Tuesday, 10 January 2012
Domestic Armenian politics continues to be dominated by the country's looming parliamentary election, set for May 2012. Most notably, the coming election represents an important turning point for Armenia, as it will be the first election since the country suffered a violent and destructive post-election crisis in March 2008, which was triggered by a disputed and disruptive presidential election in February 2008. The election may also impact the course of Armenian foreign policy as well, with at least a chance for something new on the two main issues of Armenian-Turkish diplomacy and the Nagorno Karabakh peace process.
Over the past several months, however, tension has been increasing, as the country's leading political parties have been jockeying for position in the lead-up to the coming campaign season. As evident throughout much of 2011, the most significant recent political issue centers on a shift in the nature of political competition. More specifically, there has been a notable shift from the traditional conflict between the Armenian government and opposition to a new, much more significant clash within the pro-government coalition itself.
This new political confrontation, representing a first-ever conflict within the country's political elite, pits the ruling Republican Party, Armenia's largest political party, led by President Serzh Sarkisian, against the Prosperous Armenia party, a junior member of the ruling coalition, led by businessman Gagik Tsarukian, an open supporter of former President Robert Kocharian. The Republican Party seems intent on weakening the Prosperous Armenia party prior to the election, reflecting a strategy to greatly reduce the number of seats held by Prosperous Armenia in the new parliament.
As leader and public face of the Prosperous Armenia party, Tsarukian is generally regarded as a flamboyant, but crude millionaire businessman or "oligarch" who sees himself more as an Armenian adaptation of the Italian model of businessman-turned-politician Silvio Berlusconi, with related similarities evident between Tsarukian's Prosperous Armenia and Berlusconi's "Forza Italia" parties. But given the party's deeply rooted perception as a base for former President Kocharian, it will be a challenge for the party to create its own image as a new or alternative political force within the Armenian political context.
But as the May 2012 parliamentary election nears, this conflict between the Republican and Prosperous Armenia parties will only escalate, marked by an already evident increase in tension and infighting within the ruling pro-government coalition. Clearly, however, the Republican Party holds the initiative and enjoys the advantage of greater "administrative resources" or the "power of incumbency" as the dominant force within the ruling coalition. Yet, at the same time, the risks for the Republican Party stem more from its general over-confidence and related tendency to underestimate its political opponents, in this case Prosperous Armenia. These risks are only further exacerbated by the deeper danger from the government\'s record of ignoring popular demands for lasting change and real reform.
One example of this complacency was the recent local election in the Armenian city of Idjevan, where the incumbent Republican Party mayor was unexpectedly defeated by his Prosperous Armenia party opponent. While this prompted an emergency meeting of senior Republican Party leaders, it remains unclear whether party officials recognized the inherent risk of such over-confidence. Equally troubling for the Republican Party is the fact that the Prosperous Armenia party has yet to fight back or counter these moves to reduce its power, suggesting that the Prosperous Armenia leadership has either not yet decided on an effective strategy to fight back against the Republican Party or is simply unable to respond. But it is clear that the leaders of the Prosperous Armenia party are concerned and have been holding strategy sessions, including a high-level meeting in Dubai and a follow-up session in Yerevan in the closing months of 2011.
On a broader level, however, the more significant challenge for the Armenia government is not the outcome but the actual conduct of the May 2012 parliamentary election itself. Moreover, this coming contest stands as a crucial test for the government for three main reasons. First, popular expectations for an improved election are much higher, largely due to a combination of greater civic and political activism and a marked decline in general apathy. And these expectations are only bolstered by the government's own pledges promising a greatly improved and "more free and fair" election. In addition, there is also a greater degree of international scrutiny this time, especially as the contest will be a test of the Sarkisian government's credibility in terms of its stated "commitment to democracy" in general, and regarding its sincerity in meeting its own expectations and promises after a shift in policy that resulted in the start of an important domestic dialogue with the opposition and the freeing of political prisoners, in particular.
Second, this coming election is different than any previous ballot in Armenia, as it is the first election since the divisive and deadly March 2008 post-election crisis that left at least ten people dead and many more wounded in a clash between opposition demonstrators and police. The timing of this election also offers an important opportunity for the Armenian government to overcome the legacy of mistrust and the pronounced lack of legitimacy from that post-election crisis that has hindered the Sarkisian Administration ever since it took office.
And the third reason making this coming election more important than previous contests is the chance for President Sarkisian to prepare the foundation for his own reelection bid in 2013, free from the shadow of his predecessor and offering a fresh start in terms of redefining his own personal image with a new parliament that more accurately reflects Armenia\'s new political reality. And within that context, the Armenian president may once again initiate yet another bold breakthrough in foreign policy.
Such possible bold initiatives will be limited to Armenian diplomacy with Turkey, however, as the divide between Yerevan and Baku over Nagorno Karabakh seems simply to broad for any Armenian leader to bridge, at least until Azerbaijan can exercise a greater degree of flexibility in negotiations with Armenia. Regardless, some changes and shifts in Armenian foreign policy can be expected once this important electoral threshold is passed.
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* Richard Giragosian is the director of the Regional Studies Center (RSC), an independent think tank in Yerevan, Armenia (director@regional-studies.org)
