In the third and final article analysing the results of the Eastern Partnership Summit held in Riga last week, Dennis Sammut discusses the current state of relations between the European Union and Azerbaijan.
Relations between Azerbaijan and the European Union are currently strained, and they have the potential to get worse before they get better. It is a hard truth that neither side at the moment wants to fully acknowledge, but the Riga Eastern Partnership Summit last week exposed the extent of the problem. It is going to require considerable work and a lot of good will by both sides to bring this tangled tale to a happy ending.
EU-Azerbaijan relations have traditionally lacked a shared vision - underpinned by short-term expediency rather than shared values. This has often resulted in the two sides talking at cross purposes to each other. Azerbaijan never said that it aspires to be a member of the EU, it never showed interest in signing an Association agreement, and it has been cautious of any contractual arrangements that have any hint of conditionality. Instead it has been seeking targeted thematic co-operation, with energy the obvious favourite. Azerbaijan wants to sign a strategic agreement on energy with the EU. Discussions on a new EU-Azerbaijan agreement are due to begin, although its scope is not yet clear.
The three areas where Azerbaijan and the EU have agreed to work together at a technical level in 2014-17 are regional and rural development, justice sector reform, and education and skills development, but even in these areas the approach of the two sides is different, with the EU too entrenched in its own working models, and Azerbaijan too resistant to change of any sort, for things to move fast and smoothly. The EU sees itself as a donor, with skills and money to entice its partners. Azerbaijan however no longer sees itself as a supplicant. It wants a more equal relationship and a recognition of its role as an important energy supplier. Both sides think the other side needs them more than they do. Presentation is all important for Baku, and the EU structures may in the past have failed to grasp this fully.
Brussels and Baku could have probably muddled along regardless of these differences if it was not for two other issues that have been exacerbated by recent events in Ukraine.
The first is Azerbaijan's clampdown on civil society and human rights activists, as well as independent media. Azerbaijan's civil society problems predate the latest round of government repression. Whilst NGOs flourished in Georgia and in Armenia in the 1990s in Azerbaijan they took longer to establish roots, and when they did were riddled with internal squabbles. By the time the second wave of younger and more articulate civil society activists hit the scene a decade later the window of opportunity had closed - the state was much stronger and was not interested in allowing competing forces to emerge. A clash was predictable, and it reached breaking point in Autumn 2013. Two events happened around this time - Presidential elections took place in Azerbaijan in November. President Ilham Aliev won comfortably, but the elections were criticised by part of the international election observers in what was overall a shambolic performance by the international community which saw election observation missions from the mainstream European organisations issuing contradictory reports. The election, and post-election recriminations took place as events started to play on Kiev's Maydan. Baku got convinced that a similar scenario as the one that led to the ouster of President Yanukovich was being planned in Azerbaijan. A clampdown on civil society activists ensued.
That there would a reaction in Europe to the repression was most likely predicted in Baku, but the calculation was that the fallout could be managed, and that Azerbaijan could use the leverage it had as a result of its energy resources to neutralise criticism. To some extent they were right. Criticism of Azerbaijan from the European institutions has been mild, and often European leaders sent inconsistent messages about the importance that they attach to this issue. But Brussels is not Baku, and civil society in Europe is as much part of the fabric of the continent's body politic as any parliament or Ministry. The outcry from civil society, reflected also in some hard hitting articles in the mainstream media, took Baku by surprise, and the more they tried to muffle it, through the use of a very sleek and expensive lobbying effort, the more it seemed to become louder.
Either because they genuinely do not understand how Europe works, or because it suits them to pretend not to, the Azerbaijan leadership have convinced themselves that they are the victims of a massive global plot, fuelled by dark forces in the west, funded by the Armenian diaspora, and implemented by NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch who it is claimed do their bidding. Azerbaijan officialdom claims that in this scenario the European Union, and especially the European Parliament, has become instrumentalised as part of this plot.
When President Aliev decided last week not to attend the Riga Summit his absence was explained officially as being due to the fact that he was too busy with the preparations of the Baku European Games; informally sources close to the government however told the media that it was a response to the unprecedented anti Azerbaijan campaign in Europe. By the time the European leaders gathered in Riga, Baku decided that at the summit it will make a stand on Karabakh. The Azerbaijani delegation threatened to hold up the final declaration, although in the end (after frantic phone calls by Council President Donald Tusk) it accepted to make a side declaration.
Baku's grievances on this matter also stem from the Ukraine crisis. While Azerbaijan has welcomed the importance given to the concept of territorial integrity and sovereignty in the Riga declaration they complained that whilst the Russian occupation of Crime is highlighted, the EU refused to similarly highlight Armenia's occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and other Azerbaijani territory. There is some inconsistency in the EU position, although overall both sides in the Karabakh conflict had up to now accepted the role of the EU as an honest broker. In Riga Baku sent the message that this was now no longer enough.
Azerbaijan may not necessarily have wanted to be the spoiler in Riga, and may have simply wanted to pre-empt criticism, but by the end of the summit all sides all sides were left with a bad taste. As if to highlight the message that Baku has other options apart from Europe, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Mammadyarov arrived in Moscow before the ink on the Riga declaration was even dry, and from there he went on to Kuwait to attend the Foreign Ministers meeting of the Organisation for Islamic Co-operation, reminding everyone that Azerbaijan was as much a part of the Eurasian and Islamic worlds, as it was of Europe.
As a result of the latest shenanigans there is a danger that the scope of EU-Azerbaijan relations will get narrower. Azerbaijan speaks about moving relations from the multilateral to the bilateral - although it is not clear if by this they mean bypassing the European Union altogether, and dealing instead with the individual member states, or dealing with the European Union but bilaterally and outside the framework of the Eastern Partnership. Whatever it is the Azerbaijani position can prove to be a deadly blow to the Eastern Partnership. There is a school of thought that the Eastern Partnership is no longer fit for purpose and the EU needs to now prioritise relations with the three countries that have signed an Association Agreement with it. Others still hope to keep the loose framework that it offers in order to keep Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan in the loop. As the EU moves forward with revising its whole Neighbourhood strategy this issue is likely to be much discussed in the coming months.
But EU-Azerbaijan relations are not only a matter of process. It is the problems with the substance that need to be addressed first, and here the EU needs to ensure that the institutions and the member states are singing from the same hymn sheet.
Fixing the problems
Despite all the drama of recent days there are solid arguments why the EU and Azerbaijan should have close relations that go beyond being friendly. In many ways Azerbaijan is the interconnector between Europe and Asia, between the Christian world and the Islamic world. Its importance as an energy supplier and transit country should not be overstated, but neither can it be ignored. On the other hand Azerbaijan's value will be greatly depreciated if it was to isolate itself from Europe. Azerbaijan does contribute to Europe's energy security, but that also makes Europe an important customer. Both sides therefore need to put the effort to quickly address problems in the relationship.
There is first of a need to clear the air. This needs to be done at the highest level possible. The President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, has been invited to Baku. This visit should take place as soon as it has been properly prepared. This means also ensuring that the EUs red lines need to be agreed beforehand, so that they may be clearly and firmly communicated to the Azerbaijani counterparts.
Whilst any new agreement with Azerbaijani is unlikely to include significant conditionality, it remains the duty of the European institutions to ensure that issues such as governance, human rights, democratic practises, the rule of law and corruption remain part of the agenda. If the government of Azerbaijan thinks it can exclude these issues from future dialogue with the European Union it must be told clearly that it is mistaken. The pressure to release the dozens of civil rights activists and journalists who now rot in Baku's prisons should continue, and if Azerbaijan does not like being named and shamed it needs to address this problem, as it can do quickly and comprehensively. On the other hand critics of the Azerbaijani government, who persistently call for isolating Baku and for imposing boycotts and sanctions, must also be told clearly that they are mistaken. For both sides the way ahead is through intensified dialogue, not through isolation.
A framework for intensive political dialogue between the EU and Azerbaijan needs to be initiated. There are no shortages of delegations coming and going, including those led by heads of state or government, and set piece annual gatherings envisaged by the existing institutional frameworks,, but most of these events are glorified photo opportunities that do not offer the right conditions for profound political discussions with a wide spectrum of key stakeholders. In this much can be learnt from the Russian charm offensive towards Azerbaijan since 2013.
The European Union needs also to ensure that there is consistency in its positions on issues such as territorial integrity, and where there is inconsistency this needs to be explained. Without necessarily changing in substance its current position on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and its role as an honest broker between the sides, the European Union can, and should, articulate its position on the conflict and its resolution better. A big failure of the past has been that a lot of rhetoric coming out from both Baku and Yerevan on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue has remained unchallenged by Brussels. This situation has become more acute as a result of the unprecedented level of lobbying that both sides in the conflict now conduct in Brussels. This has given the sides the impression that if they repeat something for long enough it will become the accepted truth.
The Riga Summit should serve as a wake-up call on the current state of relations between the EU and Azerbaijan. It is not too late to address problems in this relationship. Both sides however need to accept that the way forward is through intensified engagement.
source: Dennis Sammut contributedthis series of three articles on the aftermath of the Eastern Partnership Summit in Riga for commonspace.eu
You can read the first article, "Armenia-EU relations: back to the drawing board", published on 25 May here.
You can read the second article, "Goergia's European quest: a question of stamina", published on 26 May, here.
Dennis Sammut is the Director of LINKS (Dialogue, Analysis and Research). He may be contacted at dennis@links-dar.org.
