In this op-ed for commonspace.eu Dennis Sammut argues that the first phase of the Ukraine crisis is now over. In the second phase the west must buy time for Ukraine. It must also re-invent its relations with Russia, for this war that has no name will be different.
After its military intervention in Crimea, and its swift annexation of the peninsula into the Russian Federation Russia momentarily basked in the glory of territorial gain and seemed to enjoy an illusion that it had somehow regained its super power status. Russia's actions however triggered a crisis that has quickly brought it into a major confrontation with a large section of the international community, including Europe and the United States. Some are already calling it a war. It is a war with no name since it is unlike any fought before. Diplomatic channels remain open and active, including between the Presidents of Russia and the United States whose long telephone conversations over the last few weeks themselves tell us that this is an unusual international crisis in which diplomacy remains an important tool. At stake is the future of the international system as we know it, and its outcome will have serious long term repercussions.
The UN vote enabled all countries to fix their position
The first phase of the crisis is now over. On 28 March the United Nations General Assembly adopted with a vote of 100 in favour, 11 against and 58 abstentions a resolution that affirmed its commitment to the sovereignty, political independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders and which called upon all States to desist and refrain from actions aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine, including any attempts to modify Ukraine's borders through the threat or use of force or other unlawful means
The discussion in the world body brought to an end an extraordinary week of intensive diplomatic activity on both sides of the Atlantic, and followed two keynote speeches that could not have been more different from each other - President Vladimir Putin's speech to Russian parliamentarians on 18 March and US President Barak Obama's speech to European political and civil society leaders in Brussels on 26 March. Obama's previously planned trip to Europe came at a critical juncture, and enabled the US and the EU to be seen working together and in harmony at a crucial moment in the crisis. Indeed this crisis in Ukraine has brought Europe and the US together in a way that has not been seen since the 1960s. Europe, which in the 20th century had been devastated twice by territorial conflicts, has been genuinely shocked by Russia's invasion and annexation of Crimea. The Russian's perhaps too gripped with their own narcissism may have failed to anticipate that their actions will hit a raw nerve in the European political sub conscious.
Unintentionally Mr Putin has not only given the North Atlantic alliance a new lease of life, but also strengthened its moral compass. In his speech to his MPs a few days ago the Russian leader accused the west of cynicism. There is of course an element of truth in this accusation. Western action, in the Middle East in particular was not always the product of domestic, let alone international consensus. In the conduct of their international relations both the US and its European allies carry baggage from their recent history. But Russia does too, and its claims for the moral high ground sound hollow.
Furthermore, what many have rightly realised early on is that this crisis in Ukraine cannot be seen simply as resulting from a repetition of past precedents, but rather from the perspective that it itself sets dangerous precedents in the way it challenges the international order and the sovereignty of states, and their territorial integrity. Ever since the end of World War II there have been dents on this international system - both Russia and the United States, as well as numerous other countries have transgressed, but none has dared to enter another sovereign state and annex part of it, except for Saddam Hussein in Kuwait - and the result of that was military intervention authorised by the United Nations to restore the status quo ante.
The vote in the UN General Assembly thus enabled the world community to take a position on this precedent. An interesting pattern emerged. All Europe - EU and non-EU states, NATO members and neutrals alike - has with only a handful of exceptions voted in support of Ukraine's territorial integrity. Russia, which though not formally named in the resolution was its main target, could only muster ten other countries in its support despite some colourful arms twisting by its Permanent Representation in the UN - ending up with an odd bunch of malcontents as allies. Outside Europe and North America the vote reflected a division between those who see the crisis as a challenge to the international system that needed to be reversed - many countries large and small from Nigeria to Costa Rica; from Saudi Arabia to Singapore were in this camp; but others seeing the crisis as the start of a new East-West divide, decided to abstain or not vote at all. The most significant abstentions were China - a global power with good relations with Russia, and Kazakhstan which despite being closely aligned with Russia political and economically has been rattled by the prospects the Ukraine crisis present for future international relations.
A vote in the General Assembly is non-binding. However the vote on this resolution has been an important barometer of where everybody stands at the end of the first round of what is likely to be a long and protracted crisis - not a fully fledged new version of the cold war as some are claiming, since it lacks many of the ingredients of the first, but certainly this is no minor dispute and needs to be seen as a major confrontation in the international system.
The west needs to buy Ukraine time whilst it sorts out its domestic problems.
The second phase of the crisis is now about to start. This will revolve around efforts to stabilise the situation in Ukraine itself, deter further Russian incursions and enable the democratic process to take its course. This phase will last for at least the next six months and in the meantime incidents in Ukraine, of which there are bound to be many, will present the Russians with temptations for further interference. Presidential elections are scheduled for 25 May, and will probably go to a second round in June. Parliamentary elections are likely in the autumn. These elections if held successfully will go a long way to stabilising the situation and providing an inclusive political framework for all Ukrainians to participate in. But elections in the post Soviet space in the last decade have often been destabilising events. This need not be in Ukraine. Good organisation, transparency and solid and fair international monitoring will give the Ukrainian people trust in the process. Ukrainian politicians will need to be disciplined in their conduct, and to discipline their supporters. At stake is their country's future and very existence. Maturity and cool-headedness must prevail.
One hopes that the large scale economic assistance that has been promised arrives in a timely manner, and that the Ukrainian government will get its act together fast enough so that the Ukrainian people, and especially the vulnerable parts of society, are sparred undue hardship. This will help stabilise the political process.
Within Ukraine, the conversation regarding the constitutional order , and issues such as Ukraine's relations with NATO and the EU should start but must not be rushed. It is very easy for the wrong decisions to be made based on the needs of the moment or driven by media panic. Here too wisdom must prevail over populism.
In essence western policy needs to be focused on buying Ukraine time. The country has been badly damaged by the events of the past months. Its institutions are fragile. The pervasive influence of the oligarchs will take time to contain, and the process of securing democratic rights for all can be a slow and difficult process. But the ethnic divides may have been overstated in the media. The basis for national reconciliation is there as long as outside interference is kept under control. For Ukraine this crisis is also the best opportunity it has had in its modern history to provide a better future for its citizens.
A new discourse for dealing with Russia is necessary.
Whilst the long process of stabilising Ukraine gets going the international community, and particularly the EU and the US, must start to consider how to deal in the medium term with Russia given the new situation. One hopes that this crisis, and the global response to it, will trigger a debate within Russia itself about what Russia is, and what it wants to be. This debate has never really taken place after the collapse of the USSR. This has allowed romantic nostalgia for super-power status to overshadow a more realistic appraisal of real Russian circumstances based on both Russia's strengths and its vulnerabilities, and how to best use the first and address the second. Under the Putin/Medvedev duo Russians have not been encouraged to think outside the box. Indeed being different - whether it is because you have dark skin and look as if you are from the Caucasus, or whether you are gay, or if you challenge the idea of Russian irredentism - made you somehow less of a loyal citizen. Whilst in the initial euphoria after the annexation of Crimea this attitude looks more marked, soon reality is bound to set in and the Kremlin's policy is bound to be under more intense domestic scrutiny. Russia has always been led by elites, and now too it is the debate within the ruling elites which will be most important. Whilst we are seeing very little of this debate in public we should not assume that it does not exist.
This poses the west with a dilemma. Should it try to isolate Russia, or should it be trying to engage it more actively. Striking the right balance between doing both will be crucial. As a large and important state - nuclear armed and with a veto at the United Nations, Russia must be treated with respect, but whilst it persists with its present policies it cannot be treated as a friend and partner. Sanctions, the suspension of the G8 framework and other actions taken over the last days emphasised that, and need to continue doing so. The west needs to adopt a new vocabulary in its relations with Russia that will make this crystal clear, whilst avoiding some of the unfortunate cold-war rhetoric that has emerged in the last few weeks which is completely out of context and unhelpful. Tangible co-operation in the political, diplomatic, economic and cultural level should continue selectively in a way that the Russian leadership should in the future not be able to take anything for granted. On the the other hand co-operation in the military sphere would be completely inappropriate. Similarly, there are institutions, for example the Council of Europe, which Russia through its actions in Ukraine has flagrantly violated. Here too it cannot be business as usual. However those who are clamouring for action that would humiliate Russia and bring it to its knees are mistaken. Such policy will not work, and will only be counter-productive.
In dealing with the Russian people, as distinct from the Russian state, the west must show magnanimity. For sure targeted sanctions against those who are pushing this dangerous policy that threatens world peace is necessary. However, in the very tightly controlled world of the Kremlin these people are few - a few thousand at most even if you count those whose task is to cheer rather than decide. There is no need to punish 140 million Russians in the process too. The EU should therefore proceed with plans to relax and eventually abolish the visa requirement for Russians. Some may argue that suspending plans to remove the visa requirement is an effective sanction. It is true the Kremlin has been lobbying hard for this, and this is one of the carrots that the EU had been dangling as part of its soft power approach to Russia, but a policy that would hit hard at the state whilst embracing the people can be the most beneficial at the moment, and the relaxation of the visa regime can be the most visible expression of this.
Preparing for peace.
Whilst fighting this so far largely bloodless war that has no name, we must also prepare for peace. This crisis has put once more the spotlight on the weakness of international institutions and on the need to revisit some of the basic tenets of the international system. In phase one of the crises the OSCE was one sliver away from being swept into oblivion, when, it not only was not able to prevent the crisis in Ukraine from developing, nor from preventing its escalation, but nearly was not able to deal with the after effects by sending a mission to help stabilise the situation. The Russians who had been vetoing the move finally gave in and agreed to the deployment of a large mission in Ukraine - Crimea excluded. It was a belated compromise - the very minimum that was required to stop the very existence of an organisation that has already failed on many other fronts, from being put into question. Much will now depend on the performance of the mission.
A silver lining from the Ukraine crisis is that the world at large has now become aware of the grey areas that have been created over the last two decades on Russia's European borders, and the failure of the international system to deal with the suffering they create and the risks that they pose for peace in Europe. Better late than never.
The Ukraine Crisis has focused minds on the need to address security challenges on the European continent and agree on a new order. By annexing Crimea to Russia Mr Putin has shuffled all the cards, hoping to emerge with a better hand. The rest of the world needs to make sure that he doesn't - not unless that is, a new win-win situation can emerge where all are better off in the new situation. That is the challenge that is now ahead of us.
Dennis Sammut writes regularly on European security issues, Eurasia and the wider Middle East. He is based in Oxford and may be contacted at dennis.sammut@spc.ox.ac.uk
photo: Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov and US Secretary of State Kerry are keeping the diplomatic channels open as the crisis rages on. (Picture courtesy of reuters).
