Four years after the Second Karabakh War, civil society initiatives between Armenian and Azerbaijan remain arguably less impactful than ever before. On the surface, they appear few and far between, but many are often held in secret. The reason given is often security but that argument is no longer as credible as it was before. Indeed, nearly all projects that do exist remain largely untouched and unhindered. Instead, mirroring the situation before 2020, many Armenian practitioners refused to meet with their Azerbaijani counterparts, especially while Baku still held prisoners and other detainees from the war. That number is significantly less now. Time has passed and there may finally be the realisation that dialogue is the only way forward.
Though there has recently been one case of an Azerbaijani participant detained on alleged charges of treason by communicating with the other side, even a well-known Armenian facilitator of many of his activities told audiences in an online webinar held in September that this was likely not the real reason. It was rather because of his political activities. Yet many seek to derail a fragile peace process by suggesting otherwise.
Even so, other problems do persist. Perhaps the most pressing is that most initiatives work behind closed doors and are too often held in European capitals. This limits attendance and coverage if any exists at all. Budgets are unnecessarily inflated because of greater travel and accommodation costs alone. Most Armenians and Azerbaijanis are even unaware that their own researchers and analysts meet on an often regular basis, especially as few even mention the fact. Yet these meetings could normalise the process, demonstrating that communication is possible even when people disagree. However, it also doesn’t help when some have also engaged positively at such meetings but say the opposite back home.
Not that most participations have much significance or influence in their societies while those based abroad, including some who have never lived in either country despite an ethnic affinity, have none. A regional approach also remains lacking despite the large number of ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis in neighbouring countries such as Georgia where there is already an established practice of interethnic communication, cooperation, cohabitation, and coexistence. This is not the same situation as in Armenia and Azerbaijan but it does at least represent a model to aspire to. Many anyway have relatives in Armenia and Azerbaijan too. Moreover, given that regional integration and stability remains key to a lasting peace, their absence is unfortunate.
Instead, attempts to introduce ideologically driven activists has led to the unfortunate dichotomy of aggressively opposing a peace agreement sought by the governments while also advocating for projects that only the authorities themselves can achieve and implement. Moreover, they continue to replicate the same unrealistic projects implemented time and time again by themselves or others but which never were going to be viable until after a peace agreement is signed anyway. This combative, confrontational, and contradictory approach to peace-building, even against other initiatives funded by their own donors, has been so disruptive that it has effectively undermined any positive perception of the Track II process as it has become the only one visible to the population.
This does not help the peace process and the need for wider people-to-people contact among the general population. In both cases – the fracturing of the sphere solely into established researchers and analysts on the one hand and more recent political activists on the other – is counterproductive and has even manifested itself into fierce competition and insults posted online. At least twice, political activists opposed to the government but proclaiming to want peace have attempted to discredit any EU or CoE projects involving participants who are not from their own insular bubble. Yet it is those people who they oppose that likely represents society more, especially as they are not as fortunate to mainly live and study abroad. Regardless, it does result in the same thing. Such contact remains the preserve of an elite – mainly English-speaking, usually from the capitals, and mainly in the sphere of academia or Western-funded non-governmental organisations.
Arguably, the way forward is to also involve communities and individuals directly affected by the war, in close proximity to each other on the border, and in spheres that will become increasingly important over the many years if not decades that it will take to reconcile the two peoples. This means mainly non-politicised youth, musicians, artists, writers, poets, farmers, and even the business community. That is not to say that there is not an important role for academics, researchers, analysts, and activists but more that this should not remain a monopoly for much longer. There needs to instead be a holistic approach, also involving average citizens in Armenia and Azerbaijan as well. Sadly, this is not the case.
Since the 2020 Karabakh War, the negotiation process has dramatically changed away from mediated to facilitated to almost solely bilateral talks between the sides. The space for the same to occur between the people themselves should exist too. After all, these are the same people who should constitute the beneficiaries of projects funded by international donors but without their input. Otherwise, the perpetual problem of “usual suspects,” “closed doors,” and “conflict tourism” remains the same obstacle as it always did. This issue becomes particularly relevant given a process that now includes border demarcation and the inevitable proximity of border communities in the regions over the coming years.
Almost three years ago, LINKS Europe published its 30 measures between now and 2030 detailing suggestions drawn up for projects that would allow for greater inclusion a more holistic approach. That would be a good place to start.
