Turkish Central Bank Revises Inflation Targets Upwards, Extending Türkiye's Disinflation Timeline

This analysis was prepared by Anna Szedlacsek based on a report from Turkiye Today

With pressure from prolonged global conflicts, climbing energy expenses, and elevated food costs, the Central Bank of the Republic of Türkiye (TCMB) has revised its inflation projections. In its final Inflation Report of 2026, released last week, the central bank raised its year-end inflation forecast to 29.5% and set interim targets of 21% for 2027, 13.5% for 2028 and 9% for 2029. Although the medium-term inflation target remains unchanged at 5%, the timeline to reach it has been significantly extended.

The main reason behind the adjustments is the prolonged economic impact of the Iran war, as the deteriorating outlook for the resumption of normal shipments through the Strait of Hormuz has contributed to higher oil and natural gas prices and an environment of continuous uncertainty. Longer shipping routes, increased insurance and transportation costs, supply disruptions and wider refinery margins have further raised import costs. These pressures have also fed into domestic food prices, prompting the TCMB to revise its food inflation assumptions upwards. 

Monetary policy faces a prolonged restrictive period

The revised projections carry significant implications for Türkiye's monetary policy. With inflation now expected to remain at 21% by the end of 2027, the central bank is likely to maintain relatively tight monetary conditions for an extended period. This could constrain the pace of interest rate reductions and influence financial market expectations.

The TCMB's policy rate currently stands at 36%, with markets anticipating a 100-basis-point reduction at its December meeting, potentially bringing the rate to 35% by the end of 2026. Forecasts for the end of 2027 vary: Deutsche Bank and ING expect rates to reach approximately 30%, while Is Yatirim projects 27%. Seker Yatirim anticipates cumulative cuts of 700–1,000 basis points, whereas Tacirler Yatirim warns that monetary easing could be temporarily suspended in early 2027, particularly in response to minimum wage increases and other price adjustments. Overall, market expectations suggest that interest rates could remain between 25% and 30% at the end of 2027.

The central bank's approach also reflects its efforts to preserve confidence in the Turkish lira. Governor Fatih Karahan stated that demand for the domestic currency had remained resilient despite recent shocks. The growing proportion of lira-denominated deposits in the banking system, he argued, indicates that confidence is improving not only because of interest rate returns but also due to more favourable inflation expectations and greater credibility in monetary policy. Karahan added that the TCMB had observed no significant deterioration in demand for the lira or increase in exchange-rate volatility over the preceding two months. The bank currently sees no need to alter its exchange-rate policy but remains prepared to intervene if dollarization pressures intensify.

Nevertheless, Türkiye's reserve position has come under pressure. Gross international reserves declined from $210 billion on February 27, when the war began, to $161 billion on November 6. Karahan attributed $28 billion of this $49 billion decrease to lower gold prices, which reduced the valuation of the central bank's gold holdings. However, net international reserves excluding swaps also fell by $50.4 billion over the same period, reaching $28 billion.

Weaker asset prices could moderate domestic demand

Karahan also suggested that declining stock prices could generate a negative wealth effect, encouraging households to reduce spending and thus lead to disinflation. However, he noted that stock market fluctuations have historically had a rather limited influence on consumption compared to changes in other forms of household wealth. The impact could nevertheless be greater today, given the expansion of Türkiye's retail investor base in recent years. Its eventual significance will depend on the duration of the market downturn and the speed of recovery.

The governor also pointed to falling gold prices as a possible factor behind the recent moderation in domestic demand, alongside the delayed effects of monetary tightening, geopolitical developments and changes in the investment fund market.

Current account balance shows signs of improvement

According to the TCMB's September balance of payments figures, the country registered a current account surplus of $2.7 billion. Excluding gold and energy, the surplus reached $7.3 billion. Accordingly, September marked the third consecutive month of a current account surplus, following surpluses of $201 million in July and $4.6 billion in August. The sustained improvement is attributed to a narrower foreign trade deficit compared with the prior year and stronger services revenues. Lower gold prices also supported the balance by substantially reducing gold import costs.

Meanwhile, the government is continuing the liquidation process involving investment funds. Vice President Cevdet Yilmaz announced on November 14 that interim payments totalling ₺161 billion ($3.2 billion) had been distributed across 119 funds, benefiting 444,987 investors. Of these, 371,021 had received either their full net investment or the entire value of their portfolios, while 10,771 had yet to receive any payments. A further 84,737 investors remained eligible for interim compensation. Authorities expected to complete the remaining eligible interim payments within one to two weeks, although the broader liquidation process will take considerably longer. Yilmaz stressed that these distributions should not be interpreted as the conclusion of the process, even if many investors have already recovered most of what they can expect to receive.

A slower path towards price stability

Taken together, while Turkey has recorded consecutive current account balances and the demand for the lira remains stable, the TCMB's latest projections point to a more prolonged adjustment period for the Turkish economy when it comes to curbing inflation. Contrary to previous projections, the return to single-digit inflation is now expected in 2029, while achieving the central bank's 5% medium-term target will likely require even more time.

Source: This analysis was prepared by Anna Szedlacsek based on a report from Turkiye Today

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