NATO members of Parliament discussed the situation in the South Caucasus during their meeting in Kiev Thursday (16 June). The meeting hosted by the Ukrainian Parliament is being attended by over one hundred and sixty participants including eighty members of parliament from 25 NATO member states and partner countries.
The session opened with a presentation by Dr Dennis Sammut, Director of LINKS (Dialogue, Analysis and Research) who spoke about the Russian involvement in the region, including in the process of resolution of the unresolved conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh.
Dr Sammut said:
"The South Caucasus is a region which Russia considers to be in its sphere of influence. Often events in the region are looked at in episodical fashion, as if they are unrelated to each. Yet if we take a step back and reflect on what has happened in the last twenty five years we can see that Russia, even in the chaotic days of Boris Yeltsin persistently pursued a policy that sought to reassert its hegemony on the region, and that it has manipulated divisions and discord in the region to achieve its objectives. Yes, it is true that local actors often played in the hands of Russian plans, and events often developed a dynamic and momentum of their own, but if we want to understand why we have had twenty five years of not much peace, and not too much war than we have to look at Russian intentions and actions to understand."
Referring to the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia Dennis Sammut said that
"Most of the time Russia has preferred to present itself as a peacekeeper, working through proxies to support one side against another. It was only in 2008 that it engaged directly in fighting, in the short war with Georgia in August 2008. Subsequent to that Russia decided that it would do away with the pretence that it was in Abkhazia and South Ossetia as an impartial peacekeeper. Instead it recognized the two entities as independent states, received their Ambassadors in grand ceremonies in the Kremlin, and de facto adopted them as its protectorates. Russia subsequently signed long term defence arrangements with both entities, and considerably expanded its military arrangements in the two territories. Ever since Russia has poured a generous amount of money in the two protectorates, and in tandem a generous amount of soldiers and armaments. The two territories have become Russian forward bases: the ones in Abkhazia projecting Russian power forward in the Black Sea, the ones in South Ossetia projecting Russian power forward through the heart of the South Caucasus.
It is fair to say that in the initial period Russia's presence was welcomed by both the Abkhaz and the Ossetian ethnic population, and Russian diplomatic recognition was seen as the ultimate proof of Russian support. There were high hopes of how the two territories would benefit from Russian financial aid. The Russian themselves thought that their benevolence will secure them the support of the hearts and minds of the Abkhaz and the Ossetian people. After the initial euphoria however reality quickly turned sour. Clearly the honeymoon period is now over. There are serious tensions in Russia's relations with the two territories, and huge disappointment on all sides."
Turning to the Karabakh conflict Dr Sammut said that
"This situation is not satisfactory for neither Armenia nor for Azerbaijan but a solution has so far alluded the sides. Ironically everybody knows what the solution is – it is based on the so-called Madrid principles, a sort of road map for peace that both sides say they agree with in principle. The mechanism for resolving the conflict is also known and has widespread international support – the OSCE Minsk Process co-Chaired by Russia, France and the United States. So why no progress?
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a complex combination of three different dynamics:
- The internal politics in Armenia and Azerbaijan
- The relationship between Armenians and Azerbaijanis and between the Armenian world and the Turkic world
- The global political and strategic balance, and more specifically Russia's role in it, and how that plays out in the South Caucasus
A successful and durable resolution of the conflict is only possible if the three dynamics can somehow be calibrated in a way that they can be mutually re-enforcing for a solution.
The conflict enables Russia to exert leverage on both Armenia and Azerbaijan in ways that would be impossible if it was resolved. Russia therefore, whilst being one of the three mediators, has no interest in resolving the conflict. In fact over the last ten years in particular it has been the main cause for escalation, supplying huge quantities of arms to both sides. The Russians even boast that by doing so they are ensuring regional strategic balance."
Dr Sammut said
"The four-day war has exposed the limitations of Russian strategy, nowhere more so than in Armenia. Over the last years the Armenian government of Serzh Sargsyan had a choice, and it chose to throw its lot with Russia. It did so not frivolously but because it had assessed that this was the best way to secure Armenia against the perceived threat from the Turkic world around it. In April this decision was put under great scrutiny. Like the Abkhaz, the Armenians learnt very quickly that Russian military basis on their territory were not there to protect them: they were there to protect Russia. Many in Armenia and elsewhere believe that Russia orchestrated the start and choreographed the finish of that episode as a means for maintaining the initiative and as part of a process of recalibrating its relationship with Armenia and Azerbaijan. For some months Russia has been pushing the so-called Lavrov ideas, a sort of Madrid Principles lite - an important pre-requiste of which is the withdrawal of Armenian troops from some of the Azerbaijani land which they currently hold. But is there a catch for Azerbaijan? Russian media over the last months and weeks have been suggesting that as a quid pro quo for the return of some of its territories Azerbaijan will join the Eurasian Economic Union, or in another version, that Russian peacekeepers will form the largest contingent of a Russian peacekeeping force that will deployed on the Azerbaijani side of the line of contact. Azerbaijan denies that this is part of the arrangement but the huge outcry in Azerbaijan against both ideas has put the government on notice that this is a red line they cannot cross. The Russians may therefore have ended up after 2 April alienating the Armenians whilst not achieving their immediate objectives in Azerbaijan either."
Following the presentation by Dennis Sammut the representatives of the Parliaments of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia made short presentations articulating the position of their respective countries.
The three day meeting which opened on Tuesday comes to a close this afternoon.
source: commonspace.eu
photo: The meeting of NATO parliamentarians in Kiev this week brought together 160 participants including eighty members of parliament from 25 NATO member states and partner countries (picture courtesy of NATO PA)
