The Caucasus and the Middle East. Sergei Markedonov considers the impact of the fall-out from the Arab Spring and events in Iran.

Sergei Markedonov has a Doctorarte in History and is currently a Visiting Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Russia and Eurasia Program, Washington, DC. he contributed this article for Commonspace.eu 

           The geopolitical importance of the Middle East has tremendously increased over the two last years. The Arab world’s awakening was the most impressive phenomenon of 2011. And even though it is too early to summarize the results of 2012, this year could be named “the year of Iran,” because this country has undoubtedly become the focal point of the global agenda. But as part of the international discourse around the Middle East, it is also important to consider the implications that the changing dynamics of the Middle East have for neighboring regions, namely, what is known to be the Big Caucasus.   

       The term “Big Caucasus” is understood here to mean the newly independent states of the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), as well as the de-facto entities of the region and the North Caucasus republics of the Russian Federation. While the Caucasus countries have reached their second decade as independent states, the general situation in this region is far from stable and predictable. Of the 8 ethno-political conflicts in the former USSR, 6 have taken place here. Further, 3 of the 4 de facto entities that emerged from the fall of the USSR exist in this region. These turbulent conditions provoke the interest and engagement of both regional and global actors. Though the geopolitical situation in the Caucasus receives significant attention by scholars, studied well but at the same time it is mostly considered through the prism of the US-Russia rivalry. This approach, however, is too reminiscent of a Cold War-style analysis that is no longer appropriate for the 21^st century. In today’s reality, the Caucasus’ geopolitics has more complicated parameters, and its connections to neighboring regions like the Middle East deserve more attention.  

         Political actors in the Big Caucasus are taking significant interest in the events in the Middle East, because the ruling authorities and the opposition in Russia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are considering what an “Arab Spring scenario” could do to their own countries. However, the “awakenings” in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Syria should not necessarily be directly projected onto the Caucasian states, since the conditions that laid the groundwork for the events in the Middle East from 2011-2012 are different. Nevertheless the geopolitical consequences of the formation of the “new Middle East” contribute to concerns that the populations of the Big Caucasus may too experience their own “awakening,” with all the consequences that may entail.

       Most of the Middle East Arab countries consider the Big Caucasus in a broader context: U.S. foreign policy, relations with Russia, and the protracted conflict with Israel. Arab countries are interested in a stable Caucasus with the potential to be a possible area of application for their economic interests. Since the USSR collapsed, there have been no unified approaches of Middle Eastern countries to such complicated and controversial issues as Chechnya or radical Islam development. Some countries like Egypt, Jordan or Syria have been more or less benevolent to Moscow. In the end, not one Arab country acknowledged the independence of Chechnya or of the “Special Islamic territory” (the Kadar zone) in Dagestan, although Chechen delegations were officially received in the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. With the disappearance of the de-facto independent Chechen state and the lack of any authoritative infrastructure outside of the Russian government today, support for Caucasian Islamists seems even more unlikely.        

       Iran is a particularly important case in Middle Eastern-Big Caucasian geopolitics. This country shares a 660 km long border with Armenia and Azerbaijan. After the USSR’s collapse, Iranian policy in the Caucasus was developed under the approach of pragmatic regionalism. The revolutionary dimension of the Islamic Republic’s behavior remained at the rhetorical level. However, elements of radical rhetoric are used when Tehran targets international engagement in Caucasus politics. Iran firmly believes that the problems in this region could can be only be handled by regional powers; that the presence of ultra-regional powers such as the UK, China, the US and Israel, would aggravate the situation. Thus, we could see some attempts at transferring to the Caucasus the Middle East contradictions between Tehran on the one side and Washington and Tel Aviv on the other.  Iranian diplomats and experts are rather skeptical of Russia as the strong center of power and gravitation. They view Russia as a country beset with internal problems and too weak as compared to the US and her allies- both economically and geopolitically. In this light, the Iranians see Russia as unable to adequately respond to   the encroachments of extra-regional powers upon its “spheres of interest.” Iran believes that the security of the Caucasus region must only be supplied by regional actors. This position helps to explain Iranian stubbornness in discussions regarding the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Iran has worked out some proposals that might be considered as alternatives for the “Updated Madrid Principles,” signed by the US, Russian and French Presidents.

           Tehran is opposed to Baku’s official pro-Israeli and pro-US course of cooperation. The question of Southern (Iranian) Azerbaijan is another sore point in their mutual relations. But the two countries have not crossed “red lines” excluding previous year tit-for tat sniper incidents involving Azerbaijani and Iranian border guards. Other examples of Iranian pragmatism include cooperation on Armenia (a country with only a minuscule Muslim community) and Georgia (the most pro-Western country and one seeking NATO membership). Tehran supports the territorial integrity of Georgia and rejects Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  As for the Russian North Caucasus, Tehran emphasizes in every possible way that the religious radicalism which pervades that region ideologically connected with Wahhabism (Salafism) and not with the Shia Islam officially supported by Iran.  

          However, the Middle East world is not represented by just state systems. The relationship between the al Qaeda factor and Caucasus Islamist activity is a subject of special interest. On the one hand, the Russian Public Prosecutor’s Office and different law enforcement agencies could not prove that any of the terrorist attacks or operations in this region was directly led by al Qaeda. Al Qaeda leaders did not proclaim the Caucasus as the “new battlefield of jihad” after Afghanistan and Iraq. But at the same time, the Caucasus is in al Qaeda’s sphere of attention. Videocassettes regarding Caucasus terrorism activity were found both in Iraq and Afghanistan among the Islamist fighters. Moreover, some al Qaeda representatives organized financial and ideological aid, as well as contributed to fighting operations, in Dagestan and Chechnya. From 1995 to November 2005, these activities were championed by al Qaeda member Abu Omar al-Seif (born in 1968 in Saudi Arabia and killed in Dagestan in December 2005). Subsequently, a similar role was played by Abu Hafs al- Urduni (born in 1973 in Jordan and killed in November 2006 in Dagestan). In his interview with the Kavkaz Center Web site, al-Urduni sympathized with al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, although he did not admit to being part of the organization. As for the Caucasian Islamist radicals, they have used some ideological and operational weapons from al Qaeda. Since the 2000s, the Caucasian terrorists have been using suicide bombings as a tool for their political-religious struggle. They have also tried to identify their activity in terms of the combat against “crusaders and Jews.”

         It is more or less clear that the year 2011-2012 opened a new page in the history of Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria. But it is not exactly clear who will ultimately write this page of history. It is obvious that this has little to do with European democracy and “victory over tyranny.” Unlike the United States, where institutes are functional and a president’s resignation not unheard of, a power vacuum is much more dangerous in Middle Eastern countries because radicals and extremists are more likely to may try to fill the gap. It is not accident that many statements have concerned al-Qaida’s presence in the ranks of opponents of Muammar Gaddafi or Bashar al-Asad. Undeniably, in Egypt, Libya and Syria, the opponents of the current authorities are united in just one thing – rejecting secular dictatorial regimes (be it Hosni Mubarak, Muammar Gaddafi, or Bashar al-Asad). The most serious danger that can emanate from the Middle East for the Caucasus is that this large area with a dense population plunges into chaos, or that the Islamic radicals become politically strong. Just recently Christian communities in Syria (including Armenians) have taken up arms the first time since civil war started to ensure their security in the conditions of growing instability and absence of the order supported by the state. According to the Daily Telegraph, “the Armenians are fighting because they believe the FSA [Free Syria Army] are sent by their Turkish oppressors to attack them, the Christians want to defend their neighborhoods”. In this sense, Zine Ben Ali’s or Mubarak’s departure, as well as Gaddafi’s death and Asad’s potential resignations, spell significant uncertainty.  Not for the Middle itself but for neighboring regions like Big Caucasus.
          

Notes