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As Viktor Orbán’s government suffered a landslide defeat in Hungary last month, one of the main questions was how Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s new and much more pro-EU government would affect the EU’s ability to enact punitive measures against Russia, in particular the severity of sanctions that it could apply to the Kremlin and those indirectly supporting its war effort in Ukraine. With Hungary no longer stonewalling these efforts, the EU adopted its 20th sanctions package against Russia on the 24th of April. For the first time, the EU has used its ‘anti-circumvention’ tools and applied them to Kyrgyzstan. These are secondary sanctions on countries helping the Kremlin bypass the primary sanctions imposed upon it as a consequence of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. While individual Kyrgyz as well as other Central Asian banks and entities have been targeted before, this is the first time they have been applied to an entire country. Kyrgyzstan’s imports of European dual-use technologies, in particular telecommunications equipment and metalworking machinery, far exceed its domestic demand and are being re-exported to Russia, according to EU Sanctions Envoy David O’Sullivan. This is also greatly facilitated by Ruble-backed cryptocurrency, allowing re-export transactions with Russian entities to better circumvent sanctions, which is why Kyrgyz cryptocurrency company TengriCoin has also been included, along with two major Kyrgyz banks. While this re-export business is surely profitable for Kyrgyz companies, it remains to be seen whether this sanctions package will have any immediate noticeable effect on the Kyrgyz economy. Past EU sanctions have already been criticised by the Kyrgyz government, with President Sadyr Japarov previously describing EU sanctions against individual Kyrgyz entities as “baseless” and interfering in internal affairs. First Deputy Cabinet Chair of Kyrgyzstan, Daniyar Amangeldiev, also pointed out that sweeping sanctions against Kyrgyzstan will have consequences for its image on the global stage. Regardless, the EU has now pushed through its 20th sanctions package, which is undoubtedly an escalation from previous iterations and presents a difficult situation for the Kyrgyz government to navigate. So far, Kyrgyzstan has responded by calling for transparent talks with the European Commission, and is reportedly in direct consultations with the EU, as well as US and UK officials, who have also levied their own sanctions against Kyrgyz entities.

On 7 June 2026, Armenians will go to the polls in parliamentary elections that are formally domestic, but politically much larger than that. Nineteen political forces – seventeen parties and two alliances – are competing in the race. Yet the real contest is not only between parties. The 2026 elections are not only a domestic contest over power, but a referendum-like moment on Armenia’s geopolitical orientation, peace agenda, and democratic resilience. At the heart of this election are three larger questions: whether a post-war society can resist the political instrumentalization of fear; whether a small state can reclaim agency after years of strategic dependence; and whether, after repeated rupture and loss, Armenia can still define its future beyond trauma. In this sense, the election is not only about who governs Armenia next. It is about the political direction through which Armenia will try to govern itself after war, displacement, and the collapse of old security assumptions. These are Armenia’s third parliamentary elections since the 2018 Velvet Revolution, following the early elections of 2018 and 2021. That matters. For the first time in years, Armenia is not going to elections only because of the immediate crisis – revolution in 2018, post-war political breakdown in 2021 – but in a moment when the country is trying to define a new strategic direction. The vote is therefore less about routine government change and more about whether Armenia’s post-2018 democratic project can survive the pressures placed on it: defeat, displacement, polarization, foreign interference, and the daily political temptation to turn fear into votes. (To read the full commentary, click on the image above.)

This week, commonspace.eu spoke to Nigel Ellway about his work on landmines, explosive weapons and victim assistance, and his mission to make conflict-affected communities safer and more humane places to live.  Nigel Ellway is a former international journalist and Whitehall media adviser who has dedicated more than a decade to raise political awareness of landmines, explosive weapons and victim assistance. In 2011, he created an All-Party Parliamentary Group on Landmines, and in 2018 founded the REVIVE Campaign, a humanitarian NGO focused on research and advocacy. We spoke to Mr. Ellway about the long-term impact of landmines and explosive weapons, why victim assistance is too often politically neglected, and why mine action should be measured not only by land cleared or devices removed, but by lives rebuilt, livelihoods restored and communities made safe again. “When I founded REVIVE, we adopted the phrase: “Reduce explosive violence, increase victim empowerment.” That is actually where the organisation’s name comes from. But over time, I became increasingly realistic about what NGOs can and cannot achieve. Conflict will always exist, and human beings are endlessly inventive in the ways they wage war. Historically, landmines were seen as effective weapons of deterrence because they were cheap to deploy but expensive to remove. Today, however, warfare is evolving rapidly. Drone warfare is transforming the battlefield.” (To read the full interview, click on the image above.)