Georgia is one of the former Soviet republics that, in theory, could have made a smooth transition to a European-style democratic model. Instead, it plunged into civil war in the early 1990s and enduring political divisions that persist to this day.
Much of what happened in Georgia during this period can be traced back to the tragic events of April 1989, when Soviet troops attacked unarmed civilians in Tbilisi who were protesting about the status of the Georgian language. This massacre shocked the nation, and after that day the legitimacy of the Soviet regime in Georgia crumbled. But when the communist establishment collapsed, there was no immediate replacement, and the country fell into a power vacuum.
Eduard Shevardnadze came to Georgia in 1992 to take over the government from what was essentially a circle of criminals and warlords that failed to unify the country or produce a strong national leader. Shevardnadze, with his experience from his time as a Soviet foreign minister, was able to fill the political vacuum. At the time, Georgia was deeply divided, with various regions and factions either seeking greater autonomy or vying for power amidst the collapse of the Soviet Union. Ethnic tensions, particularly in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, further fractured the country, leading to violent conflicts and a humanitarian crisis.
The Georgian people only remember the lack of electricity, lack of water, and the chaos that characterised Shevardnadze’s rule, but Shevardnadze was a very clever politician and understood the Georgian mentality and Georgian people. In 1995, after elements within the fractured government and regional factions attempted to assassinate him, he tightened his control. Despite the many challenges, he managed to restore a degree of stability, though much of Georgia remained politically and economically fragmented.
Shevardnadze inherited a devastated country with no clear path to recovery. Although he managed to secure humanitarian aid and post-conflict rehabilitation assistance for Georgia, the country never fully recovered from the chaos of 1991-1992. Many Georgians became disillusioned and lost faith in the country and its political elite. The situation improved once the new parliament was established in 1995, and the rule of law began to play a role in the country's development. But this progress was not organic. It was constantly threatened by forces that sought to undermine it.
All Georgians wanted closer relations with the European Union, but this was not a controversial issue at the time because Europe was an abstract concept that few could relate to. Indeed, there was considerable doubt in Europe as to whether Georgia was even part of the European continent. This ambiguity was only resolved when Georgia joined the Council of Europe in 1999. Later, Zurab Zhvania successfully lobbied for the inclusion of Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Council of Europe, but at home, Europe felt very distant to most Georgians. While the European project was seen as important, it was not the main issue dividing the country. The underlying divide between reformists and conservatives was largely about how to deal with Russian influence and how to establish a balanced relationship with Moscow.
In November 2003, the Rose Revolution made a significant geopolitical shift towards the West, particularly NATO and the European Union. Although many in Europe still believed that Georgia was a failed state, plagued by endemic corruption, a weak economy and a haven for organised crime, the peaceful Rose Revolution led by Mikheil Saakashvili and his reformist allies ushered in a transformative period in the country's history. Under Saakashvili's leadership, corruption was largely eradicated and sweeping reforms were introduced to liberalise the Georgian economy, attract foreign investment and overhaul state institutions such as the police and civil service.
Despite the revolution's significant achievements, its legacy remains controversial, largely due to its lasting impact on Georgia's current political landscape. The early mistakes made by the young revolutionaries, including the lack of checks and balances in the new political system, continue to haunt the country. Over time, disillusionment grew with Saakashvili's increasingly authoritarian style of governance, characterised by centralisation of power and pressure on the judiciary. In November 2007, just four years after the revolution, mass protests erupted, with critics demanding his resignation over concerns about media suppression, abuse of power and political repression. The government's response, which included the use of riot police and a state of emergency, damaged Saakashvili's democratic credentials.
A year later, in August 2008, Georgia and Russia fought a brief but costly war that left many dead and injured and thousands displaced. In some ways, the war changed nothing - the two breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which broke away shortly after the collapse of the USSR, remain outside Georgian jurisdiction to this day. In other ways, however, the war marked a significant turning point, symbolising the end of the post-Soviet era and Georgia's continuing struggle to assert its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The conflict became one of the defining events of Mikheil Saakashvili's presidency. Despite his efforts to modernise Georgia and strengthen its military, the country was woefully unprepared for the war, and it was only by chance and international pressure that a humiliating defeat was avoided. While the fighting ended quickly, the long-term effects of the Georgia-Russia war have yet to be fully understood or felt. The conflict left a legacy of deepening divisions, not only between Georgia and Russia, but also within Georgian society, and has continued to shape the country's foreign policy and security strategies.
In October 2012, Saakashvili's party, the United National Movement (UNM), was defeated in Georgian parliamentary elections by the opposition Georgian Dream party, led by billionaire businessman Bidzina Ivanishvili. This marked the beginning of a political transition in which Saakashvili's influence waned. A decade of Saakashvili's rule had left the country more divided, its politics more polarised and its democracy more fragile than at any time in its post-Soviet history. Critics argue that while the Rose Revolution laid the foundations for Georgia's modernisation, the democratic gains were not fully consolidated, leading to a volatile political environment that persists today.
By the end of Saakashvili's second term in 2013, authoritarian tendencies had become more pronounced, particularly with regard to the independence of the judiciary, selective justice and the treatment of political opponents. These issues reflected deeper systemic challenges that were not fully addressed by the initial successes of the revolution. While economic growth and infrastructure development were visible, many Georgians, including the post-Rose Revolution generation who had grown up in a Georgia relatively free of crime and corruption, were now ready to move beyond this era of leadership and seek more inclusive and democratic governance.
Of course, Georgia was a very different country in the 1990s than it is today. There was no European Union presence in the region, and the United States had little direct involvement. Only a few non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were active and tried to fill the gap by promoting peace initiatives in the region. At the time, the Georgian political elite could not easily identify with the European project, either for or against, as it did not yet have a major impact on Georgia's geopolitical landscape.
The only dominant player in the region was Russia, and the main divide within Georgia was over how to manage relations with Moscow. The key debate centred on whether to be tough with Russia or more compliant, particularly in the areas of military cooperation and security arrangements. This division reflected the larger ideological struggle between pro-sovereignty factions who sought to assert Georgia's independence and those who believed that appeasing Russian demands was essential for stability.
Over time, as European and American interests in Georgia grew, the balance of power shifted, even though their role was somehow semi-detached. This growing Western influence helped to loosen Russia's grip on Georgia. Georgia's reformist leaders worked tirelessly to facilitate this shift, actively seeking to integrate the country into the Western sphere of influence. By the early 2000s, the European Union and the United States had become much more prominent actors in Georgian politics, security and development, marking a significant victory for pro-Western reformists who had long envisioned a future for Georgia outside Russia's shadow.
2024 Georgian parliamentary election
Georgian parliamentary elections were last held on 26 October 2024, resulting in a controversial result that was claimed as a victory by both the ruling Georgian Dream party and the opposition. Although the Georgian Dream party officially won the elections with almost 54 per cent of the vote. However, the opposition claimed mass support sufficient to justify allegations of electoral fraud. It is clear that a persistent issue is the deep divide in Georgia between those who favour closer ties with Russia and those who oppose such ties. The mantra of rapprochement with the EU has been used to highlight this divide, which is deeply rooted in Georgian society and goes back decades. In fact, both the Georgian Dream and the opposition parties made EU membership part of their programmes.
The election campaign was articulated by both sides as a referendum on Georgia's future with the EU, yet both parties claimed that they wanted European membership for Georgia. Realistically, the Georgian Dream party has been criticised for its ambiguous relations with European decision-makers and is not in a position to argue convincingly that it is fully pro-European, although this remains part of its official stance. So, in essence, both parties claim to have a European orientation, but the gulf that separates the Georgian Dream from its opposition is its position on Russia. What agreements will the government have with Russia? This is where we are likely to see even more confrontation in Georgian society in the future.
In Georgia, as in Moldova and other parts of the former Soviet Union, the West has misunderstood and underestimated Russia's influence. Russia has a deep-rooted influence in Georgian society, especially outside the capital, Tbilisi. Recent elections have shown that questions about relations with Russia can mobilise voters who would normally abstain, and bring out people who would not normally vote. The pro-Russian voters in Georgian society have woken up and made their voices heard. This may come as a surprise to many Georgians who are used to the rhetoric of political parties and NGOs in Tbilisi, and to European officials and other Western diplomats who are not fully attuned to the sentiments that prevail in Georgian society. They are often influenced by those in Tbilisi who believe that Georgia is uniformly pro-European. But Georgia is a divided society, and the West must stop underestimating Russia's influence and its potential to shape the current situation in Georgia.
Georgian society today faces a major challenge. On the one hand, there is a government that is convinced that it won the 26 October parliamentary elections. On the other, there is an opposition that believes the election was fraudulent and that it was robbed of its promised victory. How Georgia will resolve this problem is open to question. The opposition does not have the capacity to bring down the government through popular demonstrations, so it will have to find a way to put pressure on the government without pushing it to the breaking point.
At the moment, t the opposition is divided into four political parties, all of which have passed the electoral threshold to enter parliament and all of which have different ideas about how they see Georgia's future. The opposition's first task is to unify its positions so that all four factions speak with one voice. This is easier said than done because these factions are deeply rooted in personal rivalries and ideological differences. Until the opposition is able to do this, any attempt to influence the situation is unrealistic.
Although the government thought it could validate the election results by simply emphasising that the Central Election Commission had confirmed them, this perception was shattered when President Salome Zourabichvili appeared on television on Sunday evening 27 October. She declared that she did not recognise the elections, that they were fraudulent and that Georgian citizens were the victims of a 'special Russian operation'. Zourabichvili has played a very interesting role in this whole saga, because she has managed to double the support of all the opposition parties that have rallied around her, and she is destined to be a key player in the coming days, weeks and months as Georgia tries to unravel this conundrum.
What can the Georgian opposition do? They have raised public expectations about what they can achieve. Irakli Kobakhidze's government is not going to disappear; it is not going to go away - it is going to fight to the end. Two things have to happen very soon, and it seems that the opposition has agreed on these actions. The first is to call on the people to go onto the street in order to demonstrate. The second is to refuse the parliamentary mandates of the new MPs, meaning they will boycott the new parliament. There is debate about whether this is a good decision, as it could lead to political gridlock. But there will be pressure on MPs not to do this, especially from those who believe in engagement within the parliamentary system.
What should the EU do in this situation? First of all, it is important that the EU does not burn all its bridges with Georgia. There is still potential for political progress, but the EU needs to be much more strategic than it has been in its engagement with the process. It must not cut ties, but it must show that it takes seriously the frequent violations of democratic principles and the fact that these elections were far from free and fair. So, the EU should take some tough decisions, including possibly considering sanctions or conditionality on aid, but at the same time be wise enough to maintain open lines of communication with Georgia. This will be a difficult but necessary task to ensure that democratic values are upheld while supporting Georgia's European aspirations.
