Theme

Diplomacy

Editor's choice
News
Keir Starmer: Only Greenland and Denmark should decide the future of Greenland

Keir Starmer: Only Greenland and Denmark should decide the future of Greenland

Only Greenland and Denmark should decide the future of Greenland, British Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer has told the BBC. It comes after President Trump again said "we need Greenland from the standpoint of national security". Both Greenland's prime minister and Denmark's prime minister strongly rejected the idea over the weekend. Greenland's Prime Minister Jens Frederik Nielsen responded to Trump's latest comments by saying "that's enough now" and described the notion of US control over the island as a "fantasy". Meanwhile, Denmark's Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen had said "the US has no right to annex any of the three nations in the Danish kingdom". Asked whether he would also say to President Trump "hands off Greenland", Sir Keir's response was definitive, when so often in diplomacy answers are caveated and nuanced. "Yes," he replied. "Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark must decide the future of Greenland and only Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark. "And Denmark is a close ally in Europe, is a Nato ally and it is very important that the future of Greenland is for the Kingdom of Denmark and for Greenland themselves and only for Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark."
Editor's choice
Opinion
Opinion: The US strikes Venezuela, Consequences for Ukraine and Europe

Opinion: The US strikes Venezuela, Consequences for Ukraine and Europe

This is a Flash Analysis published on 3 January 2026 by the European Policy Centre in Brussels. Chris Kremidas-Courtney is a Senior Visiting Fellow at the European Policy Centre. As 2026 barely takes its first breath, we are already drifting back into an age where great powers manage their own neighbourhoods and look away from everyone else’s. It’s a world order that prizes control over legitimacy and stability over justice until neither one survives. The most immediate consequence of the US strike on Venezuela may be felt not in Latin America, but first in Ukraine. As foreshadowed in the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy, Washington is intent on rooting its power firmly in the Western Hemisphere while potentially leaving Russia and China greater freedom of action in their ‘backyards’. Seen through this lens, the strike on Venezuela looks more like part of a broader reversion to regional spheres of influence. The emerging message is that the United States will enforce primacy close to home but its willingness to underwrite security beyond its hemisphere is increasingly transactional and politically fragile. This is a 21st century version of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, in which US hemispheric dominance was paired with strategic disengagement from Europe’s wars. It is also the world Putin has long argued for. It is hard to see an upside for Europe, but there may be one small silver lining. Prior to the strike, Caracas had been demonstrating how a sanctioned regime could survive and adapt by embedding itself into alternative economic and financial networks backed by China, Russia and Iran. That resilience was undermining the credibility of sanctions as a systemic tool, on which the EU relies far more heavily than the United States. By decapitating the Maduro regime, Washington has reasserted that sanctions are not an end state, but a step on an escalation ladder that can still culminate in the use of force. Yet this restoration of the credibility of sanctions comes at a great cost. It risks signalling to other revisionist or embattled regimes that force is the ultimate arbiter. All eyes are now on Moscow, since, as former US National Security Council official Fiona Hill testified in 2019, Russia had informally offered to end its support for Venezuela in exchange for US acquiescence on Ukraine.  Meanwhile, online advocates in China are calling on their regime to emulate the US and take similar steps against Taiwan. Worse still, Venezuela is now politically hollowed out. Any opposition figure who emerges now could be instantly labelled a US proxy. It is not yet clear what the thinking is in Washington about the day after, but the precedents of Iraq and Afghanistan are not encouraging. Once again, Washington has demonstrated its ability to act decisively – but also reminded us of its lack of staying power. For Ukraine, that distinction may prove fatal unless Europe can step up and support Kyiv more decisively in 2026.

Filter archive

Publication date
Editor's choice
Opinion
Opinion: A sustainable peace requires consistent long-term European involvement

Opinion: A sustainable peace requires consistent long-term European involvement

There is no denying that the EU, especially key member states acting in support, helped bring Baku and Yerevan closer to the Washington Declaration of August 8, 2025. But a declaration is not a treaty. Turning principles into a peace deal and eventually to a sustainable peace requires consistent long-term European involvement, writes Yalchin Mammadov in this-op-ed for commonspace.eu Before facilitating trust between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the EU is first expected to address its own credibility gap with Baku. A more balanced approach—such as including Azerbaijan, alongside Armenia, in the European Peace Facility—could be a useful first step. Diplomats can negotiate peace; societies must build peace. In this context, the EU can do what it does the best: long-term societal engagement. By expanding youth and academic exchange programmes, investing in cross-border civil society initiatives, and fostering people-to-people cooperation, Brussels can help shape a new generation equipped to sustain peace beyond political cycles. Such tools are slow and unglamorous, but if ignored, even the strongest treaty risks collapse. And obviously, these aspects require two-way engagement and genuine willingness by both governments to facilitate contact. If Brussels wants to remain influential, it needs to replace outdated one-size-fits-all policies with ambitious, interest-driven and differentiated approaches. Without a clear regional strategy, which appears to be the current situation, the South Caucasus will continue to sit at the margins of Europe’s security architecture—leaving space for other powers to take the lead. (You can read the op-ed in full by clicking the image.)
Editor's choice
Monday Commentary
Monday Commentary: Multilateralism remains the best option, but the rules have changed

Monday Commentary: Multilateralism remains the best option, but the rules have changed

To listen to world leaders speaking these days, one would think that the world has embraced multilateralism, as the guiding principle in international relations. From Brussels to Beijing the concept is lauded, often to distinguish countries or groups of countries from Trumpian America, which has turned multilateralism into a bogey, and often a punching bag. But a closer look indicates that many countries are talking at cross-purposes.  At one end you have the European Union, itself a quintessential multilateralist project grouping 27  member states, some of whom had spent the last century fighting each other. At the other extreme, there is China, a country with great ambitions, and a great discourse that accompanies these ambitions, who however presents itself as the self-proclaimed leader of the global south. Put simply, multilateralism is when a group of countries agree to pursue a common goal in cooperation, and based on equality. On the European continent, multilateralism was for fifty years the way the continent conducted business, and two organisations became a clear expression of this multilateralist path: the European Union (EU), and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). They both operate by consensus. Beyond the continent, on a global level, the UN is in crisis. It will take a lot of time, effort, and money, to fix it. Three countries can help, or they can make matters worse: the US, Russia, and China. Trumpian America does not like the UN and has turned its back on multilateralism. The shameful US national security strategy creates a wedge between the US and Europe and sets a narrow vision of the world. Trump described the document as a "roadmap" to ensure the US remains "the greatest and most successful nation in human history". Russia is today in no position to counterbalance the US position, even if it wants to. So, its role in the future world order will be one of an opportunistic spoiler. China is another matter. It has the ambition to be a superpower and global player. It has good connections with the global south, although its claim of leadership is often overstated, and it pays lip service to multilateralism. It needs to be engaged, but with caution. Attempts at multilateral initiatives in the South, for example BRICS, are increasingly dysfunctional. Yet, multilateralism remains the best option for addressing the future. Some of the world's problems, such as climate change, simply cannot be tackled by one country, or one country working alone. But most of the institutions are greatly in need of an overhaul. The European Union must take the lead. It must also engage with China on a case-by-case, topic-by-topic basis. This will be a long and laborious process. But the rules of the game, and the assumptions that underpinned them, have changed, or at best are being challenged. It is time for a global rethink. (Click the image to read the full Monday Commentary).
Editor's choice
Opinion
Opinion: The European Union must recognise that the C5 have now become the C6

Opinion: The European Union must recognise that the C5 have now become the C6

In recent years, Eurasia has undergone a structural transformation in how regions connect, trade, and cooperate. The combination of geopolitical shocks, disrupted supply chains, and the search for secure east–west routes has elevated the importance of the Trans-Caspian space. The states of Central Asia, once constrained by geography, have taken unprecedented steps to strengthen regional coordination, modernize infrastructure, and integrate more closely with Europe. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan has rapidly emerged as an indispensable connector linking Central Asia with the South Caucasus, Türkiye, and European markets. This new reality was formally acknowledged in November 2025 when Azerbaijan was unanimously welcomed as a full participant in the Consultative Meeting of Central Asian Heads of State in Tashkent. What had long been a C5 grouping transformed into a C6, marking a historic moment: the Caspian was no longer a frontier separating two regions but the center of a unified geopolitical and geo-economic space. President Ilham Aliyev described this alignment as the emergence of “a single geopolitical and geo-economic region,” while President Shavkat Mirziyoyev called Azerbaijan’s inclusion “historic” and proposed transforming the consultative platform into a structured regional institution capable of shaping security, economic, environmental, and digital policy. The Caspian is no longer a boundary; it is the heart of an integrated region. The transformation of the EU and U.S. C5+1 formats into C6+1 is the logical next step to ensure that both sides of the Caspian advance together – coherently, strategically, and with shared purpose. (click the image to read the full op-ed).
Editor's choice
Monday Commentary
Monday Commentary: Europe still needs the OSCE

Monday Commentary: Europe still needs the OSCE

The Ministerial Council of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) will have its annual meeting in Vienna on 4-5 December. Foreign Ministers from the 57 member states, which also include the United States and Canada, and the Central Asian republics, and 11 partner countries, will congregate to discuss the future of European Security at a time when many believe that war in Europe over the next decade is likely. Ukraine is just a rehearsal for Russia’s ultimate ambitions. British diplomacy used to describe the OSCE as “the organization to manage Russia”. It has not done a good job of that, but this task remains paramount. The Ministerial Council will be the last major business of this year’s chairmanship, Finland, and will launch the new Chairmanship for 2026, Switzerland. The OSCE has been moribund for some time, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, nearly ended it. But Europe still needs the OSCE, and there is hope that it will take a new lease of life in 2026. Switzerland has held the Chairmanship of the OSCE twice before, successfully. It has the experience, a wide network of embassies, and an able team in Bern, to successfully start what is likely to be a long and laborious journey. The new Chairman-in-office is Swiss Federal Foreign Minister Councillor, Ignazio Cassis. Cassis is also the current Vice President of the Swiss Confederation, and is fluent in Italian, English, German and French. Quite unusual also is the fact that currently the General Secretary of the OSCE is a Turk. Feridun Sinirlioğlu is an experienced Turkish diplomat, who has held the position for a year. Between them, Cassis and Sinirlioğlu will have to craft out the new OSCE, but in the end, it will largely depend on the will of the member states, including Russia. A new, reborn, OSCE, must understand that its core task remains European peace and security. It should resist the temptation of “looking busy” with a lot of secondary things. After peace and security return to Europe, it can consider other tasks. But we are far away from that yet. (Click the image to read the full commentary)
Editor's choice
News
Pope's visit to Türkiye and Lebanon has a strong ecumenical character, and places interreligious dialogue at its centre

Pope's visit to Türkiye and Lebanon has a strong ecumenical character, and places interreligious dialogue at its centre

Pope Leo XIV has begun the first overseas trip of his pontificate, a six-day visit to Türkiye and Lebanon, which started yesterday (27 November) and ends on Tuesday (2 December). According to Vatican Radio, the visit "carries a strong ecumenical character and places interreligious dialogue at its centre. It will also be a moment of closeness to Christian communities and local populations across the region".   During nearly a week in the region, Pope Leo XIV will meet civil and religious authorities, visit mosques and ancient churches, pray at Beirut’s port in memory of the victims of the 2020 explosion, and hold private meetings with Presidents Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Joseph Aoun.   A highlight of the visit will be a visit to Nicaea, where the Pope will mark the anniversary of the Council of Nicaea. Christians of many traditions recognise the Council of Nicaea as a foundation of shared faith. One of the most anticipated moments will be the Pope’s encounter with Lebanese youth in Bkerké, at the Maronite Patriarchate, a meeting expected to carry strong messages of hope in the Jubilee Year. A central event will be the ecumenical celebration in İznik, where the Pope and Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew will walk together toward the ruins of the Basilica of St Neophytos. The prayer, held before icons of Christ and the Council, will conclude with the lighting of a candle—a symbolic gesture of unity. The journey will also highlight interreligious engagement.   Memorable moments are expected throughout the trip: a wreath at Atatürk’s mausoleum, prayer inside the Blue Mosque, Mass at Istanbul’s Volkswagen Arena, the planting of a cedar at the presidential palace in Beirut, and prayer at the tomb of St Charbel in Lebanon. The Vatican said that "Pope Leo XIV’s pilgrimage to Türkiye and Lebanon aims to offer a voice of peace, unity, and hope at the heart of the Middle East."
Editor's choice
Analysis
Mehman Aliyev on what "peace" can look like for Ukraine

Mehman Aliyev on what "peace" can look like for Ukraine

In this analysis,  veteran Azerbaijani journalist and political commentator, Mehman Aliyev, draws lessons from the 1994 Armenia-Azerbaijan ceasefire, to assess what can be possible impact of ceasefire in Ukraine. According to diplomats, a negotiating format or a partial ceasefire based on a modified version of the twenty-eight points is entirely plausible in 2026. A frozen line of contact, monitored by international mechanisms while talks drag on, is more likely than a fully implemented peace treaty by early that same year. “This document opens a window,” said political commentator Farid Gakhramanov. “Whether it means the end of the war or the beginning of a new frozen conflict will depend on the decisions of Moscow, Kyiv, Washington, and Brussels — not on the document itself.” (You can read the full analysis by clicking the image)