A few days ago, Arminfo News Agency correspondent David Stepanyan, interviewed Ambassador Vladimir Kazimirov, Former Russian co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, and currently First Vice Chairman of the Russian Diplomats of the Association of Russian Diplomats.
From May 1992 to August 1996 Ambassador Kazimirov was the Head of the Russian mediation team engaged with the Karabakh conflict, and Head of the Russian Delegation to the Minsk Process. He served as the Russian co-Chair of the Minsk Process from January 1995 to December 1996.
In the interview Kazimirov is highly critical of Baku's information policy, using language that is sometime less than diplomatic. Has the veteran Russian diplomat himself lost his cool, or is this a sign of a wider diplomatic frustration at the lack of progress in the Karabakh peace process?
ARMINFO contributed this interview exclusively to commonspace.eu. The ARMINFO text follows:
Vladimir Nikolaevich, where do you think will the anti-Armenian propaganda and systematic shifting of the goalposts lead Azerbaijan in the long run?
Overstatements, and sometimes direct distortions in propaganda, deepen mutual misunderstanding, create mistrust, and even plant hatred not only between the parties in the conflict, but between the two entire neighboring nations - for decades, maybe for an entire century.
You are right, Baku and its supporting voices are particularly capable of propaganda tricks. Mental fatigue, after errors and failures in the war, forces them to disseminate all kinds of tales, while aspiration to win back at the negotiations, spurs them to back up their overstated demands with at least propaganda.
But you can zombify your own citizens only, what’s actually happening meanwhile is that the international community has developed immunity against propaganda from the sides.
As one of the most active mediators in the settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict all these years, do you see the propaganda as detrimental to the current process of conflict settlement?
Absolutely! This is what it is. Various layers of society become victims of this propaganda, all those who are not able to double-check the information communicated to them, foremost the youth, who do not have life experience. On top of this you have the southern character, with high emotionality, which hinders a cool rational perception of reality; all this is actively used by propaganda. And the general mood of public opinion - deformed by propaganda and the complex of defeat - is an obstacle to progress in the negotiation process, and the settlement of difficult issues.
Apart from references to “one million refugees” and to “20% of territories”, which have become notorious, Ilham Aliev keeps referring to the 4 resolutions by the UN Security Council, which require “unconditional” pulling out of ”occupying” forces from Azerbaijani territories; even though he omits any reference to Baku’s failure to implement a number of elements of those very resolutions. Can you explain this?
Those notorious exaggerations – 20% and one million – are classical examples of the frenzy of Baku’s propaganda. I do not want to use sharp words here, but it is time to call a spade, a spade: they are sheer lies, repeated every day.
Even with dubious calculation of adding the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh itself, apparently “occupied” by its own inhabitants, the real figure does not reach 14% of the territory of the former Azerbaijani SSR. And if it’s about rounding up the figures, for those who do not know mathematics, than 10% or 15% will be much closer to reality, then 20%. But Baku has made a point of calling it 20%. Only recently they started to say something like “around 20%”. Just few dare say 16%, while the “most conscientious” - 14%, - ridiculously including NK territory in their calculation. And even the highest ranking officials are not squeamish about “rounding” the figure to the highest number. But why have they been silent for two decades about how they lost control over 7 Azerbaijani regions, and how by delaying the military response the Azerbaijan leadership facilitated this! Where is the analysis of those bad errors? Is it possible that there are no intellectuals in that country, capable of analyzing cause-and-effect connections of events during the war, and their consequences? These people certainly exist, but there are things they are not allowed to do.
As to the unconditional withdrawal of Armenian troops, then this term appeared only in the second resolution of the UN Security Council (№853), out of the four, whilst Baku’s propaganda keeps insisting that all four resolutions demand “unconditional” withdrawal. They should make it clear, why this word disappeared in the third and fourth resolutions №s874 and 884).Well, they could not just have omitted the word in New York by chance. The key to understanding this is in the insistent continuation of war by Baku from 1991 to 1994, and violations of the cease-fire regime (as one can see also from resolution №884). This is why the withdrawal of troops has long ago stopped being unconditional, but became an important subject of negotiations between the sides.
By refusing to accept NKR as a side of the conflict, Baku forgets that during the war it signed 14 documents with NKR, including an agreement on strengthening of a cease-fire regime on 4 February 1995. What is the reason for such forgetfulness?
This summer Azerbaijani propaganda machine conducted a whole campaign of distorting the process of Karabakh conflict settlement, in order to prevent the return of Karabakh to the negotiating table.
Mystifications have now turned to outright disinformation. What is published about this is no longer simply false, its sheer lies. . They invented all kinds of tales! As if NK never participated in the talks; as if those were not three-sided, but were always conducted on “Baker rules” – 2+2, that is with participation of the Azerbaijani community of NK as well; as if the documents signed by Azerbaijani officials and “separatist NKR”, or by three sides do not exist; as if not a single international document ever mentions NK as a party to the conflict; as if the mandate given by Heydar Aliev to Afiyaddin Jalilov to conduct negotiations with NKR is false; as if in May 1992 a ceasefire agreement was signed in Tehran. This is not a complete list of inventions by Azerbaijani propaganda around Karabakh conflict. Lies are popular there, not only around this topic. For example, the Moscow agency Regnum is said not to be publishing opinions of Azerbaijani political scientists, while in reality there are plenty of these publications. It is not only the propaganda side of Azerbaijan that is busy with these concoctions. Baku was publicly expressing its agreement with the Madrid principles for some two years, and was reproaching Yerevan for its position, but in reality began producing amendments to them - dozens of them. How can one trust Azerbaijan’s position after this?
Baku, with perseverance better directed at something more useful, calls on the Minsk Group co-chair, influential states and international organizations to press on Armenia so that Yerevan adopts a version of the Madrid principles, convenient for it. Is this possible, even in theory?
The OSCE co-chairs mandate does not allow them to pressure the sides on the substance of the talks. I was one of the drafters of this mandate so I am not talking only on paper. I believe that there two absolutely special, exceptional cases, when pressure is not only acceptable, but also necessary, simply based on logic. The first is to eliminate threats of resorting to force, since the OSCE undertook to resolve the conflict peacefully, by political and negotiating means. And second – to pressure this or that side to implement obligations, which it had officially accepted. Such situations are frequently being created by one and the same side. So where is the continuity and authority of OSCE, and its capability to bring to life decisions, taken under its aegis?
Can you please outline a compromise option or options for the conflict settlement, which in your opinion is possible? What are the apparent prospects for a Karabakh settlement?
The basic skeleton of a Karabakh settlement has already been outlined by the international community with the support of OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs, even if not everything there is approved by this or that side. Changes are possible in the minor details, but hardly in the fundamental points of that outline. The starting point is the comprehensive adoption of the Madrid principles, and then the signing of a peace agreement, one option is an agreement of non-use of force in the resolution of this conflict, and agreeing upon an interim status for NK. Only after this can there be the gradual withdrawal of troops from the regions around NK, but by the time the pull-out begins, the basic parameters and terms of the legally binding expression of will of NK’s population on its final status, have to be agreed.
Uncertainty could linger for some time more. But if, after everything, Armenians do not agree to pull their troops out, and Azerbaijanis will again attempt to resort to force or cancel the expression of will, in which case I am sure more will be lost than will be gained. And while the parties are ripe for agreement, the international community should focus on insisting on the unacceptability of new military adventures in such a difficult conflict and sensitive region.
The interview was conducted on 21st September by David Stepanyan for Arminfo news agency and contributed to commonspace.eu
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