Opinion: Hungary’s Constitutional Overhaul: Democratic Renewal or a Step to Autocracy?

Anna Szedlacsek is Junior Research Assistant at LINKS Europe. She wrote this op-ed for commonspace.eu

Hungary entered a new political era after the 2026 parliamentary elections, when the opposition Tisza Party secured a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly, granting it unlimited power to transform the Hungarian political system. Péter Magyar, the president of the party and the new prime minister of Hungary, has promised to root out the remnants of Orbán’s “mafia system” using "Operation Purgatory." However, the new government’s first reforms have sparked intense legal debates and protests from members of Fidesz, now in opposition, in the capital city of Budapest.

Constitutional Debates

With its two-thirds majority, Tisza has secured the constitutional power required to amend the country’s Fundamental Law and thus reshape (or restore) institutions that had been significantly transformed during Fidesz’s rule. The government’s first major constitutional intervention, the 17th amendment to the Fundamental Law, has since become a central test of whether Hungary’s political transition will strengthen democratic checks and balances or simply replace one concentration of power with another.

Among other propositions, the 17th amendment seeks to introduce a mandatory retirement age of 70 for Constitutional Court judges, effectively removing Péter Polt, the current head of the Constitutional Court, who has already reached this age. Polt has served as Hungary's Chief Prosecutor for over two decades before stepping down in June 2025 to join the Constitutional Court. He has frequently been accused of weaponizing the prosecutor's office to protect the ruling Fidesz party and its allies from corruption investigations.

Another part of the amendment appears to serve a similar purpose: by establishing a 12-year (three-term) maximum limit for all members of parliament, it would ban 21 members of parliament from the 44-member Fidesz group and 3 from the 6-member Mi Hazánk group from running in the next general election in 2030. As most current Tisza MEPs have previously not held political positions, the party would be largely unimpeded (for now) by this new rule.

However, the most politically controversial element of the amendment is the removal of President Tamás Sulyok, who was elected in 2024 with the support of Orbán’s Fidesz party. Parliament approved the measure on July 13, allowing the president’s mandate to be terminated. According to the amendment, he would be replaced by a new president elected by Parliament for a maximum term of five years or until a new constitution is enacted.

After the amendment's adoption, Sulyok was given five days to decide whether to promulgate the legislation. On Saturday (July 18), the final day of the deadline, he announced that he would sign the amendment despite describing it as a grave violation of constitutional democracy. In a televised address, Sulyok argued that the measure represented an unprecedented assault on the presidency and claimed that it damaged the principles of the rule of law, separation of powers, and democratic governance. Nevertheless, he maintained that neither the president nor the Constitutional Court possessed the authority to block a constitutional amendment adopted according to the procedures established by the Fundamental Law. Faced with a choice between signing the amendment or violating his constitutional obligations, Sulyok stated that he had concluded he had no lawful alternative but to promulgate the measure.

His decision ended the immediate constitutional standoff that many observers had anticipated. Rather than triggering an impeachment procedure and a lengthy procedure with the Constitutional Court – which remains composed of a majority of Fidesz-appointed judges – , the amendment entered into force through the ordinary constitutional process. However, the political and legal controversy surrounding the amendment remains unresolved, as critics continue to question the amendment’s legality and legitimacy.

A Just Cause?

The Tisza government argues that institutional renewal is necessary after years in which key state bodies became closely associated with the previous ruling party. The government contends that the removal of officials like Sulyok was a central campaign promise supported by a significant majority of voters and they therefore had a democratic mandate to carry this change out. In Péter Magyar's view, "Tamás Sulyok remained silent... when Hungarian citizens who criticized the regime were regularly portrayed by the fallen power as traitors, servants of foreign interests, and internal enemies.” and therefore could not be part of a government that seeks to unite, rather than divide. Legal expert Tamás Lattmann has suggested that the government may have specifically been worried about the president’s pardon power, which could shield former officials of the Fidesz government from criminal prosecution over charges of corruption.

The decision has also raised questions about the limits of constitutional reform. In response to the amendment, Péter Róna argued that Magyar has a "categorical mandate" to remove officials like Sulyok, he warns that the three-term limit for MPs was not a campaign promise and thus constitutes "arbitrary governance.” Benjamin Ward, deputy Europe and Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch, also acknowledged the government's mandate to repair the damage to the rule of law but warned that the ends do not justify the means: he is specifically worried about the rushed five-day window for public consultation, stating that restoring the rule of law requires "respecting due process" and fairness.

Meanwhile, András Baka, former head of the Supreme Court, said he supports the removal of the president, stating it is necessary to dismantle a "sophisticated authoritarian regime" designed to survive an electoral defeat. However, he disagrees with the three-term limit for lawmakers, arguing it restricts the public's right to vote for their preferred candidates.

A New Tyrant in Town?

To protest Sulyok’ removal, Fidesz has organized a demonstration in front of the Sándor Palace with the motto "Stop Tyranny!" (Stop Önkény!). Former President János Áder, speaking for the party, argued that the measure violates the prohibition against the abuse of power and the right to a fair procedure, calling the (then) planned removal of his successor unconstitutional. Meanwhile, while former prime minister Viktor Orbán used his social media to encourage followers to attend the protests stating “We will be there!,” he himself did not attend the event, and instead traveled to the United States for the football World Cup finals.

Who is Next?

Following Sulyok's departure, Parliament is expected to move quickly to fill the institutional vacuum. During an extraordinary parliamentary session on Monday, lawmakers are scheduled to determine which deputy speaker will temporarily assume the duties of the Speaker of Parliament while Speaker Ágnes Forsthoffer exercises the powers of the presidency on an interim basis, as provided under Hungary's constitutional succession rules. The National Assembly is constitutionally required to elect a new president within 30 days. Although the governing Tisza Party's two-thirds majority gives it full control over the selection process, speculation has already begun over potential candidates, with Speaker Ágnes Forsthoffer, chess grandmaster Judit Polgár, Culture Minister Andrea Rost, parliamentary group leader Andrea Bujdosó, and Living Environment Minister László Gajdos.

Ultimately, Hungary’s 17th amendment represents the "post-illiberal trilemma" of democratic governments that follow authoritarian regimes. This trilemma extends far beyond the debates around the person of the president and is expected to be a lasting feature of the new government’s reforms as Magyar faces pressure to carry out changes quickly and effectively but also to respect legal norms. Only time will tell whether the new prime minister is able and willing to balance reversing illiberal damage, preventing a populist resurgence, and strengthening checks and balances, rather than merely consolidating his own political authority.

source: Anna Szedlacsek is Junior Research Assistant at LINKS Europe. She wrote this op-ed for commonspace.eu

photo: celebration in Budapest after the recent Tisza victory

The views expressed in opinion pieces and commentaries do not necessarily reflect the position of commonspace.eu or its partners

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