South Caucasus

After the wave of diplomatic activities in late September – early October 2022, it seemed that the idea of signing a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan by the end of 2022 was more than a dream. However, November – December 2022 proved that pessimists were closer to reality. After Russia re-inserted itself in the negotiation process by organizing a new trilateral leaders' summit on October 31, 2022, and Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers met in Washington on November 7, 2022; the peace process stalled. In the current situation, the external players involved in the negotiations and interested in preventing a resumption of hostilities should focus on preserving the fragile stability that emerged after September aggression by Azerbaijan. In this context, the resumption of the Brussels format of negotiations is of utmost importance. Otherwise, the Nagorno Karabakh conflict and Armenia – Azerbaijan relations risk becoming another pawn in Russia – US confrontation, with negative implications for all sides.

Over the last month, the diplomatic traffic between Azerbaijan and the Eastern European countries has intensified in a remarkable way. The mutual high-level visits between Albania and Azerbaijan, as well as between Serbia and Azerbaijan in a short period of time over the last few months were a sign of the sides’ interest in bilateral cooperation in various fields, particularly in the field of energy. Azerbaijan is also involved in projects with the countries of the region within multilateral formats together with the European Union (EU). In this context, two major agreements signed this year provide a good basis for this cooperation both in the imports of natural gas and importantly green energy, writes Vasif Huseynov in this op-ed for commonspace.eu. These developments in the relations between Azerbaijan and the Eastern European countries brings with it also geopolitical approximation between the sides. As President Aliyev stated following the signing of the electricity deal in Bucharest, Azerbaijan’s contribution to European energy security creates an important bridge between the EU and Azerbaijan. The bridge between the two shores of the Black Sea forms a larger security architecture which increase the resilience of the regional countries in the face of national security challenges they face.

The European Union continues to develop its tools in support of its objective to contribute to peace and security in the South Caucasus.  On Monday (19 December), the EU Monitoring Capacity in Armenia (EUMCAP), launched in October, completed its mandate. Based on the agreement between the leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, European Council and France, the EUMCAP was deployed on 20 October along the Armenian side of the international border with Azerbaijan with the objective of monitoring, analysing and reporting on the situation on the ground. EU leaders, meeting in Brussels last week, assessed the wotk of the mission and the way forward. A statement by the European External Action Service on Monday stated that, "the Council – in agreement with Armenia’s authorities - decided that the existing EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia) will deploy a transitional planning assistance team in Armenia to enhance the EU’s awareness of the security situation, and contribute to the planning and preparation of a possible civilian CSDP mission in the country. The transitional planning assistance team is also expected to support the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, in the EU-facilitated normalisation process between Armenia and Azerbaijan."

Russia's attempts to show Armenia and Azerbaijan its red lines during the summit in Sochi on 31 October disrupted a positive moment in Armenia-Azerbaijan relations that had been ongoing throughout 2022. A deterioration in Azerbaijan-Iran relations has further hightened tensions in the region. "One can foresee that new escalations and hostilities will be imminent, if the peace efforts fail to deliver tangible outcomes between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and if some external actors continue to fuel the tensions in the region", writes Vasif Huseynov in this op-ed for commonspace.eu.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shattered Europe’s security architecture, with far-reaching and unpredictable implications for conflicts in neighbouring regions where Russia plays a role. This discussion paper, just published by Conciliation Resources, focuses on the impacts of war in Ukraine on the peace processes of the South Caucasus, a region fractured by protracted conflicts dating back to the 1990s.

The Lachin Corridor, a road that connects the areas controlled by the Armenian community of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, has been blocked for several days. A group of Azerbaijani activists on Monday arrived in the area to show concern about exploitation of natural resources in the territory which is under Armenian control, but which is internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan. A stand-off with Russian troops that have overall control over the corridor led to the closure of the road, effectively isolating the Armenian population in the territory. The issues are ofcourse deeper than simply control over some goldmines and other natural resources. In essence it is about the future of Karabakh. It is also about the Russian role in the region and in the wider South Caucasus. On 10 November 2020, Russia, in agreement with the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan,  deployed around two thousand soldiers as "peacekeepers" as part of an agreement that followed the Azerbaijani military victory in the 44 day war. Their mandate has always been thin, and their mission full of ambiguity. The current stand-off reflects these weaknesses. So far, serious incidents in this current stand-off have been avoided, but either side can easily escalate the situation, and unplanned incidents can also exacerbate the situation. Over the last twenty-four hours their have been expressions of concern voiced by the international community, including the US and the EU. Both want Armenia and Azerbaijan to return to menaningful negotiations and to move quickly with the signing of a peace agreement. What the Russians want is another matter. President Putin spoke to the leaders of the two countries separately on Monday, but clearly did not achieve much. Russia's priority is to maintain its military presence in the area, because it believes it gives it leverage on both Baku and Yerevan. Yet as this latest incident is showing the presence also puts on Russia responsabilities. Distracted by the war in Ukraine, and unsure how it really wants to proceed Russia may opt, for the moment at least for inaction. This does not serve the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh well. The Lachin corridor is a lifeline, and without it the community has no future - or at least none that it is ready to accept. It is not a humanitarian disaster yet, but it can become one quickly. The free and unimpeded movement on the Lachin corridor should be restored as soon as possible, and the negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan with the mediation of the European Union, that looked so promising only a few months ago, need to be continued and the momentum regained.