In July 2025, Armenia officially applied to become a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), marking a significant step, underscoring its commitment to a diversified foreign policy amidst shifting regional dynamics. As Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan confirmed during a press conference on July 16, the move reflects Armenia’s pursuit of a balanced and balancing foreign policy amidst shifting global and regional dynamics. This application, however, is more than a simple institutional maneuver; it encapsulates Yerevan’s strategic search for geopolitical stability, economic partnerships, and regional relevance in an increasingly complex Eurasian theater.
Historical Context and Political Momentum
Armenia’s engagement with the SCO dates back a decade. In July 2015, during the SCO Ufa summit, Armenia was granted “dialogue partner” status, which was allowing limited participation in SCO activities. However, for years the interaction remained largely symbolic, with few practical outcomes. The changing security architecture following the 2020 and 2022 clashes with Azerbaijan, and the perceived failure of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to respond to Baku’s aggression, triggered a reassessment in Yerevan. Armenia’s leadership began exploring broader multilateral platforms that potentially could better reflect its security, economic, and diplomatic interests.
This reassessment initially led to a significant intensification of Armenia’s dialogue with Western partners. In 2023–2024, Yerevan signed an EU civilian mission agreement (EUMA), hosted high-level delegations from Brussels and Washington, and deepened cooperation under the EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA). It is in this context of widening international engagement that the July 2025 decision to apply for full SCO membership should be understood as a complementary move within a balanced foreign policy framework.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ statement cited the organization's founding principles, such as territorial integrity, non-use of force, and inviolability of borders as aligning with Armenia’s national priorities. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan further clarified that Armenia views the SCO as a structure distinct from the CSTO, emphasizing its non-military, multilateral nature of the engagement.
Why the SCO, Why Now?
The motivations behind Armenia’s decision are multi-faceted:
- Geopolitical Balancing: Armenia’s foreign policy in recent years has increasingly emphasized the need for balance. Frustrated by the CSTO’s inaction and wary of overdependence on any single partner, Yerevan is now seeking diversified partnerships, including stronger ties with Western partners, China, India, and Iran. The SCO, where most of these powers already operate alongside Russia and Central Asian states, offers a unique multilateral arena for cooperation.
- Economic Opportunity: The SCO represents over 3.4 billion people and includes major global economies. For a landlocked country, which is under blockade by Turkey and Azerbaijan, economic connectivity is vital. Armenia sees SCO membership also as a gateway to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and as a potential boost for its “Crossroads of Peace” initiative - a plan to turn Armenia into a regional transit and logistics hub.
- Security Cooperation: The SCO’s focus on combating terrorism, extremism, and separatism aligns with Armenia’s own security concerns. While Armenia does not share SCO members’ threat perceptions one-to-one, joint exercises, intelligence sharing, and policy coordination can contribute to regional stability, particularly in the South Caucasus.
- Strengthening Ties with China: Armenia’s pursuit of closer ties with China has become a visible and strategic dimension of its balanced foreign policy. In late June 2025, Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan paid an official visit to Beijing, where he held substantive talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. The visit underscored Armenia’s interest in deepening bilateral cooperation across political, economic, and infrastructural domains. During the same trip, Mirzoyan also visited the headquarters of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and met with its Secretary-General Nurlan Yermekbayev. Shortly thereafter, Armenia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially announced its aspiration to become a full-fledged SCO member, a move that complements, rather than defines, Armenia’s engagement with China. These developments reflect Yerevan’s commitment to elevating relations with Beijing, not merely through multilateral mechanisms, but as a core pillar of its Eurasian outreach and balanced diplomacy.
Challenges on the Path to Membership
While the strategic rationale for joining the SCO is clear, Armenia’s candidacy is not without obstacles. The challenges are both internal and external:
- Institutional Constraints and Internal Contradictions:
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) remains a consensus-based platform and unlike more structured and legally binding frameworks such as the European Union, the SCO lacks strong enforcement mechanisms and an integrated bureaucracy. Decisions are made unanimously, and implementation often lags behind rhetoric. For prospective members like Armenia, this institutional looseness may reduce the likelihood of immediate, tangible benefits. Nevertheless, the SCO offers symbolic significance and a high-level diplomatic arena, which can be a key element for Yerevan's strategy of balanced foreign policy engagement.
Compounding this structural weakness are growing internal contradictions. India and China, both dominant players within the SCO, maintain an increasingly adversarial relationship, rooted in unresolved border disputes and regional competition. Meanwhile, the enduring conflict between India and Pakistan continues to limit the organization’s cohesion and capacity for coordinated action.
There is also a growing chorus of voices within China skeptical of further enlargement. Some Chinese policy analysts argue that earlier expansions, especially India’s accession, have diluted the SCO’s effectiveness, leading to policy gridlock and diverging priorities. In this context, Armenia’s application may face scrutiny unless clearly positioned as a net contributor to the organization’s goals of regional dialogue, stability, and connectivity.
In such an environment, Armenia’s value as a neutral, constructive player could be tested. Careful diplomacy will be essential to avoid entanglement in rivalries where Yerevan holds no direct interest, while still carving out space to advance its strategic goals within the SCO framework.
- Pakistan’s Opposition and India’s Strategic Calculations
Pakistan remains the only UN member state that does not recognize Armenia’s independence, maintaining a decades-long policy of solidarity with Azerbaijan. This alignment, reinforced by Islamabad’s firm stance during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, and again during recent Indo-Pakistani tensions following the Pahalgam terror attack, where Azerbaijan openly supported Pakistan, positions Pakistan as a likely opponent of Yerevan’s SCO membership bid. Given its track record, Islamabad may seek to block Armenia’s accession as part of its broader regional strategy.
India, by contrast, has developed increasingly strong diplomatic and defense ties with Armenia, especially in the past few years. However, New Delhi may approach Armenia’s membership with caution if it is presented in parallel with Azerbaijan’s application. India has long viewed Baku’s close partnership with Islamabad with concern, especially given the deepening military and strategic coordination between the two. While Armenia is not at the center of this rivalry, its accession process may become entangled in broader geopolitical calculations.
Despite these complexities, evolving regional dynamics within the SCO could offer a path forward. Pakistan is actively promoting Azerbaijan’s entry into the organization, and if both Islamabad and New Delhi choose not to exercise their veto rights, the possibility of parallel accession could emerge. In this context, China’s role is pivotal. As a close strategic partner of Pakistan, Beijing could use its influence to encourage a constructive stance. Given these dynamics, Armenia hopes India will continue to approach the matter with pragmatism and support Yerevan’s membership based on shared democratic values, mutual interests, and the broader potential for regional cooperation.
- Russia’s Calculations and Belarus’s Potential Role
As a founding member and strategic pillar of the SCO, Russia formally supports the organization’s expansion and regional engagement. At the same time, some in Moscow observe with unease the steady growth of China’s political and economic footprint in areas historically viewed as within Russia’s sphere of influence, particularly the South Caucasus. Armenia’s prospective membership in the SCO will therefore require a delicate diplomatic approach that reinforces its commitment to balanced foreign policy while preserving cooperative ties with Russia. Though there has been no official opposition from Moscow, experts note that Armenia’s effective integration into the SCO may depend in part on its ability to maintain constructive dialogue with Russia, particularly in the context of evolving Eurasian security architectures.
In this broader balancing act, Belarus may have a modest but meaningful role to play. While relations between Yerevan and Minsk have been strained, particularly due to Belarus’s close alignment with Azerbaijan, Armenia could view a constructive stance by Belarus on its SCO membership as a potential opening for diplomatic reengagement. Although not a central player in the process, Minsk’s support could contribute to fostering a more inclusive consensus within the organization. For Belarus, this would be an opportunity to reaffirm its relevance in regional diplomacy, while for Armenia, it could serve as a small but symbolic step toward reestablishing dialogue and recalibrating bilateral ties within a multilateral framework.
- Reinforcing Ties with the EU and the West: A Complementary Track
Armenia’s pursuit of full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization does not signal a departure from its deepening engagement with the European Union and broader Western partners. On the contrary, Armenia continues to strengthen its democratic institutions, diversify its economic partnerships, and align with key Western frameworks through the EU–Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA), the Eastern Partnership, and ongoing security and resilience dialogues with the United States and NATO.
Yerevan views engagement with the SCO not as a substitute for its ties with the West, but as a complementary effort to ensure national sovereignty, economic diversification, and geopolitical balance. In this context, Western partners are encouraged to view Armenia’s engagement with Eurasian institutions as part of a broader strategy of resilience, dialogue, and inclusivity in a rapidly shifting global order.
Strategic Implications for Armenia and the Region
Armenia’s pivot to the SCO is not an abandonment of Western engagement or a departure from its European ambitions. Instead, it is a calculated move to expand its geopolitical toolkit. Yerevan seeks to leverage multiple vectors - West, Russia, China, India and Iran - to maximize its sovereignty and maneuverability.
In this context, Armenia’s “Crossroads of Peace” initiative aligns well with the SCO’s founding principles. Launched by the Armenian government, the initiative envisions the unblocking and modernization of regional transport and communication routes across the South Caucasus, based on four key principles: sovereignty, reciprocity, jurisdiction, and equality. Its core aim is to transform Armenia into a logistical and infrastructural hub connecting the Persian Gulf, Black Sea, Caspian region, and Europe, facilitating regional trade while ensuring national control over transit operations. Within this framework, SCO membership could lend additional international legitimacy to Armenia’s regional agenda and potentially attract infrastructure investment from key players like China, India, and other SCO members.
Conclusion: Pragmatism in Uncertain Times
Armenia’s bid for membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is not a shift in geopolitical alignment, but a reflection of a balanced and pragmatic foreign policy. It signals Yerevan’s intention to diversify its strategic options, embed itself deeper into multilateral regional formats, and navigate a world increasingly marked by fragmentation and volatility.
This step comes amid a backdrop of shifting global dynamics. The future of Euro-Atlantic cohesion remains unclear, as questions persist about the United States' long-term strategic engagement in Eurasia. Transatlantic relations have shown signs of strain, particularly regarding diverging priorities between Washington and Brussels. Meanwhile, the European Union’s own strategic autonomy remains an aspiration more than a reality, often limited by internal divisions and dependency on external security guarantees. In this environment, smaller states like Armenia must think beyond binary choices and cultivate partnerships across multiple axes.
We believe, that SCO membership offers such a platform, where dialogue with both established and emerging powers is possible without exclusive alignment. Armenia is not seeking protectionism or bloc-based politics, but rather inclusivity and functional cooperation on security, trade, connectivity, and diplomacy. While challenges abound, including internal rivalries within the SCO and unresolved regional tensions, the potential to convert participation into strategic leverage is tangible.
What remains essential is Armenia’s adherence to core principles: sovereignty, mutual respect, and balanced engagement. If Yerevan continues to approach the SCO with strategic patience, proactive diplomacy, and a vision rooted in regional interdependence, it can transform its accession not into a reactive move, but into a cornerstone of a more resilient and forward-looking Eurasian policy.
source: Johnny G Melikyan is Senior Research Fellow at Orbeli Centre, in Yerevan and a member of LINKS Europe Strategic Expert Platform (jonmelikyan@gmail.com).
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