Putin had envisioned when he launched his full scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Thousands of young Ukrainians have died defending their country. Ukraine has been able to optimize its drone capability in order to take the battle back to the Russians, including to Moscow and St Petersburg. But to defend itself and its cities and citizens from sophisticated Russian weaponry Ukraine needs western support. This has not been as forthcoming as the Ukrainians hoped. Certainly Donald Trump has been less enthusiastic in helping Ukraine than his predecessor. Maybe this is now changing too. Europe’s support needs to remain high and consistent, and ambivalence must be avoided. Last week, Germany’s foreign minister held talks with his Russian counterpart in the first face-to-face meeting between top officials of the two nations since Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Johann Wadephul said he used the “intense conversation” with Sergei Lavrov in New York to warn Moscow against further escalation after a drone laden with explosives was discovered at Leipzig airport last month in an incident that Berlin has blamed on Russia. He said that he “gave Russia a clear warning” not to continue in the same vein, adding: “We can defend ourselves, we can fight back and we will do so.” Wadephul told German public broadcaster ZDF that he had also offered Lavrov “a chance to de-escalate” in Ukraine, adding that it had “fallen on deaf ears”. “I also made it very clear to Russia: we stand with Ukraine, Ukraine has our full support, and economic pressure on Russia will continue,” he said. “I said that again to Lavrov and called on him finally to be prepared to enter talks.” The meeting lasted around 20 minutes and ended with a handshake between the two men. I support diplomacy and dialogue as a means of resolving issues. But I am also aware that isolating Russia diplomatically is an important way of putting pressure on Russia to end the mayhem it unleashed in Ukraine. The German Foreign Minister has to ask himself if the 20 minute meeting with Lavrov was worth easing that pressure. The last time Lavrov met a German foreign minister was in January 2022, the month before Putin launched his full-scale assault on Ukraine. Europe must continue supporting Ukraine, and isolating Russia should be part of that strategy. On the other hand engaging with Russia as part of a search for a solution is necessary. Balancing the two considerations is a difficult business, and Europe is best acting in a united fashion on this matter too. (click image to read the Monday Commentary in full).

In this analysis for commonspace.eu, Anna Szedlacsek argues that Kazakhstan and Armenia, two countries that Russia had considered in its sphere of influence, appear increasingly eager to ensure that Moscow is no longer their only option. Armenia and Kazakhstan both reached their strategic turning points between 2020 and 2022, driven by security failures, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and severe economic vulnerabilities.  Among these reasons, the war in Ukraine sheds a particularly long shadow. In Kazakhstan, Russia’s “special military operation” substantially damaged Moscow's image among ordinary Kazakh citizens and reignited anxieties about revanchist Russian rhetoric regarding northern Kazakhstan. Almaty is heavily challenged by having to navigate its deep economic and transit interdependence with Russia. Kazakhstan is aggressively developing alternative transport links, such as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor) through Baku, Azerbaijan, to reach European and global markets without crossing Russian territory. This also reflects a move away from Russia as its main trading partner – this position has been earned by China, or, if considered as a bloc, the European Union (EU). Armenia, on the other hand, began its pivot away from Moscow’s orbit after the 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and reached a point of no return following Azerbaijan's final capture of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023. This is due to the fact that despite hosting a Russian military base and belonging to the CSTO, Armenia received no military assistance from Russia during either of these conflicts. Moscow remained neutral – and thus turned untrustworthy in the eyes of Armenians – because it wished to safeguard its expanding economic, energy, and transit partnerships with Azerbaijan and Turkey. The Armenian parliament also passed a law to initiate the EU accession process, while ministries are recruiting Western-educated professionals to restructure the civil service away from the Kremlin. The question, is not simply whether Russia is losing its allies. It is whether Russia is losing its ability to make those allies dependent on it. As of September 2026, the evidence does not point to a definitive answer. Russia has not been pushed out of either country – but both Kazakhstan and Armenia appear increasingly eager to ensure that Moscow is no longer their only option. (click the image to read the analysis in full)

Uzbekistan called for a more effective and representative United Nations on September 23, as presidential administration chief Saida Mirziyoyeva used her address to the UN General Assembly to seek support for the country’s candidacy for a nonpermanent Security Council seat in 2035–2036. Speaking at the Assembly’s 81st session in New York, Mirziyoyeva argued that international cooperation remains necessary despite growing geopolitical divisions. She endorsed UN Secretary-General António Guterres’ UN80 reform initiative and called for an expanded Security Council, arguing that international rules should be applied consistently rather than according to the interests of powerful states. Uzbekistan’s planned chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement in 2027 was presented as another platform for promoting dialogue. Her emphasis on multilateralism also fits a broader Central Asian effort to increase the region’s role in international institutions. Kyrgyzstan, for example, will hold its first Security Council seat in 2027–2028. Mirziyoyeva also highlighted regional cooperation, pointing to improved relations among Central Asian states over longstanding border and water disputes. On Afghanistan, she urged countries not to view it solely as a security threat, stressing the importance of creating conditions for peaceful development. She linked Uzbekistan’s international agenda to domestic reforms, citing economic growth, falling poverty and expanded education. Climate and water security also featured prominently, with the Aral Sea serving as an example of the consequences of poor environmental management. (click image to read more)

Kazakh president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, declared September 25 a national day of mourning following the deaths of servicemen during military exercises in the Caspian Sea. Twelve Kazakh servicemen died after being swept into the Caspian Sea during the Khazar Qorgany–2026 naval exercises in the Mangystau region on Thursday (September 24). The incident occurred after weather conditions suddenly deteriorated and winds intensified during a combat training mission. In a Telegram post, the Ministry of Defence reported that 19 servicemen had been swept into the sea. So far, three have been rescued, one of whom was hospitalized, while 12 bodies have been recovered.  Search operations were continuing for the remaining four servicemen. A large-scale rescue and recovery effort has been launched, involving Kazakhstan’s Naval Forces, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, aviation assets and other relevant services.   Deputy Prime Minister Kanat Bozumbayev, who is leading a government commission at the scene, ordered a continuous, round-the-clock search for those still missing. Authorities were also instructed to provide financial and other assistance to the families of the deceased. (click image to read in full)

It has been a little over a year since Armenia and Azerbaijan initialed a peace agreement in Washington, and the mood in the South Caucasus is neither breakthrough nor stalemate. A government-facilitated Peace Bridge initiative has brought dozens of citizens across the border in both directions, and Armenia can now import goods from Russia via Azerbaijani territory. Yet the agreement still stands unsigned and unratified, and the long-promised opening of the Armenia-Türkiye border, agreed in principle back in 2022, has still not come to reality. There remains a parallel struggle linking both outcomes to a change in Armenia's constitution. Dr Benyamin Poghosyan has spent close to two decades studying exactly this terrain. A historian by training, he worked at Armenia's Ministry of Defence think tank, the Institute for National Strategic Studies, for a decade, including three years as a director of the institute, before joining APRI Armenia as Senior Research Fellow in 2023. Since 2021, he has served as the Armenian co-rapporteur of the Joint Armenian-Azerbaijani Liaison Group (JOLIG), a dialogue platform facilitated by LINKS Europe, working alongside Azerbaijani counterparts through some of the most difficult years in the two countries' recent history. JOLIG was dissolved in 2024 and replaced by the Armenia-Azerbaijan Expert Strategic Platform, which monitors developments in Armenia-Azerbaijan relations and acts when necessary. Santiago Ferbel-Azcarate interviewed Dr Poghosyan for the Thursday Interview feature, on commonspace.eu (click the image to read the interview in full)

Far-right groups in Georgia rallied in Tbilisi on September 20 against the UAE-based Eagle Hills investment and its planned large-scale developments near Tbilisi and Batumi. Organizers described the demonstration as a protest against “Arab towns” and announced the creation of a “National Unity for the Protection of Georgian Lands” to coordinate opposition to the projects. The initiative plans to bring together political groups, academics, lawyers and economists opposed to the investment. Organizers also announced plans for legal challenges before Georgia’s Constitutional Court, administrative courts and Prosecutor’s Office, alongside further demonstrations. The Eagle Hills project, representing $6.5 billion in real estate, is promoted by the Georgian government as the largest investment in the country’s history. Critics have questioned the agreement’s transparency, financial viability and potential environmental and social effects. Far-right groups have additionally linked the project to fears about immigration and demographic change. Eagle Hills’ project was announced in January 2025 following Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze’s visit to the United Arab Emirates. Its expansion has since become a focal point for both economic debate and nationalist opposition, with different groups raising distinct concerns about the investment. The governing Georgian Dream party has condemned the protests.