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A Berlin government spokesperson said on Monday (30 June) that Germany expects the EU’s plans for an 18th sanctions package against Russia to be adopted this week.

The Nato Summit held in The Hague on 24-25 June was a failure, wrapped in success. It was a success because it avoided public display of divisions, mainly by avoiding issues: it was the shortest summit anyone can remember; it also had a very short final statement that basically had two points, the first a re-commitment to article 5 of the North Atlantic Charter and the principle that an attack on one will be considered an attack on all. The fact that Nato leaders in the Hague had felt the need to re-emphasise this should be a cause of worry not celebration, but in the end, it is good that it was said. The second outcome, the one that received most attention, was the commitment of European countries to spend more on their defence: 5 per cent of GDP, of which 3.5 per cent on hard defence, and 1.5 per cent on related ancillary areas such as infrastructure. You may, if you want, believe that this was a response to US President Donald Trump's insistence. Or, if you are more prudent, understand that countries that matter – Germany, France, Poland and the Scandinavian countries had decided on this course of action quite separately, and as a response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which was a wake-up call. Finland and Sweden’s decision to abandon their neutrality, and join NATO was taken long before Trump returned to the White House. The EU’s decision to spend massively on defence was always to ensure that other European countries are part of this process, willy-nilly.