Armenia is still absorbing the implications of the protests that overwhelmed Yerevan on May 9. On April 19, 2024, the Armenian and Azerbaijani border delimitation and demarcation commissions signed the protocol on the delimitation and demarcation process in the Tavush region of Armenia. That agreement granted Azerbaijan control over a patch of territory along that border that had been officially part of Soviet Azerbaijan but controlled by Armenia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.
The movement “Tavush for the Motherland” started with the closure of the Armenia-Georgia interstate highway near the village of Kirants in the Tavush region, one of the villages that was going to be affected by the process. Later, it transformed into a march towards Yerevan. Protestors led by Tavush Archbishop Bagrat reached Yerevan on May 9, 2024, and at a rally asked for Prime Minister Pashinyan's resignation. The rally was followed by several rallies in Yerevan in the last two weeks, sometimes accompanied by clashes with police.
This is not the first wave of protests demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Pashinyan after the second Nagorno-Karabakh war. Protests calling for his resignation occurred in late 2020 and early 2021. After several tense months, the Prime Minister resigned, and snap parliamentary elections took place in June 2021, which ended with the ruling party's victory. The next wave of protests started in April 2022 in response to the Prime Minister’s suggestion to lower the bar of Nagorno-Karabakh’s status during the negotiations. The movement faded away after two months of rallies in Yerevan.
In both cases, the driving force behind the protests were political parties and politicians who were in power in Armenia before the Velvet Revolution, and that was one of the reasons for their failure, as part of the Armenian society continued to view them negatively. Another common element during the previous two waves of protests was the narrative about "Russia's hand," that Russia was supporting or organising the protests to get rid of the democratic government of Armenia. External interference is a recurring way to explain complex events in post-Soviet space, that Russia or the West is behind changes triggered by the Russia-West rivalry and confrontation.
The ongoing protests in Armenia raise two questions: why people are protesting, and why they are led not by a political figure but by a clergyman, Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, the head of the Tavush Diocese of the Armenian Apostolic Church, the very region affected by the concessions.
The answer to the first question lies in understanding people’s sentiments. Part of the Armenian society is tired and fed up with the uncertainty of the country’s fate and its successive losses in the last four years in Armenia-Azerbaijan relations: the defeat in 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, the incursions of Azerbaijan into Armenia in 2021 and 2022 and occupation of up to 200 square km of territory, the blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh followed by the military takeover and forced displacement of Armenians in September 2023. According to the CRRC Armenia “Caucasus Barometer” survey of June 2022, around 98% of questioned Armenians were against the Azerbaijani control over Nagorno-Karabakh, even if Armenians were allowed to live there, and this is an indicator of how Armenians perceived the September 2023 military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh and forced displacement of Armenians.
There is also discontent within Armenian society about the process of delimitation and demarcation, which was announced in the Tavush region in March 2024. According to the survey published by the MPG organisation in early April 2024, 80% of respondents were against the process. The government's decision to push away the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh from government communication and narrative and the deletion of sections on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from the official web pages of the President's office and the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has probably only fueled the resentment. The assertive and aggressive rhetoric of President Aliyev, who threatens to use an "Iron Fist" against Armenia anytime if Armenia decides not to implement Azerbaijani demands, and his growing list of demands only increases questions and concerns among the Armenian population. Thus, there were below-the-surface tensions among the part of the population, and they needed only a spark to be mobilised.
And here lies the answer to the second question: why did an archbishop lead the protests? The key explanation for this phenomenon is the Armenian population's lack of trust in politicians, and the lack of alternatives. Since 2018 the political life in Armenia was mostly concentrated around either forces, who governed Armenia before 2018 or forces who came to power after the Velvet Revolution. According to the IRI poll of March 2024, 60% of respondents did not trust anyone from the current cohort of Armenian politicians. The September 2023 Mayoral elections in Yerevan, with around 29 per cent participation of voters, was another proof of lack of trust towards existing political parties. Thus, we have a situation in Armenia where many are ready to protest but do not want to be associated with any political party or figure. In this context, Archbishop Bagrat, who sees himself as the spiritual leader of the Armenians living in Tavush, and responsible for their well-being, decided to lead the protests in Tavush, and was able to mobilise at least part of those unhappy with the trajectory of Armenia–Azerbaijan negotiations.
Once the protests reached Yerevan on 9 May, gathering according to different sources between 32,000 and 44,000 individuals in the capital, political factions including members of the previous regime became a more visible part of the crowds. The parliamentary opposition, the former ruling Republican Party and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, showed support for the protests, along with several non-parliamentary opposition parties and movements, such as the "Democratic Consolidation Party," "Democratic Alternative Party," and "Hayaqve” movement. The involvement of political parties, including those who were in power before 2018, is a sign that they want to use the momentum for their political goals. However, this time, clergy members, not political parties, are leading the protests, which is unique in post–1991 Armenia.
What we are witnessing in Armenia is a mainly anger-driven protest, with different factions instrumentalising or attempting to instrumentalize it for their own gains. Some may assume that if Prime Minister Pashinyan managed to stay in power after the defeat of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war and there had been no large-scale protests after the September 2023 military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh, it means that Armenians are either indifferent or willing to comply with any solution imposed by Azerbaijan. The current situation shows the opposite. If Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiations continue within the current paradigm of Armenia conceding to whatever Azerbaijan demands, we are likely to see more protests in Armenia, destabilising the current government. Should the popular discontent remain unaddressed, this will either force the current government to review its politics or bring a new government to power, which will seek to change the logic behind the negotiations. Azerbaijan will reject those attempts, and Armenia – Azerbaijan negotiations will be stalled while Armenia’s democratic efforts stumble.
The only way to prevent these developments is for Azerbaijan to stop with its maximalist ultimatums, be satisfied by what it got in 2020-2023, and make real steps towards making a peace with its neighbour.
