This commentary was prepared by Dr Andrzej Klimczyk for the second issue of Armenia Election Monitor 2026 on 6 May.
The upcoming parliamentary elections in Armenia will undoubtedly be crucial for the country’s future. We can already observe significant social polarisation, the use of hate speech, and brutal media attacks by competing electoral entities on each other. Unlike Georgia or Moldova, Armenia is operating under intense and immediate security pressure following the end of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Border issues, normalisation of relations with Azerbaijan, and relations with Türkiye are not just foreign policy issues; they are existential political issues. This raises the stakes of the election and increases the likelihood of hardline rhetoric that could complicate post-election management.
Armenia continues to hold genuinely competitive, free elections. Compared to countries such as Russia, this remains an important strength. The main problem is not the lack of competition, but the quality of it. Currently, politics is highly polarised and often based on support for or opposition to Nikol Pashinyan. This risks narrowing the political debate and turning elections into referendums on leadership rather than on future-oriented programmes.
There are real threats and risks of disinformation or hybrid interference in these elections.
Not only during the campaign, but also on election day and afterwards. The greatest threat is the constant flow of hate-driven narratives, which reinforce existing polarisation rather than creating a stable pre-election environment.
Disinformation can also target the diaspora. Armenia’s large diaspora is an asset, but it also allows narratives to spread outside the country and return through social media platforms.
Armenia is partly prepared to counter external disinformation. For sure, Armenia is better prepared than it was a decade ago, but its defences against hybrid interference are still not fully integrated.
There are many organisations, civil society groups, and independent media outlets actively engaged in fact-checking and monitoring, often with support from the European Union. This is an important strength.
In this context is worth noting that on April 21, the EU approved a new civilian mission in Armenia, EUPM (EU Partnership Mission to Armenia), aimed at combating hybrid threats (election interference, cyberattacks, illicit financing).
The mission was created at the request of the Armenian side ahead of the parliamentary elections scheduled for June 7. Yerevan asked Brussels to deploy a "rapid response team" to protect against external interference.
The European Council established the EUPM Armenia within the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), further contributing to efforts to strengthen Armenia's democratic resilience and crisis management capacity. The mission will support Armenia in countering multifaceted threats, such as foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), cyberattacks, and illicit financial flows. EUPM Armenia will provide strategic advice and capacity-building to various ministries and government institutions in developing policies to counter the threats facing society and government, as well as support the development of a horizontal, whole-of-government approach.
Key objectives of the mission are,
- Combating disinformation and cyberthreats
- Preventing illicit financial flows in politics
- Advising security agencies
EUPM should help Armenia to fill out institutional gaps, including the lack of a fully integrated, state-led strategy that combines cybersecurity, strategic communications, platform engagement, and crisis response. Faster and clearer communication from authorities is needed to prevent information vacuums. Coordination across social platforms and closer cooperation with major technology companies may also be necessary to detect coordinated behaviour at an early stage.
The greatest risk is not that the elections will be technically manipulated, but that the information environment becomes so polarised that the outcome is widely questioned.
Another problem is low public awareness, which causes weak or poorly documented claims to quickly gain popularity.
There is a need for faster official communication. Clear, timely updates from authorities are necessary to prevent an information vacuum.
- In summary, elections will be competitive in a very polarized electoral environment. Compared to countries like Russia, Armenia continues to hold truly competitive elections. The bigger problem isn't the lack of competition, but the quality of it. Politics is highly polarized, largely based on support for or opposition to Nikol Pashinyan. This polarization risks narrowing the political debate and turning elections into referendums on leadership rather than on forward-looking agendas. On April 23, the Central Election Commission registered 19 entities: 17 political parties and 2 electoral unions, as candidates to participate in the elections. At present, I do not observe a real contest over programmes, but rather a contest over names. Voters are being asked to choose between party leaders, not between program proposals.
- A specific problem for the opposition is its difficulty uniting. In Armenia, opposition forces often coalesce around protest movements but struggle to maintain cohesive electoral coalitions. This situation favours the ruling party, despite persistently high levels of public dissatisfaction with Nikol Pashinyan's rule.
- There are real threats, not only during the election campaign, but also on election day and the day after. In my opinion, the greatest threat is the constant flow of “hate” narratives that reinforce existing polarization rather than creating a stable and peaceful pre-election atmosphere.
- Armenia has made real strides in electoral administration since 2018—better transparency, more credible vote counting, fewer blatant abuses of administrative resources compared to earlier periods. But public trust in institutions remains uneven. Many voters still suspect elite bargaining or external influence behind political outcomes, even when procedures are sound. Post-election stability: Even a technically well-run election could be followed by protests if the result is politically contested.
The main challenge isn’t whether votes are counted correctly; it’s whether the outcome is broadly accepted as legitimate in a society under significant internal and external strain.
Armenia is better prepared than it was a decade ago, but its defences against hybrid interference are not yet fully integrated. The greatest risk isn't that the elections will be "hacked," but that the information environment will become so controversial that the legal outcome will be widely questioned—a problem that is both political and technical.
Source: Dr Andrzej Klimczyk is a former Polish diplomat with over 25 years of experience in post-Soviet countries. Dr. Klimczyk is an expert in fields such as the promotion of democracy and human rights pertaining to electoral systems, as well as freedom of speech in mass media. Moreover, he has broad experience in the security and defense sector. Dr Klimczyk is a former Political Officer in the OSCE Mission to Moldova (2001-2008) and Political Officer in the NATO Liaison Office in Georgia ( 2010-2017). Additionally, he has served as a former journalist and press attaché in the Polish Embassy in Moscow (1996-2000). Dr Klimczyk has significant experience observing general, local, and municipal elections in Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. He is the founder of the“Anush Klimczyk Foundation”.The foundation was established in March 2025 in Yerevan, Armenia.
