Russia

The war in Ukraine rages on, and the constant pounding of Kyiv by Russian drones and missiles, is a reminder that this is not a war being fought in some far away border region. The war turned out very different from the one Vladimir Putin had envisioned when he launched his full scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Two factors caught the Russians by surprise: the first was the readiness of the Ukrainian people to resist. At first this caught the west by surprise too. Many in the Chancelleries of Europe thought the whole thing will be over within a week. Ukrainian initial resistance, enabled westerners to think again. A mainly European willingness to help Ukraine emerged, together with an understanding that the battle for Ukraine was actually a battle for Europe. Short of engaging in direct combat, Europe – the EU plus non-EU countries such as Britain, Norway, and honorary Europeans, such as Canada, have given an unprecedented amount of support to Ukraine, ensuring that the country kept functioning in a war environment. Putin was not prepared for either, yet he persisted with his adventure, not caring about the costs – human, financial and moral – in pursuit of some vague dream of a “Great Russia". Ukraine’s resolve in resisting Russian aggression has been inspirational. The country has made huge sacrifices; tens of thousands of young Ukrainians have died defending their country. Ukraine has been able to optimize its drone capability in order to take the battle back to the Russians, including to Moscow and St Petersburg. But to defend itself and its cities and citizens from sophisticated Russian weaponary Ukraine needs western support. This has not been as forthcoming as the Ukrainians hoped. Certainly Donald Trump has been less enthusiastic in helping Ukraine than his processor. Maybe this is now changing too. Europe’s support needs to remain high and consistent, and ambivalence must be avoided Europe’s support for Ukraine must remain high and consistent. Ambivalence must be avoided. Last week, Germany’s foreign minister held talks with his Russian counterpart in the first face-to-face meeting between top officials of the two nations since Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Johann Wadephul said he used the “intense conversation” with Sergei Lavrov in New York to warn Moscow against further escalation after a drone laden with explosives was discovered at Leipzig airport last month in an incident that Berlin has blamed on Russia. He said that he “gave Russia a clear warning” not to continue in the same vein, adding: “We can defend ourselves, we can fight back and we will do so.” Wadephul told German public broadcaster ZDF that he had also offered Lavrov “a chance to de-escalate” in Ukraine, adding that it had “fallen on deaf ears”. “I also made it very clear to Russia: we stand with Ukraine, Ukraine has our full support, and economic pressure on Russia will continue,” he said. “I said that again to Lavrov and called on him finally to be prepared to enter talks.”  The meeting lasted around 20 minutes and ended with a handshake between the two men. I support diplomacy and dialogue as a means of resolving issues. But I am also aware that isolating Russia diplomatically is an important way of putting pressure on Russia to end the mayhem it unleashed in Ukraine. The German Foreign Minister has to ask himself if the 20 minute meeting with Lavrov was worth easing that pressure. The last time Lavrov met a German foreign minister was in January 2022, the month before Putin launched his full-scale assault on Ukraine. Europe must continue supporting Ukraine, and isolating Russia should be part of that strategy. On the other hand engaging with Russia as part of a search for a solution is necessary. Balancing the two considerations is a difficult business, and Europe is best acting in a united fashion on this matter too. (click image to read the Monday Commenttary in full). Independent sources put the number of Russians dead in the Ukraine war as exceeding half a million. However you look at this, it is a staggering amount. Whilst Putin is sensitive to the ability of Russian society to absorb pain for the sake of the motherland, the level of losses is so high that it now has become an issue.

In this analysis for commonspace.eu, Anna Szedlacsek argues that Kazakhstan and Armenia, two countries that Russia had considered in its sphere of influence, appear increasingly eager to ensure that Moscow is no longer their only option. Armenia and Kazakhstan both reached their strategic turning points between 2020 and 2022, driven by security failures, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and severe economic vulnerabilities.  Among these reasons, the war in Ukraine sheds a particularly long shadow. In Kazakhstan, Russia’s “special military operation” substantially damaged Moscow's image among ordinary Kazakh citizens and reignited anxieties about revanchist Russian rhetoric regarding northern Kazakhstan. Almaty is heavily challenged by having to navigate its deep economic and transit interdependence with Russia. Kazakhstan is aggressively developing alternative transport links, such as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor) through Baku, Azerbaijan, to reach European and global markets without crossing Russian territory. This also reflects a move away from Russia as its main trading partner – this position has been earned by China, or, if considered as a bloc, the European Union (EU). Armenia, on the other hand, began its pivot away from Moscow’s orbit after the 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and reached a point of no return following Azerbaijan's final capture of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023. This is due to the fact that despite hosting a Russian military base and belonging to the CSTO, Armenia received no military assistance from Russia during either of these conflicts. Moscow remained neutral – and thus turned untrustworthy in the eyes of Armenians – because it wished to safeguard its expanding economic, energy, and transit partnerships with Azerbaijan and Turkey. The Armenian parliament also passed a law to initiate the EU accession process, while ministries are recruiting Western-educated professionals to restructure the civil service away from the Kremlin. The question, is not simply whether Russia is losing its allies. It is whether Russia is losing its ability to make those allies dependent on it. As of September 2026, the evidence does not point to a definitive answer. Russia has not been pushed out of either country – but both Kazakhstan and Armenia appear increasingly eager to ensure that Moscow is no longer their only option. (click the image to read the analysis in full)