South Caucasus

Turkey-Russia relations are typically based on compartmentalization. They simultaneously compete and cooperate in various regions, separating the areas in which their interests are overlapping from those where they are in competition. This concept was the base of their competing relations in Syria until the demise of Assad regime in 2024, and mutual interactions in post-Gaddafi Libya.

“You must be glad to be here,” the bartender told my friend, a journalist for a major international media outlet just arrived that evening in Yerevan from Baku via Tbilisi. He raised an eyebrow in response as the bartender slowly poured our drinks. “Why?” he asked, clearly confused. “Because Azerbaijanis are Muslims, they don’t drink, and there are no bars in Baku,” she replied, somehow absolutely convinced that she was correct. The exchange was almost comical, but revealed something deeper. Three decades of conflict had turned former neighbours into strangers. In Tbilisi, where ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis live side by side, it would be met with ridicule. Only last October I sat at a table where the vodka flowed as a local Armenian sang in Azerbaijani and ethnic Azerbaijanis expressed their appreciation in Armenian.

Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan held important trilateral meetings in the Turkmen city of Turkmenbashi on Friday, 22 August. Joint development of deposits on the Caspian shelf and cooperation in the field of energy exports, including renewable sources, were discussed. The talks came in the framework of the visit to Turkmenistan of President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan and President Shovkat Mirzizoyev of  Uzbekistan who were hosted by the Chairman of the Halk Maslahaty (Senate) of Turkmenistan, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, who is a former president and the father of the current president, Serdar Berdimuhamedov. Azerbaijani media noted that during the meeting Uzbekistan hailed a scheme to export green electricity to Europe as promising, while Turkmen officials signaled a new openness to ideas long discussed in Brussels and Ankara, to build a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, a project that has been under discussion for more than 30 years.

Tensions between Azerbaijan and Russia have been on an escalatory track since the crash of the Azerbaijani Airlines commercial airplane in December 2024. In the past, similar disputes were usually resolved quickly, leaving little lasting impact. This time, however, the crisis is far more complex and shows no signs of de-escalation. On the contrary, almost every month since the crash has marked new record lows in Baku–Moscow relations and appears likely to have a lasting impact on future bilateral ties. The situation has become so intricate and unpredictable that further deterioration cannot be ruled out.

It is now 31 years since I first travelled from London to the South Caucasus to report from what was then Nagorno Karabakh. Since then, I’ve covered almost every dimension of the conflict. From the Azerbaijani POWs and civilian hostages I encountered on my first trip to Karabakh in 1994, through the ethnic Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan struggling to rebuild their lives in Armenia that same year and then from 1999, and the lingering danger of landmines and unexploded ordnance that plagued the seven formerly occupied regions of Azerbaijan surrounding Karabakh throughout the 2000s. They still claim lives today.