Monday, 15 August 2011
For most people, the month of August is best known as a time for vacation and leisure. But for many in the Caucasus, the month of August has assumed a more serious and mournful meaning, as a reminder of the sudden and destructive war between Russia and Georgia, which took many by surprise when it first erupted during the night of 7-8 August 2008. Now three years after the war between Russia and Georgia, this month of August has also renewed attention, and sparked some concern, over Russia’s role in the region.
This renewed attention and concern over Russia’s role in the region is driven by an active and assertive diplomatic agenda, as Russian President Dmitry Medvedev continues to be personally engaged in taking the lead to mediate the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Most notably, the Russian president held separate meetings with his Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts. President Medvedev met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Sochi on 9 August, followed only days later by a separate meeting with Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian on 12 August, on the sidelines of a Collective Security and Treaty Organization (CSTO) summit meeting in Kazakhstan.
But as Moscow has now overtaken others in mediating between Yerevan and Baku, there is increasing concern over Russia’s deeper design, as many see this new diplomatic offensive as a troubling trend based on a reassertion of Russian power and influence in the region.
But what is driving Russian policy, and what is the outlook for the broader region from such an acceleration of a more assertive Russian policy of engagement?
Despite the intensity of Russian diplomatic activity, the recent record of Russian mediation of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict has been marked more by failure and frustration. Moscow’s frustration was most evident in the wake of its last bid to broker an agreement between the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides, as President Medvedev hosted a presidential summit in the Russian city of Kazan on 25 June. Although that summit was heralded as a “last chance” for achieving some progress over the Karabakh conflict, neither Russian expectations nor Western hopes for success were met. In fact, the failure of the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents to reach any agreement angered Russian officials, with some interpreting the failure as a setback to Russian influence and others seeing it as a personal slight to the Russian president.
Despite this backdrop of frustration, however, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev seems eager to continue his personal diplomatic initiative. And even with the lack of any success during the Kazan meeting, Russia does see some advantage and expect some benefit from its engagement.
This sense of value in continuing its lead role stems from several factors. First, and most notably, the fact that Russia is permitted and even encouraged to assume the lead role as mediator of the Karabakh conflict reflects a recognition of Russian power and influence in the South Caucasus. And while the sole diplomatic body empowered to mediate the Karabakh conflict is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), through its so-called “Minsk Group,” is co-chaired equally by France, Russia and the United States, both Paris and Washington seemed to have ceded the diplomatic initiative to Moscow. In the wake of this month’s third anniversary of Russia’s war with Georgia, such Western passivity in the face of a Russian consolidation of its power and influence in the Caucasus can be viewed either as a geopolitical embarrassment or as a realistic recognition that only Moscow holds the means to pressure the Armenians and Azerbaijanis over Karabakh. In this context, it is also about obtaining respect as a regional power, a Russian objective that is far too often underestimated or misunderstood.
A second benefit for Russia is an opportunity to reassure the West that Russian interests are not always a threat. Through its mediation of Karabakh, Russia may demonstrate that its interests do not always clash with those of the West, and it may show that regional security and stability is a mutual, shared interest. And third, Moscow may garner yet anther dividend from assuming the lead role in tackling the region’s sole “frozen” conflict, by positioning itself as the main actor already on the ground, ready in the event of any outbreak of war over Karabakh to respond much faster than any Western power. Such a position also helps to preempt any likelihood of either greater Western engagement or any direct intervention by Russia’s rivals in the region, like Turkey and Iran.
Thus, even in the face of the difficulty in forging any real progress over Karabakh, Russia already gains from its direct diplomatic engagement.
Yet at the same time, there may still be a “surprise” over Karabakh to come. The possible “surprise” stems from an assessment of the recent trend in policy toward Karabakh and the region. More specifically, it is fairly apparent that in the case of the parties to the conflict, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh itself, there is no real expectation for any change in their diplomatic position. Likewise, there is little if any indication of any shift in the policies of other regional actors, such as Turkey and Iran. And for the United States and the European Union, there is also no real sign of any policy change regarding Karabakh.
But the one exception to this trend is Russia, which may very well surprise many by adopting a significant policy change. There is already substantial evidence of such a shift in Russian policy toward Karabakh and the wider region, especially as Moscow increasingly seeks to improve its relations with Azerbaijan and deepens its “partnership” with Turkey. Russia is already firmly entrenched in Armenia, owning and controlling outright many key sectors of the economy, exercising a dominant role overseeing and “guarding” much of Armenia’s external borders, and empowered by the presence of a military base on highly unfavorable terms to the host nation. What this means for Armenia is that in the event of any subsequent shift in Russian policy, away from its more traditionally overt pro-Armenian stance to a more balanced “neutral” position over Karabakh, Armenia will have little response and even less recourse.
Richard Giragosian is the Director of the Regional Studies Center (RSC), an independent think tank in Yerevan, Armenia. He may be contacted at director@regional-studies.org
© commonspace.eu
