In August 2008 a long-lasting Georgian-Ossetian conflict developed into a five day war. This military confrontation between Georgia and South Ossetia was the third in 17 years. But its consequences differed radically from the previous two.
First of all, Russia openly intervened in the ethno-political conflict, stepping in as the guarantor of security of the unrecognized republic of South Ossetia. Secondly, military clashes with participation of Russia (a permanent member of UN Security Council, and a nuclear power) inevitably turned it into a focus of international attention. And if before 2008 the conflicts in the post-Soviet area were called in the West not only “frozen”, but also “forgotten”, then 3 years ago those August days they were not short of attention.
However, the explosion of this interest had its own reasons. Three years ago the principles of inviolability of the borders between the former USSR republics, preserved for 17 years, were put into question. And that happened specifically in the Caucasus. A precedent of recognition of new states on the territory of Eurasia out of former Soviet autonomies was created. Two partially recognized states appeared on the Great Caucasus, whose status was similar to that of Northern Cyprus or Western Sahara.
So what is the result in the end? The political agenda for Abkhazia and South Ossetia changed significantly. A serious rearrangement of topics of internal and external policies occurred. Instead of the problem of fight for independence, the partially recognized states changed their top issue to the quality of that independence. Instead of the Georgian factor, Russia’s factor began playing the leading role. The level of Russian economic and military-political presence became a priority for Abkhazia. This issue has become a dividing line between the authorities of Abkhazia and the opposition. For South Ossetia, setting up of control over allocation of financial aid, provided by Russia for restoration of the republic, has become the top issue.
August of 2008 deprived Russia of tools for pressure on Georgia, and made the latter even closer with the USA than it was before. However, this approximation, ironic as it may sound, separated Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia even further. And, conversely, facilitated strengthening of new status-quo. US and NATO do not have resources to change the position of Russia radically, while Russia has no opportunity to move deeper into Georgia.
However, apart from Russian-Georgian relations, the new status touched other countries of the region as well. Armenia and Azerbaijan – in the first place. August 2008 proved that Yerevan cannot be satisfied with one-sided dependency upon dynamics of Russian-Georgian relations. First of all, because the entire logistics in relations between the two allies largely depends on Georgia. This brings about increased interest in normalizing of Armenian-Turkish relations, something not seen except for a brief period between 1991-1993, as well as in seeking a peaceful solution to Karabakh conflict. Baku, in turn, clearly realized that implementation of a scenario similar to the one by Croatia in Serbian Kraijna in 1995 will not be possible in Nagorno Karabakh. Or at least, will be difficult to implement. It is not by chance that within a few months following the five days war Azerbaijani officials restrained from any kind of military rhetoric. And the interim outcome of the August shock was signing of Meindorf declaration – the first document signed simultaneously by Armenian and Azeri leaders.
Parallel to searches of Armenian-Azerbaijani compromise in 2008, Armenian-Turkish dialogue began to speed up, which also became a serious factor of influence on the process of Karabakh settlement. A geopolitical paradox took place! An absolute majority of supporters of Armenian-Turkish normalization were speaking (and still speak) of need to separate the two problems: the peace process in Nagorno Karabakh and rapprochement between Yerevan and Ankara. However, in reality what happened was fusion of those two processes. With support of multi-side pressure (particularly by the US), it became possible to convince Turkey to sign two protocols on normalization of relations with Armenian without mentioning Karabakh and Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict at all. Those protocols (signed in Zurich on October 10, 2009) were named “historical” and “breakthrough”. And it is true, the two protocols on establishment of diplomatic relations and opening of land border became the first legally binding documents, signed simultaneously by Yerevan and Ankara. However, they will remain just a paper if not ratified by the parliaments. Realizing this, the Turkish side after a short intermission at the end of 2009- beginning of 2010 again raised the issue of fusing the approximation with the Armenian side and “progress” over “Karabakh issue”. But this was not achieved solely by the Turkish diplomacy. Credits should as well go to Azeri president (and his diplomatic machinary), who managed to block the Karabakh problem from finally “flowing away” from the process of Armenian-Turkish normalization. It was essentially due to it that in spring 2010 the dialogue between Yerevan and Ankara was brought to stagnation.
As to Karabakh process specifically, then the consequences of August shock no longer have an important impact on either Azerbaijan or Armenia. Abiding by their maximalist lines became a top priority. But after 2008 it increasingly they face a united pressure from the mediators. Unifying the potential of USA, France and Russia has its own reasons. After recognition of independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow strives to let the West understand that its “revisionism” has a selective nature, and is not related to the times of the cold war. In its turn, it is important for the West to identify common spaces with Russia to expand opportunities for constructive cooperation. The consequence is spurring of Karabakh peace process by the mediators from 2009 (joint declaration of the presidents of US, Russia and France in L’Aquila in Italy). Whatever it is, in 2011 both Yerevan and Baku have far less opportunity for maneuvering between Moscow, Washington and Paris.
Iran is also concerned about the new status quo in the Caucasus. Iran does not take well to new external players in its neighborhood. This is why Iran strives to have its contribution in resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In April 2010 Manouchehr Mottaki, then Iranian Foreign Minister, announced proposals elaborated by Tehran which can be considered as an alternative to the updated Madrid principles. Since then no alternative document has ever been published by official Tehran, though Iranian officials spoke about its existence a lot. In any case it is known, that Iran will not be happy with a resolution format which contained bringing in international peacekeepers in the region (no matter under which flag – American, Swedish or German these forces will be deployed under). Representatives of Tehran have always declared that only regional forces can be present in the region (3 Caucasian states and 3 neighbors – Turkey, Russia, and Iran).
To sum up, starting from 2008 serious changes are taking place in the wider Caucasus region. They relate not only to Russian-Georgian relations, but to Nagorno-Karabakh process as well, and the involvement in the region of Turkey, Iran, EU and the US. A more intensive policy of other new players interested in the region, such as Israel, is also possible.
Today it is too early to draw final conclusions. However, today’s Caucasus has become much more internationalised in contrast to what we knew before 2008, while the problems existing here are also intertwined with each other much more.
Sergey Markedonov is a Ph.D. in History and currently a Visiting Fellow at Center for International and Strategic Studies, Russia and Eurasia Program (Washington, DC, USA). He is a regular blogger non commonspace.eu Russian edition.
