Next Gen Security Conference: Escalation in the Middle East panel discussion

On 27-28 May, the Netherlands Atlantic Association, the Clingendael Institute and Leiden University Campus The Hague co-hosted the Next Gen Security Conference, with support from the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Municipality of The Hague.

The event, which brought established professionals and the next generation of leaders, sought to encourage intergenerational dialogue on pressing global challenges. Through the exchange of knowledge, ideas, and experiences, participants explored how young people can contribute to shaping future policy and societal developments.

Panel discussion: Escalation in the Middle East

On 28 May, at Campus The Hague, experts on Iranian foreign policy, Turkish strategy, US foreign policy, and developments in Israel and the Palestinian Territories came together to share their perspectives on the military escalation, shifting regional alliances, and the use of strategic leverage points in the Iran war and the Palestine war.

In her opening remarks, moderator Fernande van Tets, a freelance journalist and former Middle East correspondent, invited the members of the panel discussion to a conversation on what they believed to be the role of modern diplomacy – whether from middle powers or influential external actors – in creating space for de-escalation.

Israel-Iran War: Regional responses and prospects for de-escalation

Fernande van Tets first inquired about the pre-war expectations of the countries involved, encouraging speakers to give an analysis of the domestic dynamics behind the international conflicts. 

Nate Swanson, Resident Senior Fellow and Director of the Iran Strategy Project at the Atlantic Council, opened by arguing that the Trump administration initially expected the war to be short-lived, similar to the previous confrontation between the US and Venezuela. However, he suggested that this assumption quickly proved incorrect, as Iran demonstrated a greater capacity to absorb pressure and sustain confrontation than many policymakers in Washington anticipated. While rising fuel prices and growing public dissatisfaction with the war created domestic political costs, Swanson argued that President Trump's decision-making remained highly centralized and largely insulated from these pressures. At the same time, he noted that the administration did not want to become entangled in another prolonged Middle Eastern conflict.

Building on the question of Iran's resilience, Hamidreza Azizi, Visiting Fellow at SWP, argued that Iranian authorities had anticipated the possibility of a military confrontation, particularly following waves of domestic unrest beginning in December 2025. Referring to warnings issued by the Intelligence Ministry, President Masoud Pezeshkian, and the former Supreme Leader Ali Hosseini Khamenei, he explained that the Iranian leadership viewed the conflict not only as a military challenge but also as a potential catalyst for internal instability. 

Competing visions for a ceasefire

In a second round of questions, Fernande van Tets asked speakers about their assessment of the future of ceasefire negotiations. Discussing Iran's perspective on the matter, Azizi stressed that Tehran remains deeply sceptical of ceasefires, viewing them less as pathways to peace and more as opportunities for Israel to recover militarily before launching renewed attacks. He argued that previous ceasefires in the region have often allowed Israel to regroup while simultaneously weakening its adversaries, creating mistrust and skepticism among Iranian officials regarding future agreements. 

This assessment was challenged by Nasrah Habiballah, Correspondent for Israel and the Palestinian Territories at NOS, who explained that Israeli perceptions of the conflict are shaped by a widespread belief that Iran constitutes the country's most significant security threat. While she acknowledged that Israel had underestimated the scale of Iran's response, she argued that most Israelis continue to see military pressure as necessary because they believe a weakened Iran would reduce long-term risks to Israeli security. This, she suggested, helps explain why Israeli public support for a ceasefire remains limited. Habiballah further noted that many Israelis expected the conflict to contribute to regime change in Iran, a goal that reflected broader concerns about Tehran's regional influence.

Responding indirectly to this point, Azizi cautioned that external pressure on Iran could produce unintended consequences. While acknowledging that the conflict may have generated certain strategic gains for Tehran, he argued that the greatest challenges are likely to emerge after the fighting ends. He cited internal estimates placing reconstruction costs at approximately USD 300 billion and warned that economic hardship, combined with existing social grievances, could fuel renewed protests, especially considering that during the war, Iran has used the conflict as a cover for the increased execution of political opposition. According to Azizi, this explains why Iran's leadership is seeking sanctions relief and economic support while simultaneously cracking down on domestic dissent.

Türkiye's strategic ambitions

Fernanda van Tets also questioned speakers about the regional implications of the conflict. Hürcan Aslı Aksoy, Senior Fellow at the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) at SWP, argued that Ankara views the fragmentation of the Middle East through a distinctly pragmatic lens. While Türkiye shares concerns about regional instability, she suggested that it sees opportunities to expand its influence and strategic autonomy. Aksoy also argued that Türkiye has sought to strengthen its position through a combination of military engagement, diplomacy, and economic connectivity initiatives.

Aksoy also responded to the discussion on Iran by noting that Türkiye's interests differ substantially from both Israeli and Iranian objectives. While Ankara does not want to see a nuclear-armed Iran, it also fears the consequences of a severely weakened Iranian state, including refugee flows and further instability in Iraq and Syria. In this sense, she suggested that Turkish policymakers occupy a middle ground between the security concerns outlined by Habiballah and the warnings about regional destabilisation raised by Azizi.

Regional conflicts, global interests

The speakers also discussed the role of external powers. Swanson argued that Iran possesses advantages in negotiations that other actors such as Lebanon or Gaza lack, particularly through its ability to threaten disruption in the Strait of Hormuz. This gives Tehran leverage that can complicate efforts to impose ceasefire arrangements. Azizi expanded on this point by highlighting the support Iran continues to receive from China and Russia. He noted that both countries provide diplomatic protection at the UN Security Council, while China remains an important economic partner. Nevertheless, he emphasised that Iranian officials continue to seek engagement with Europe and generally distinguish between European governments and the United States, even if relations with some countries, particularly Germany, have deteriorated significantly.

The conversation on Europe prompted reactions from both Habiballah and Aksoy. Habiballah argued that disappointment with Europe is widespread among both Israelis and Palestinians, though for different reasons. Many Israelis feel that Europe does not adequately recognise their security concerns and point to rising antisemitism across the continent. Palestinians, by contrast, are frustrated by what they perceive as Europe's unwillingness to use its political and economic leverage to restrain Israeli actions in Gaza and the West Bank.

Aksoy largely agreed that Europe's influence has declined but argued that this trend began well before the current conflict. According to her, many Turks view the EU as increasingly inconsistent in its application of international law, undermining its credibility in the region. While pro-European groups in Türkiye continue to advocate closer cooperation, she suggested that many young people simultaneously see Europe as an attractive destination while questioning its political reliability.

Domestic dynamics

The moderator subsequently raised the role of domestic politics in shaping conflict outcomes. Habiballah argued that Prime Minister Netanyahu has increasingly linked his political legitimacy to his ability to provide security. Although the war in Gaza initially weakened his standing, military successes against regional adversaries, such as the elimination of Ali Hosseini Khamenei, have helped restore support for his leadership.  

The discussion concluded with a reflection on public discourse and information environments. Habiballah stressed that journalists have a responsibility to engage with multiple perspectives and resist the tendency to retreat into ideological bubbles. She warned that self-censorship and algorithm-driven media consumption increasingly limit meaningful dialogue across political divides.

This summary was provided by Anna Szedlacsek, Junior Research Assistant at LINKS Europe, who attended the event. Image courtesy of the Netherlands Atlantic Association.

Latest

Editor's choice
Monday Commentary
Monday Commentary: PEACE IN OUR TIME?

Monday Commentary: PEACE IN OUR TIME?

Making peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan was never going to be simple, nor easy, nor quick. It is taking time, writes Dennis Sammut in this Monday Commentary. “There is a sense of realism coming from the leaders of the two countries – President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan and prime minister Nikol Pashinyan of Armenia, that frankly, is necessary and welcome”, he writes. At a time when conflicts are raging all over the world – from Ukraine to the Gulf, from Africa to South Asia, the prospect that Armenia and Azerbaijan had finally, after decades of conflict that left thousands of dead and many more displaced, decided on embarking on a journey of peace was welcomed. Peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan can be top-down up to a point. Both leaders have spent political capital preparing for a peace deal. But both are aware that their people are not ready for peace yet. In fact, in Armenia, most of the elite are negative toward a peace deal with Azerbaijan. Pashinyan needs time to persuade his countryfolk. That is why 2031 is realistic. Ilham Aliyev runs a tighter shop, but he is also not immune to public opinion. Every time someone hits a landmine in Karabakh, which unfortunately happens often, peace comes into question. Which is why Aliyev chooses to sound hardline, more often than not. In pursuing the peace agenda, both Aliyev and Pashinyan need to proceed cautiously. But they are right in making peace the central issue in their agenda. It is the main issue, and the one that will define them in history. So forward, cautiously but resolutely! In pursuing the peace agenda, Aliyev and Pashinyan need to be supported clearly and unambiguously. There are too many people in Baku and Yerevan who are sitting on the sides, waiting. The international community is not doing enough. It is time to be counted. Otherwise, the spoilers will win, and the region will go back to its bad habits. (Click the image to read the full commentary).

Popular

Editor's choice
Monday Commentary
Monday Commentary: European-Azerbaijan relations need an intensive and multifaceted dialogue that is frank and honest

Monday Commentary: European-Azerbaijan relations need an intensive and multifaceted dialogue that is frank and honest

Last week I visited Baku, Azerbaijan. My visit was relatively short, but very intensive, and had many meetings with stakeholders and colleagues. When I arrived in Baku first time in 1996,  Azerbaijan was a different country: weak, poor, and shaken by defeat in war. For thirty year the Karabakh issue dominated the agenda: the political agenda but also the popular mindset. Now, thirty years later, Azerbaijan has returned to Karabakh, and peace with Armenia is on the horizon. It is a new era for Armenia-Azerbaijan relations, for the South Caucasus, but also for Europe.  But we cannot be complacent: the Peace agreement has been initialed but not signed; borders remain closed; TRIPP is ambitious but remains an idea; and there are spoilers who want to turn the clock back. We must not allow them, and in this Europe and Azerbaijan must work together. Europe’ vanguard organization is the European Union – it is a free union of 27 member states; it is a strong global economic force, and increasingly a diplomatic and military force too. But it remains “work in progress” and can often appear dysfunctional. It often lacks collective and institutional memory. In its dealings with Azerbaijan the EU has made many mistakes – not least opening the delegation here late – in 2008. It sometimes appears condescending. Some utterances from the European Parliament and from some quarters in some member states are not understandable even for me. They irritate the Azerbaijanis, but serve no other purpose But Azerbaijan has also not handled relations with the EU well. It has failed to respond when the hand of friendship reached out; and it confused irritating actions, sometimes by well-meaning people; sometimes by outright spoilers, with strategic action. In short, EU-Azerbaijan relations have suffered from a lack of proper dialogue. This dialogue must be frank, honest and multi-faceted involving different segments of society on both sides.   Is Azerbaijan Europe? When Azerbaijan applied to join the Council of Europe in the 1990s, there were some who opposed, saying this was not Europe. I was one of the people who argued that Armenia and Azerbaijan may be on the periphery of the continent geographically, but were European in essence. Certainly their elites. During the discussion on 4 September in Baku, my friend Farhad Mammedov, mentioned that Azerbaijan is not interested in joining the EU, and was now close to the Central Asian countries in the 5 plus 1 format. Neither things mean that Azerbaijan is not Europe. There are several European countries that are not in the EU, and do not want to be, for example Norway and Switzerland. Iceland has recently voted to stay out of the EU. The UK was a member and left. Europe is bigger than the EU, and the holding of the European Political Community summit in Baku in 2027 proves that. Despite all the rhetoric, I never heard the president of Azerbaijan  saying that Azerbaijan is not Europe, nor have I heard any European president say it either. Not wanting to join the EU and forging close relations with neighbouring regions does not make Azerbaijan any less European. It is only logical that when Europeans talk to Azerbaijan they talk like family. The conversation is often frank. It must also be honest, and Europeans need always to remember this too. A frank, honest and multi-faceted dialogue A frank, honest and multifaceted dialogue will contribute to relations between Azerbaijan and the rest of Europe: it will avoid misperception, which unfortunately is very common on both sides; it will provide a forum where problems can be discussed and resolved, and it will increase mutual trust, so that together common problems can be addressed. (click image to read the full Monday Commentary)
Editor's choice
Monday Commentary
Monday Commentary: “The barren rocks of Aden” and “These lands of Yemen are so ruthless”

Monday Commentary: “The barren rocks of Aden” and “These lands of Yemen are so ruthless”

There are two early 20th-century tunes that mark foreign attempts to occupy and “pacify” Yemen. The Scottish tune “The barren rocks of Aden” marks the mobilisation of Highland soldiers, enlisted to be deployed to the Yemeni port of Aden, that in 1837 became the last colony to be incorporated into the British Empire. The tune talks of the harshness of the terrain, but is celebratory, It was even played as a farewell tune to Sir William Luce at the parade in Sharjah celebrating his end as “British Viceroy” in the Middle East in 1966. The second tune is an Anatolian lament. As Ilker Sezer reminded us this weekend, in his weekly feature on “Turkiye Today”, it “mourns the tragic fate of Ottoman soldiers dispatched to the harsh, remote deserts of Yemen during the fall of the empire, young men who marched away from their villages and never returned home. Most of their names, and numbers, were never recorded. Yet, their fate left a mark on the Turkish psyche.” Subsequent invaders have discovered that Yemen is a grave that cannot be overcome by the strength of modern technology, and that whilst Yemeni society is splintered and divided, building a reliable alliance with Yemeni factions is difficult. These are the harsh lessons facing Saudi Arabia, as the Kingdom faces its biggest challenge in its modern history. The leadership of the Kingdom now has to respond decisively. At stake is their very credibility. This is likely to be a long and messy conflict. Saudi military objectives need to be focused: to box in the Houthis rather than destroy them. This is likely to include: (a) regaining territory lost on the Red Sea coast; (b) control over Bab el Mandeb Strait; (c) some kind of cordon sanitaire on the Saudi-Yemeni border; and if things go well (d) the capture of Sanaa. All this would not eliminate the Houthi problem, but it will contain it. In the end the Saudis will have to continue managing Yemen with a mixture of carrot and stick. For the moment, the stick is likely, but the carrot cannot be forgotten either. (click the image to read the Monday Commentary in full)