Delays in signing an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement open the prospects that the process may be derailed as a result of domestic politics. Next month, Yerevan will go to the polls to indirectly elect a new mayor. The parliamentary opposition is boycotting the vote, and a large number of voters remain apathetic or undecided, but the vote can still be seen as demonstrative enough ahead of the 2026 national parliamentary elections. In this op-ed for commonspace.eu, Onnik James Krikorian argues that Pashinyan foes are already attempting to turn the 17 September 2023 vote into a ‘referendum’ on Armenia-Azerbaijan talks and former de facto State Minister of Karabakh Ruben Vardanyan has called for the same.
As the third anniversary of the start of the 2020 war over the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) approaches, uncertainty continues to surround the possibility of signing an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement by the end of the year. In a perfect world, there should be little to prevent one, but that too was arguably the case in the years following the earlier 1994 ceasefire agreement.
In short, we simply don’t know.
But what we do know is that time is arguably running out with a number of dates on the horizon making some kind of agreement all the more urgent. Aside from the risk of a major humanitarian crisis in Karabakh unless commercial goods can be delivered via Lachin, with additional humanitarian aid possibly via a supplemental route through Aghdam, the most obvious date is already known – 2025.
According to the 2020 ceasefire statement, it will be then that the first term of the Russian peacekeeping contingent is up for automatic extension if none of the parties object. However, all signs are that Azerbaijan is likely to block an extension past 2025 – or at least unless it gets something in return. The integration of the Karabakh Armenians could be the price.
Indeed, the recently leaked Russian document detailing Moscow’s approach on this issue, and one that remains at the centre of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, has only added fuel to such speculation. Landlocked Karabakh otherwise remains unsustainable without some kind of agreement on routes both in and out of the breakaway region as well as on the rights and security of its population.
But the future of the Russian peacekeeping mission is not the only deadline to define 2025. In the first quarter of the same year, elections are scheduled to be held not only in Karabakh but also in Azerbaijan proper. And it is the former – Karabakh itself – that is a particular flashpoint given that Baku has always been irked by internationally unrecognised elections being held there.
Tensions this time could turn ugly and not least because Azerbaijan will also go to the polls at roughly the same time. Though the outcome of those elections are hardly in doubt, the future of the Russian peacekeeping mission could also prove a sensitive matter for Aliyev. If its continued presence is to be palatable for many Azerbaijanis, there needs to be a concrete reason why.
But there are other deadlines too.
In 2026, Armenia will go to the polls in parliamentary elections that will determine whether Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan retains his position. His ratings are already in free fall and will likely decline further if there is no acceptable breakthrough on Karabakh that can be adequately explained to the electorate. What has saved him so far has only been widespread apathy and the lack of a viable opposition.
Looking ahead to 2026 now might seem premature, but it should be remembered that the past three years have already passed quickly. The political situation can change significantly and tangible signs that his ‘peace agenda’ has borne fruit will be necessary for Pashinyan to comfortably contest the elections. There is very little time left for any dividends to emerge before that vote.
For context, during his re-election post-war in 2021, Pashinyan did not run on ‘lowering the bar’ on Karabakh’s status, as is policy now, but on a commitment to internationally pursue remedial secession for the breakaway region and even the return of surrendered territories to Armenian control. Both stated objectives are as clearly unattainable as they were two years ago so Pashinyan will need something.
Meanwhile, perhaps the first sign of whether Pashinyan can survive any political fallout from a deal will materialise even earlier. Next month, Yerevan will go to the polls to indirectly elect a new mayor. The parliamentary opposition is boycotting the vote, and a large number of voters remain apathetic or undecided, but the vote can still be seen as demonstrative enough ahead of 2026.
Pashinyan foes are already attempting to turn the 17 September 2023 vote into a ‘referendum’ on Armenia-Azerbaijan talks and former de facto State Minister of Karabakh Ruben Vardanyan has called for the same. With his own “horse”, Aprelu Yerkir, in the election race, the Russian-Armenian tycoon has clearly highlighted how now is the time for Armenians to make their dissatisfaction with Pashinyan known.
An opposition-controlled municipal council in a city where most of the country’s economic and political power is concentrated would represent a significant threat to the government over the coming years. Pashinyan’s post-revolution mayor, Hayk Marutyan, is also running, accusing his former ally of betraying those that brought the prime minister to power and seeking to establish a one-party system.
Some political forces such as Prosperous Armenia have already decided not to contest the vote given that Karabakh could trump local issues such as garbage collection and public transport but others have not. And with the ratings for all candidates running in the city council elections in single digits, it is still too early to call. Much will indeed depend on a pre-election campaign that has only just started.
Moreover, if Karabakh does dominate the campaign trail, and if Pashinyan’s Civil Contract can emerge victorious with no major abuse of administrative resources recorded, then there would hardly be any political reason not to sign a peace agreement in the nearest future. But if the government were to lose City Hall as 2025 and 2026 approaches, then that would look even less certain.
For now, that does not appear likely, but what happens next month could greatly influence Pashinyan’s options in the weeks, months, and years ahead.
source: Onnik James Krikorian is a journalist, photojournalist, and consultant from the U.K. who has covered the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict since 1994.
photo: An Armenian election box
The views expressed in opinion pieces and commentaries do not necessarily reflect the position of commonspace.eu or its partners
