A second Trump presidency is unlikely to bring a sharp focus to the South Caucasus and American policy for the region will hinge on existing bipartisan frameworks and congressional initiatives rather than direct presidential involvement, according to an analysis by Vita van Dreven of The Hague Institute for Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. She explores how the Trump presidency might impact the South Caucasus, analysing potential policy directions and their implications for the region:
As Donald Trump takes over the White House, many wonder how his presidency will impact global affairs. The South Caucasus is no exception: a region facing challenges and opportunities with a potential peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and escalating political tensions in Georgia. The role of the United States under Trump’s leadership could be pivotal.
The initial plans revealed about Trump’s American presidency paint the picture of an isolationist United States, with little interest in playing a leading role in international organizations. Trump has stated, among others, he will restart the trade war with China, deport millions of undocumented immigrants, and demand NATO members to meet the 2 percent GDP condition. A potentially more urgent concern for the South Caucasus stems from Trump’s remarks on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. He has hinted at scaling back or even halting aid to Ukraine. In July 2023, Trump declared he would ‘have the deal done in one day’ a claim he has since reiterated without providing specific details. He has also previously asserted that the prospect of Ukraine joining NATO was the catalyst for Russia’s full-scale invasion, hinting that NATO membership would likely be off the table as part of any peace negotiations.
If the war between Ukraine and Russia comes to an end – regardless of the terms – Russia’s strategic focus is likely to pivot back toward the South Caucasus. This shift would be driven by the reallocation of resources and political attention currently heavily tied up in the conflict with Ukraine. Over the past several years, Russia’s military, economic, and diplomatic capacities have been stretched thin, limiting its ability to assert influence beyond its immediate priorities. A renewed Russian interest could manifest in several ways: increased military presence, a more aggressive diplomatic stance, or renewed efforts to mediate or control the peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The question then becomes whether Trump will focus on the South Caucasus, especially given the absence of a comprehensive, overarching regional policy.
In the case of less American involvement in the region, it could create a vacuum, opening the door for other actors to assert greater influence. However, increased involvement by (regional) powers – such as Türkiye, Iran, China, and Russia – may paradoxically attract renewed American attention, particularly if its interests are perceived to be threatened. China, for instance, has increasingly tightened its relationship with Georiga in the past years, driven in part by Georgia’s strategic position in the Middle Corridor. This growing partnership underscores the South Caucasus’ growing importance in global trade and regional connectivity. Given Trump’s adversarial stance toward China, such developments could initiate U.S.-China competition in the South Caucasus.
Likewise, to compensate for decreased American investments, the Georgian government might search for alternatives, finding a China that prioritizes strategic and economic partnerships over democratic values, governance standards, or human rights considerations. Similarly, Iran has historically maintained close ties with Armenia, which could face challenges under the Trump presidency due to his staunchly anti-Iran stance and prioritization of isolating Tehran. For Armenia, renewed U.S. sanctions or diplomatic pressure on Iran could create additional obstacles, especially if Armenia finds itself caught between maintaining its ties with Iran and fostering its growing partnership with the West. These dynamics underscore the complexity of the South Caucasus as a region where several powers intersect, each seeking to secure their strategic interests.
Returning to the impact of the Trump administration on Armenia and Azerbaijan, it is important to consider the recent efforts of both parties to come to a peace agreement. In 2024, discussions focused on critical issues such as establishing diplomatic relations and delimiting borders. By the end of October, Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan stated that around 90 percent of the agreement was finalized. However, as emphasized by Armenian Foreign Minister Mirzoyan, the negotiations are taking place between the two parties directly without the involvement of third parties. The Biden Administration made significant efforts to finalize the peace agreement before the year’s end. During that same month, Senior Director for Europe at the National Security Council, Michael Carpenter, delivered a letter from President Biden to Azerbaijani President Aliyev. The letter affirmed U.S. support for the ongoing peace process and highlighted the potential benefits of increased trade and regional connectivity that could follow an agreement. Nevertheless, despite the efforts, a peace agreement was not signed before Trump took office.
So, while the U.S. may not currently have a seat at the negotiation table, Trump’s return to the White House could alter the dynamics. President Aliyev had openly expressed his support for Trump, praising him as a defender of peace and traditional values. In contrast, Prime Minister Pashinyan has refrained from endorsing any candidate, instead emphasizing the importance of fostering positive Armenia-U.S. relations. Trump has also indicated potential picks for key positions, such as Marco Rubio, a Florida senator, as his secretary of state. In this position, Rubio serves as a key advisor to Trump on foreign policy issues. While Trump is known to act independently of his appointed advisors, in smaller and less influential regions – such as the South Caucasus – Rubio likely has more room to express his own political views. This is particularly relevant, as Rubio is known to be pro-Armenia and has openly expressed his support for the country.
Georgia presents a more complicated case, characterized by the recent deterioration in US-Georgia relations. This downturn began earlier in the year following the controversial “law on foreign agents.” In response, the United States indefinitely postponed joint military exercises with Georgian troops and introduced the ‘Mobilizing and Enhancing Georgia’s Options for Building Accountability, Resilience, and Independence (MEGOBARI)’ Act. Initially designed to deter the adoption of the foreign agents’ law, the MEGOBARI Act has since expanded to include provisions for sanctions against key members of the Georgian Dream government and investigations into Russian sanctions evasion through Georgia.
In addition, Georgia’s inclusion in the 2023 “Black Sea Security Act” underscores the United States’ recognition of its strategic importance in countering Russian aggression. This act, divided into five sections, emphasizes fostering economic development and democratic resilience through regional initiatives and direct U.S. involvement. However, despite these frameworks for cooperation, tensions between the United States and Georgia have grown, especially in the aftermath of the Georgian parliamentary elections in October 2024. Widespread allegations of election fraud, voter coercion, and compromised ballot secrecy led opposition parties to boycott parliament. Smaller protests took place mainly in the capital Tbilisi, which intensified after Georgian Prime Minister Kobakhidze announced on November 28 that Georgia would pause EU accession talks and refuse grants until 2028.
The government’s violent suppression of these demonstrations – including the use of tear gas, water cannons, and rubber bullets – has drawn widespread domestic and international condemnation. As a response, the United States suspended its strategic partnership with Georgia, stating that the decision to postpone the EU accession process goes against the Georgian constitution and the will of the people. Within this context, President Zourabichvili has sought external allies, appealing to Western countries to support the Georgian protests. At the Grand Reopening of the Notre Dame Cathedral in December 2024, she reportedly discussed the alleged election fraud and violent repression with French President Macron and then President-elect Trump. Trump’s stance on Georgia remains unclear, Georgian Prime Minister Kobakhidze expressed optimism, citing the alignment between Trump’s policies and Georgian Dream’s agenda, including shared opposition to ‘LGBT propaganda’ and concerns about foreign funding transparency. Yet, Trump’s potential support for Georgian Dream is far from certain. His longstanding friendship with former Georgian President Saakashvili, dating back to the early 2010s, could complicate matters.
Furthermore, key U.S. legislative measures concerning Georgia, such as the MEGOBARI Act and the Black Sea Security Act, enjoy bipartisan backing and are likely to proceed regardless of who occupies the White House. This bipartisan consensus may play a decisive role in shaping U.S.-Georgia relations. Particular attention should be paid to Republican Representative Joe Wilson, who has proven to be a staunch supporter of Georgia’s European path and Zourabichvili. He has called for sanctions against key Georgian officials, including Tbilisi Mayor Kaladze and the Minister of Internal Affairs, for their role in the violent crackdown. Moreover, at the beginning of 2025, he introduced the “Georgian Nightmare Non-Recognition Act” with Democrat Representative Steve Cohen. The bipartisan bill prevents any normalization of relations “with any Government of Georgia that is led by Bidzina Ivanishvili or any proxies due to the Ivanishvili regime’s ongoing crimes against the Georgian people”.
It also states that Zourabichvili shall be recognized as the incumbent President and legitimate leader of Georgia. On that note, Wilson invited Zourabichvili to attend the inauguration of President-elect Trump, which she accepted. Similarly, several other U.S. Senators have expressed strong bipartisan support for President Zourabichvili’s leadership and voiced serious concern over the Georgian government’s decision to suspend EU accession talks and the brutal response to the peaceful demonstrations.
A second Trump presidency is unlikely to bring a sharp focus to the South Caucasus. The American policy for the region will hinge on existing bipartisan frameworks and congressional initiatives rather than direct presidential involvement. However, Trump’s broader foreign policy decisions – such as his approach to the Russo-Ukrainian war – could create significant ripple effects. Furthermore, his transactional and isolationist tendencies could further reduce U.S. engagement, creating a vacuum for other (regional) powers, including Türkiye, Iran, China, and Russia, to assert greater influence. Yet, this very competition might prompt renewed American interest.
For Armenia and Azerbaijan, the prospect of a peace agreement remains urgent and challenging. While the U.S. currently lacks a direct role in the negotiations, even limited support could potentially serve as a stabilizing force. Meanwhile, Georgia faces domestic political unrest and strained relations with Washington, potentially making sustained American engagement critical in safeguarding its democratic trajectory. Notably, bipartisan backing for legislative measures like the MEGOBARI and Black Sea Security Acts may serve as a counterweight to any potential disengagement from the Trump administration. Ultimately, the South Caucasus’ future will depend not just on U.S. policy but on the ability of local actors to navigate shifting global dynamics.
