Relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have in the last decade, been competitive. Led by two ambitious but visionary men – both named Mohammed: MBS – Mohammed bin Salman, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia; and MBZ – Mohammed bin Zayed, the Ruler of Abu Dhabi and president of the Emirates, the two Gulf neighbours embraced many aspects of modernity, and moved hurriedly to turn their countries into global vanguards.
Yet up to now, competition was kept within bounds. They cooperated closely in areas of security and presented a united front. They were on the same side when they confronted Qatar and in their opposition to the Houthis' takeover of Yemen. Yet problems had been brewing under the surface for a while, and in the last month they burst into the open.
The relations between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have been increasingly strained as a result of the different approaches of the two countries towards Yemen. Whilst both countries were initially together in resisting the Houthis ' takeover in Yemen, the UAE subsequently focused on the South of the country, backing the Southern Movement (STC), which seeks to restore the independence of South Yemen. South Yemen became an independent country in 1967, at the end of British rule, and only unified with the north in 1990.
The Saudi-led “Coalition to Support Legitimacy in Yemen” on Tuesday, 30 December, said it conducted a “limited” airstrike targeting two ships “that smuggled weapons and other military hardware into Mukalla in southern Yemen”. The ships originated in the UAE port of Furjeirah.
In a statement carried by the Saudi Press Agency (SPA), the Coalition Forces spokesman, Major General Turki Al-Maliki, said that two ships coming from the port of Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates entered the Port of Mukalla in Hadramaut without obtaining official permits from the Joint Forces Command of the Coalition.
“The crews of the two ships disabled the tracking systems of the two ships and unloaded a large quantity of weapons and combat vehicles to support the Southern Transitional Council forces in the eastern governorates of Yemen (Hadramawt, Al-Mahra) with the aim of fueling the conflict. This is a clear violation of imposing a truce and reaching a peaceful solution, as well as a violation of UN Security Council Resolution No. (2216) of 2015 AD,” said the spokesman.
The coalition urged civilians and fishermen to evacuate the Port of Mukalla, signalling that a major military operation to force an STC withdrawal could be imminent.
Al-Maliki said the Coalition Forces acted on a request by Rashad Al-Alimi, the president of the Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council, “to take all necessary military measures to protect civilians in the governorates of Hadramawt and Al-Mahra.”
Al-Alimi warned last week that unilateral actions by the STC were pushing the country toward a dangerous tipping point.
“Given the danger and escalation posed by these weapons, which threaten security and stability, the Coalition Air Forces conducted a limited military operation this morning targeting weapons and combat vehicles unloaded from the two ships at the port of Al-Mukalla. This was done after documenting the unloading, and the military operation was carried out in accordance with international humanitarian law and its customary rules, ensuring no collateral damage occurred,” spokesman Al-Maliki said.
He affirmed the Coalition’s "continued commitment to de-escalation and enforcing calm in the governorates of Hadramawt and Al-Mahra, and to prevent any military support from any country to any Yemeni faction without coordination with the legitimate Yemeni government and the Coalition. This is aimed at ensuring the success of the Kingdom and the Coalition’s efforts to achieve security and stability and prevent the conflict from spreading.”
The Southern Transitional Council (STC), launched a sweeping military campaign early in December, seizing the governorates of Hadramaut along the Saudi border and the eastern governorate of Al-Mahra in Yemen’s border with Oman.
The UAE-backed STC forces captured the city of Seiyun, including its international airport and the presidential palace. They also took control of the strategic PetroMasila oilfields, which account for a massive portion of Yemen’s remaining oil wealth.
This prompted Saudi Arabia to issue a firm demand for the STC to withdraw and hand over the seized areas to the National Shield Forces, a Saudi-backed unit.
The coalition warned that any military movements undermining de-escalation efforts would be dealt with immediately to protect civilians, according to the Saudi Press Agency.
On 26 December, the UAE issued a statement welcoming Saudi Arabia’s efforts to support security and stability in Yemen.
The statement carried by state news agency WAM praised Saudi Arabia’s constructive role in advancing the interests of the Yemeni people and supporting their legitimate aspirations for stability and prosperity. But the Saudis claim that the UAE continued to back the STC.
In a move seen as an attempt to de-escalate a crisis with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, on Tuesday (30th December), announced that it was heeding a call to withdraw its troops from Southern Yemen.
The leading English-language newspaper in Abu Dhabi, The National, said that the main UAE force was based at Riyan Mukalla International Airport, with access to fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, but also operated smaller contingents in the port town of Balhaf and Shabwa.
"It is understood it also flew a number of drones from the airbase that were able to track terrorist movements, pass information back to its allies and assist special forces' missions."
Saudi Arabia has led the anti-Houthi coalition since 2015, with the UAE playing a key role in halting the advance of the Iran-backed rebels, expelling them from the south, and combating extremist groups such as Al Qaeda and ISIS.
The British “peace” served to keep the Saudis out
The problems between Saudi Arabia and the Emirates are not new. The Kingdom was never happy with the existence of the smaller states on the Arabian peninsula, which, for most of the 20th century, had British “protection”. But the wisdom of MBZ’s father, Sheikh Zayed, the founder of the UAE, and the caution of MBS's uncles, who ruled Saudi Arabia, generally managed the problems outside the public eye. When the British peace ended abruptly in the 1960’s – the British ran out of money – many thought that the Saudi peace would replace it. Sixty years later, it still has not.
The British presence on the Trucial Coast was the main deterrent for keeping the Saudis out, and the Wahhabis who took over the kingdom in the late 19th century would have run over the sheikhdoms of the Trucial Coast if the British were not there to scare them off. There had been standoffs as late as 1955 in Buraimi, where British forces had to expel Saudi encroachment by a show of military force. Many Saudi land borders with neighbouring countries remain under dispute.
In the 1960’s, the first reaction of American and even British officials, on sensing the British government’s desire to withdraw from the Gulf, was to think that Saudi Arabia should be allowed to do what it had been stopped from doing a century earlier. Astute observers, including Sir William Luce, in his valedictory to the Foreign Office, on 19 July 1966, visualized a scenario whose “central feature would be Saudi Arabia, led by a progressive monarchy and militarily well equipped within the limitations of its population. The Gulf states, or what remained of them, would become satellites of Saudi Arabia, led by Sheikhly families who would be autonomous in internal affairs, though subject to strong pressures and perhaps more from Saudi Arabia, if the conduct of any of them imperilled the security of the whole”. Luce dubs his plan ‘Arabian Peninsula Solidarity’. Another British official, Sir George Middleton, had put forward a similar idea in 1960, but was strongly rebuffed by London.
Others outside the British government were also thinking on the same lines, as can be seen from the record of a conversation in 1964 between the US Ambassador to Iraq, Robert C. Strong, and the visiting French Consul-General in Aden, Paul Carton. The US Embassy in Baghdad reported to the State Department:
“Mr Carton considered that the possibility of future trouble in the area was great, as the contradictions of increasing wealth and continuing backwardness, autocracy and lack of opportunity for constructive development became more and more pronounced. The British were trying hard to push and haul the Sheikhs and the Sultan [of Oman] into taking a more enlightened approach, but were not succeeding. The Ambassador speculated personally that perhaps the best thing for the area as a whole was to let it become a whole (sic). Perhaps the British, in their urge to reduce their commitments, would find it in their best interest to let the natural power in the area, Saudi Arabia, assume control of the Trucial Coast, and perhaps Qatar. Perhaps a Labour government in some future day might entertain such ideas. British commercial interests would still be well served by British commercial know-how. Mr Carton thought this reasonable once Saudi Arabia proved it was really modernising.” (Memorandum of conversation from American Embassy Baghdad to State Department, Airgram A669 10 February 1964, NARA 2745 pp 1324-5).
In a more comprehensive assessment of Saudi intentions towards the peninsula, four years later in 1968, the US Embassy in Jeddah produced a report for the State Department entitled “Saudi Arabia takes another look at the Arabian Peninsula”. The assessment says that Saudi Arabia now had a choice, either “to annex certain riparian areas (for example, the Trucial States), or merely to seek to establish predominant foreign influence over such areas (as in the case of Yemen and South Arabia)”. (US Embassy, Jeddah, to State Department, 14 February 1968, pp 2-3, NARA 2273 pp 1101-1111).
KSA – primus inter pares.
In its role within the Gulf Co-operation Council, and in the region generally, Saudi Arabia has traditionally played the role of primus inter pares.
The Bahrainis, short of money and beleaguered by the Shia majority in the country, generally acquiesced; the Kuwaitis are too focused on their internal problems; and the Omanis remain as aloof as they can, although they also have concerns regarding UAE intentions. It is Qatar and the UAE that in different ways challenge Saudi hegemony.
KSA has learnt lessons from its dispute with Qatar, but the UAE remains vulnerable
Saudi Arabia, under Mohammed bin Salman, has learnt from its dispute with Qatar that such squabbles can be costly, not only in monetary terms, but also diplomatically.
Saudi “Peace” may be tempting, but it comes at a price.
The UAE remains vulnerable because of its size, demography and geography; Its wealth may protect it for a while, but it has its limits. The decision of the UAE to break ranks and recognise Israel may have endeared it to the United States. But many inside, as much as outside the country, are not convinced.
source: This briefing, appeared first in Arabia Concise on 27 January 2026, and was prepared by Dr Dennis Sammut, Managing Editor of commonspace.eu, and Director of LINKS Europe. In 2015 Dennis Sammut was awarded a Doctorate by the University of Oxford, for his thesis with the title “End of Empire policies, and the politics of local elites; the British exit from South Arabia and the Gulf, 1951-72”.
