Russia

Russia has confirmed one of its warships has been damaged in a Ukrainian attack on a Black Sea port. The airstrike took place at Feodosiya in Russian-occupied Crimea early on Tuesday morning. Russia's Ministry of Defence said the large landing ship Novocherkassk was struck by Ukrainian aircraft carrying guided missiles. The head of the Ukrainian Air Force said earlier its warplanes had destroyed the ship. One person was killed in the attack, according to the Russian-installed head of Crimea, Sergei Aksyonov. Several others were reportedly hurt. Six buildings were damaged and a small number of people had to be taken to temporary accommodation centres, Mr Aksyonov added. The port's transport operations are said to be functioning as normal after the area was cordoned off, while a fire caused by the attack was contained. Footage purportedly showing a huge explosion in the port was shared by Ukrainian air force commander Lt Gen Mykola Oleshchuk. The images have not been independently verified. However, satellite imagery from 24 December shows a ship at port in Feodosiya that appears to be the same length as the Novocherkassk - a landing ship designed to transport troops, weapons and cargo to shore. Any significant damage to the ship will be a welcome bit of good news for Ukraine, with waning Western support now affecting its front-line operations. Given that the Novocherkassk was in dock, it is highly likely it was being loaded with soldiers, equipment or both. There was speculation that the ship was carrying Iranian-made Shahed drones, which Russia has been using in its attacks on Ukrainian targets.

The foreign ministers of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Russia and Turkey, met in Tehran on Monday 23 October in the second meeting of the 3 + 3 format, which however is only 2 + 3 since the third South Caucasus country, Georgia, refuses to participate in the process because of its problems with Russia. Recently, Turkey and Iran have made statements that they prefer this format of interaction with the South Caucasus countries since it excludes external players. Some Azerbaijani officials have expressed similar views. At the end of their meeting in Tehran, the foreign ministers issued a nine-point statement, in which amongst other things, they said that "expressing their positions on various international issues, they discussed the most important issues in the region and emphasized the importance of such platforms as the regional consultative "3+3" platform to provide opportunities for constructive dialogue and establish mutually beneficial cooperation between the countries of the region". commonspace.eu political editor said that the absence of Georgia in the 3 + 3 format hugely reduces the significance of the initiative since it is difficult to discuss regional issues without that country being present. However, the format is important, particularly for Iran, which has been desperately trying to have a role in the region. For the Turks, this is an opportunity to share a platform with Armenia, even as discussions on the normalisation of relations continue. The meeting between the Turkish and Armenian foreign ministers, on the margins of the main event, was perhaps the most significant event in the one-day diplomatic extravaganza in Tehran. For the Russians, such a meeting has limited use. They would prefer to deal with the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis on their own, separately or together. But given that their monopoly over dealings with the two countries, especially on the issue of normalisation of relations, has now been lost, Moscow wants to make sure it is present whenever and wherever the opportunity arises.

For decades, Russia has tried to protect its interests in the South Caucasus following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. But Russia had nothing to offer to the countries of the region, be it for their economic and political challenges, or even more importantly for the process of restoring peace in the region after it slid into conflict at the end of the Soviet era. There was however one thing that it could do, and that was to spoil any efforts for peace and reconciliation, if these efforts did not originate and were managed by Russia itself. This way it could maintain it primordial position in the region, and as much as possible, keep everyone else out, whilst often presenting itself as an exemplary peacemaker. This grotesque situation has played itself out in front of everyone’s eyes since 1992. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have for most of the time had no choice but to play along with the Russian masquerade, and the international community, most of the time distracted by other issues, generally played along, being content to be seen offering some kind of balance to Russian posturing. Russia never had, and certainly does not have now, any interest in working genuinely with international partners to support peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. If a dialogue with Russia is necessary so that Russia will not be a spoiler, than that dialogue is futile because Russian objectives are not the same as those of the West. Russia’s gloating when Azerbaijani president Aliyev failed to turn up for a crucial summit in Granada last week is a case in point. We are now already seeing Russian rhetoric increase as preparations for the long-expected meeting between Aliyev and Pashinyan, with Michel, scheduled for later this month, intensify. Russian pressure on Armenia and Azerbaijan ahead of the Brussels meeting is also increasing both overtly and covertly. There is an argument that Armenia and Azerbaijan simply cannot afford to be seen agreeing with each other, under the auspices of Brussels, without the Russians being part of the story. Thus there has been in recent weeks some frantic discussions about how that could be done, including by having the final lap of any discussions in Tbilisi, without any outside mediators. Such ideas have also found favour in Tehran and Ankara. A wonderful idea, but one that has many flaws. Any agreement will need to be somehow underpinned by some kind of international patronage. And “ownership” will also determine who is going to pick up the bill for post-conflict reconstruction and other costs of erasing the scars of the conflict from the region, including for example demining. Still, Tbilisi may be a venue that more or less can be acceptable to both the Russians as well as to the Europeans and the Americans. In the end, the location of the symbolic finishing line must not turn out to be the most important issue. All focus, and all efforts must be concentrated on getting Armenia and Azerbaijan to agree to finally put an end to this long painful episode in their history, that has taken the lives of tens of thousands, displaced hundreds of thousands and costed billions. And that would be just the end of the beginning because translating a written agreement into concrete actions that would ensure lasting and durable peace will be a much longer and more difficult endeavour.

Turkish President, Recip Tayip Erdogan visited Sochi on Monday, 4 September, to meet Russian president Vladimir Putin. Erdogan had sought this meeting for some time, hoping that in a face-to-face encounter he could persuade his Russian counterpart to restore the so called Black Sea Grain Deal, which enabled Ukraine to export its grain products to international markets safely, despite the ongoing war with Russia. "Erdogan failed in this primary mission", writes commonspace.eu political editor in a comment "There were of course other issues under discussion in Sochi - both related to bilateral relations, as well as issues concerning the international and regional situation. There were no new breakthroughs, no new agreements signed, nor new initiatives announced, except for one related to the supply of Russian grain to African countries via Turkey, a side issue of the main Grain Deal.  In many ways, Sochi showed the limits of the Turkish-Russian entente. It has always been built on mutual convenience as both sides try to show the world that they are independent players in a complex international system. But Russian hopes to lure Turkey away from NATO have failed miserably. Russian disappointment at Turkey's overt support for Ukraine in military as well as political spheres, is a sore point for President Putin. The Russians have also learnt that the Turks drive a hard bargain when it comes to economic issues. Reeling under heavy western sanctions the Russians need to keep the Turks on board, but the cost is high. For Turkiye too the limits of the friendship with Russia are obvious. Opinions differ on a range of issues - from the South Caucasus to Syria to Central Asia. Turkiye has tried to lure Russia into negotiations with Ukraine. Moscow politely but firmly said no. For Turkiye the war raging in the Black Sea poses a huge threat. All its efforts so far to stop it have failed, and Sochi has not brought this objective any nearer. After Sochi, Turkiye will once more have to evaluate how to position itself in the war for its long term interests. For the moment the Turkish Russian relations, which are of huge consequences for the security of the Black Sea region, remain at face value, good. But Sochi has shown signs of cracks on a number of issue, cracks that polite words and expressions of friendship in the press conference following the Summit, failed to hide."