A preliminary memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran was agreed on Thursday (28 May), emerging as one of the most concrete diplomatic developments of the war so far. Writing for Arab News, Hassan Al-Mustafa reported that the memorandum's primary provisions focus on the consolidation of a renewable truce, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, the removal of naval mines, the allowing of the passage of commercial ships and oil tankers without fees, and a gradual easing of economic restrictions on Iran (note, it postpones the negotiations on the nuclear issue entirely). The memorandum, importantly, is not a finalized peace deal but rather a genuine attempt to establish a safe transition from war to the negotiating table. And hence, as reported by Hassan Al-Mustafa, it leaves some obstacles along the way: whether Iran‘s opening of the Strait will be full and instant or gradual and conditional; whether sanctions relief will precede or follow nuclear commitments; whether Iran will commit to restraining and holding back its allied groups in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen; and whether US President Trump will succeed in separating the Iran track from his desire to expand the Abraham Accords, especially given that Saudi Arabia has coupled any recognition of Israel to a credible road map toward Palestinian statehood. Another factor defining the success of the memorandum of understanding comes from Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s participation in a group call with Trump and the leaders of Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain, Jordan, Egypt, Türkiye, and Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, but reflects Riyadh’s determination that an understanding with Tehran must be embedded in an integrated regional security framework, beyond a bilateral deal between Washington and Tehran alone.
Despite positive diplomatic movement, the broader strategic picture is a more difficult reality. Writing for the Arab Center in Washington, Charles W. Dunne argued that the war had substantially weakened the Pax Americana, which was the US-led security structure built to stabilize the Middle East from the 1990s onwards. This comes as Washington cannot claim a decisive victory, with damage to US military facilities in the Gulf reportedly more significant than previously acknowledged. Israel has used the cover of war to devastate Gaza and consolidate its hold in the West Bank, while progress toward the Abraham Accords now appears almost dead. China, by contrast, has emerged as an unexpected beneficiary following Trump's visit to Beijing, which was described by Dunne as having an air of humility with the portrayal of China as Washington's strategic equal. However, whether Beijing can capitalize effectively on its diplomatic gains remains in a realm of uncertainty, but for many in the region, there now may be a welcome alternative to American leadership.
The war has also continued an accelerated strategic recalibration between Europe and the Gulf. Writing for the Middle East Council on Global Affairs, Camille Lons made a direct parallel with Europe’s post-2022 geopolitical awakening, with GCC states now facing a similar dilemma of relying on a security partner that is detrimental to survival, yet increasingly perceived as a liability. France dispatched the Aircraft carrier "Charles de Gaulle" and Rafale jets to the region; the UK reinforced its regional bases and prepared air patrols over the Strait. Most European governments, however, distanced themselves from US offensive operations entirely, prompting Washington to threaten scaling back its NATO commitment. France and the UK have since promoted an alternative defensive maritime coalition for the Strait, purposefully excluding the United States. However, challenges remain, Ukraine will continue to dominate European strategic priorities, and Gulf states may ultimately continue to prioritize Washington for as long as American Military capabilities remain irreplaceable and indispensable.
Iran has been utilizing weaknesses in Gulf AI infrastructure, which has opened a reality that neither international law nor corporate risk models were adequately prepared for. Mohammed Soliman, a senior fellow for the Middle East Institute, documented that Iranian drone strikes on Amazon data centers in the UAE and Bahrain were designed to make global capital nervous about the Gulf’s stability. The strategy resulted in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar collectively planning eight to ten gigawatts of AI-related computational capacity, backed by sovereign capital with generational time horizons that, as Soliman argued, do not get deterred by a drone getting through air defences. UAE ambassador Yousef al-Otaiba made Emirati intentions plain at a Washington conference in early May, describing the UAE as all-in on American tech. Now, despite this clear positioning from many of the Gulf States, Iran has been documented to have begun to reframe the Strait of Hormuz as a digital chokepoint, as submarine cables carry about ninety-nine percent of intercontinental data and an estimated ten trillion dollars in financial transactions daily. On 22 April, the Tasnim News Agency (directly linked to Iran's Revolutionary Guard) published a detailed map of undersea cables in the Arabian Gulf, floating the idea of extracting protection fees from operators. The IRGC has since said that foreign operators must receive permits and pay fees to maintain cables in Iranian waters. The real strategy, as argued by Zaid M. Belbagi for Arab News, is not to cut the cables but to hold the repair of infrastructure hostage. On 12 March, Alcatel Submarine Networks suspended maintenance across the Arabian Gulf, placing the 2xAfrica Pearls cable, which was meant to connect nine countries this year, on an indefinite hold. Iran has spent longer than any other state learning to live without open connectivity; now, this asymmetry is what the region must plan for.
Source: This briefing was first published Arabia Concise on 2 June 2026. It was prepared by Santiago Ferbel-Azcarate, with support from the commonspace.eu editorial team, drawing on reporting from Arab News (Riyadh), the Arab Center (Washington D.C.), Middle East Institute (Washington D.C.), and the Middle East Council on Global Affairs (Doha).
