South Caucasus

For decades, Russia has stood at the centre of the South Caucasus’ security order. No peace deal, no war settlement, no major infrastructure project could be imagined without Moscow’s involvement. Yet this year, for the first time in Azerbaijan’s modern history, that assumption has been openly challenged. A series of diplomatic clashes between Baku and Moscow, followed last week by the U.S.-mediated summit in Washington, show that Azerbaijan is willing to confront Russia more directly than ever before, and that the South Caucasus may now be shifting away from Moscow at an accelerated pace.

Turkey-Russia relations are typically based on compartmentalization. They simultaneously compete and cooperate in various regions, separating the areas in which their interests are overlapping from those where they are in competition. This concept was the base of their competing relations in Syria until the demise of Assad regime in 2024, and mutual interactions in post-Gaddafi Libya.

“You must be glad to be here,” the bartender told my friend, a journalist for a major international media outlet just arrived that evening in Yerevan from Baku via Tbilisi. He raised an eyebrow in response as the bartender slowly poured our drinks. “Why?” he asked, clearly confused. “Because Azerbaijanis are Muslims, they don’t drink, and there are no bars in Baku,” she replied, somehow absolutely convinced that she was correct. The exchange was almost comical, but revealed something deeper. Three decades of conflict had turned former neighbours into strangers. In Tbilisi, where ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis live side by side, it would be met with ridicule. Only last October I sat at a table where the vodka flowed as a local Armenian sang in Azerbaijani and ethnic Azerbaijanis expressed their appreciation in Armenian.