In this analysis foor commonspace.eu, Anna Szedlacsek argues that Kazakhstan and Armenia, two countries that Russia had considered in its sphere of influence, appear increasingly eager to ensure that Moscow is no longer their only option. Armenia and Kazakhstan both reached their strategic turning points between 2020 and 2022, driven by security failures, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and severe economic vulnerabilities.  Among these reasons, the war in Ukraine sheds a particularly long shadow. In Kazakhstan, Russia’s “special military operation” substantially damaged Moscow's image among ordinary Kazakh citizens and reignited anxieties about revanchist Russian rhetoric regarding northern Kazakhstan. Public discontent has flared during Russian state visits and against Russian state projects like Rosatom’s nuclear power plant bid. Similarly, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, in 2022, in a bold statement at the 25th St. Petersburg International Economic Forum – sitting directly adjacent to Russian President Vladimir Putin – made it clear that Kazakhstan does not recognize Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territories or the "quasi-states" in Donetsk and Luhansk. More recently, in July 2026, he also publicly called on Putin to reconsider his war policy, suggesting it was time to "freeze this conflict" and return to negotiations. However, beyond the scope of diplomatic relations, Almaty is heavily challenged by having to navigate its deep economic and transit interdependence with Russia. Kazakhstan shares a 7,500 km land border with Russia and remains bound by shared membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Crucially, over 80% of Kazakh crude oil exports cross Russian territory via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) to Novorossiysk, giving Russia massive structural leverage. To mitigate this reliance, Kazakhstan is aggressively developing alternative transport links, such as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor) through Baku, Azerbaijan, to reach European and global markets without crossing Russian territory. This also reflects a move away from Russia as its main trading partner – this position has been earned by China, or, if considered as a bloc, the European Union (EU). Armenia, on the other hand, began its pivot away from Moscow’s orbit after the 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and reached a point of no return following Azerbaijan's final capture of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023. This is due to the fact that despite hosting a Russian military base and belonging to the CSTO, Armenia received no military intervention from Russia during either of these conflicts. Moscow remained neutral – and thus turned untrustworthy in the eyes of Armenians – because it wished to safeguard its expanding economic, energy, and transit partnerships with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Concluding that Russia was no longer a reliable security guarantor and had its resources consumed by the war in Ukraine, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan suspended Armenia's participation in the CSTO in 2024 and began replacing Russian arms imports – which previously supplied over 90% of its arms – with defense systems from India and France. Furthermore, in March 2025, the Armenian parliament passed a law to initiate the EU accession process, while ministries are recruiting Western-educated professionals to restructure the civil service away from the Kremlin. Armenia has also concluded an energy cooperation agreement with Iran and is trying to strengthen its ties with China and India.  Ultimately, despite these developments, it would be premature to conclude the end of Moscow’s control over these countries, as both Armenia and Kazakhstan face severe structural constraints that strictly limit how far or how fast they can move away from Russia. Russia remains Armenia's primary trading partner, accounting for roughly 35% of its total foreign trade, and supplies 82% of the country’s natural gas at preferential prices via Gazprom, which owns Armenia's internal gas distribution network. Meanwhile, Almaty will certainly not dare risk a Russian halt along the CPC corridor as such a move would be detrimental to its state revenues and economy. It also continues to supply fuel to Russia during its refinery shortages and has just recently evaluated proposals to process Russian crude at Kazakh refineries.  The question, therefore, is not simply whether Russia is losing its allies. It is whether Russia is losing its ability to make those allies dependent on it. As of September 2026, the evidence does not point to a definitive answer. Russia has not been pushed out of either country – but

Uzbekistan called for a more effective and representative United Nations on September 23, as presidential administration chief Saida Mirziyoyeva used her address to the UN General Assembly to seek support for the country’s candidacy for a nonpermanent Security Council seat in 2035–2036. Speaking at the Assembly’s 81st session in New York, Mirziyoyeva argued that international cooperation remains necessary despite growing geopolitical divisions. She endorsed UN Secretary-General António Guterres’ UN80 reform initiative and called for an expanded Security Council, arguing that international rules should be applied consistently rather than according to the interests of powerful states. Uzbekistan’s planned chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement in 2027 was presented as another platform for promoting dialogue. Her emphasis on multilateralism also fits a broader Central Asian effort to increase the region’s role in international institutions. Kyrgyzstan, for example, will hold its first Security Council seat in 2027–2028. Mirziyoyeva also highlighted regional cooperation, pointing to improved relations among Central Asian states over longstanding border and water disputes. On Afghanistan, she urged countries not to view it solely as a security threat, stressing the importance of creating conditions for peaceful development. She linked Uzbekistan’s international agenda to domestic reforms, citing economic growth, falling poverty and expanded education. Climate and water security also featured prominently, with the Aral Sea serving as an example of the consequences of poor environmental management. (click image to read more)

Kazakh president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, declared September 25 a national day of mourning following the deaths of servicemen during military exercises in the Caspian Sea. Twelve Kazakh servicemen died after being swept into the Caspian Sea during the Khazar Qorgany–2026 naval exercises in the Mangystau region on Thursday (September 24). The incident occurred after weather conditions suddenly deteriorated and winds intensified during a combat training mission. In a Telegram post, the Ministry of Defence reported that 19 servicemen had been swept into the sea. So far, three have been rescued, one of whom was hospitalized, while 12 bodies have been recovered.  Search operations were continuing for the remaining four servicemen. A large-scale rescue and recovery effort has been launched, involving Kazakhstan’s Naval Forces, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, aviation assets and other relevant services.   Deputy Prime Minister Kanat Bozumbayev, who is leading a government commission at the scene, ordered a continuous, round-the-clock search for those still missing. Authorities were also instructed to provide financial and other assistance to the families of the deceased. (click image to read in full)

It has been a little over a year since Armenia and Azerbaijan initialed a peace agreement in Washington, and the mood in the South Caucasus is neither breakthrough nor stalemate. A government-facilitated Peace Bridge initiative has brought dozens of citizens across the border in both directions, and Armenia can now import goods from Russia via Azerbaijani territory. Yet the agreement still stands unsigned and unratified, and the long-promised opening of the Armenia-Türkiye border, agreed in principle back in 2022, has still not come to reality. There remains a parallel struggle linking both outcomes to a change in Armenia's constitution. Dr Benyamin Poghosyan has spent close to two decades studying exactly this terrain. A historian by training, he worked at Armenia's Ministry of Defence think tank, the Institute for National Strategic Studies, for a decade, including three years as a director of the institute, before joining APRI Armenia as Senior Research Fellow in 2023. Since 2021, he has served as the Armenian co-rapporteur of the Joint Armenian-Azerbaijani Liaison Group (JOLIG), a dialogue platform facilitated by LINKS Europe, working alongside Azerbaijani counterparts through some of the most difficult years in the two countries' recent history. JOLIG was dissolved in 2024 and replaced by the Armenia-Azerbaijan Expert Strategic Platform, which monitors developments in Armenia-Azerbaijan relations and acts when necessary. Santiago Ferbel-Azcarate interviewed Dr Poghosyan for the Thursday Interview feature, on commonspace.eu (click the image to read the interview in full)

Far-right groups in Georgia rallied in Tbilisi on September 20 against the UAE-based Eagle Hills investment and its planned large-scale developments near Tbilisi and Batumi. Organizers described the demonstration as a protest against “Arab towns” and announced the creation of a “National Unity for the Protection of Georgian Lands” to coordinate opposition to the projects. The initiative plans to bring together political groups, academics, lawyers and economists opposed to the investment. Organizers also announced plans for legal challenges before Georgia’s Constitutional Court, administrative courts and Prosecutor’s Office, alongside further demonstrations. The Eagle Hills project, representing $6.5 billion in real estate, is promoted by the Georgian government as the largest investment in the country’s history. Critics have questioned the agreement’s transparency, financial viability and potential environmental and social effects. Far-right groups have additionally linked the project to fears about immigration and demographic change. Eagle Hills’ project was announced in January 2025 following Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze’s visit to the United Arab Emirates. Its expansion has since become a focal point for both economic debate and nationalist opposition, with different groups raising distinct concerns about the investment. The governing Georgian Dream party has condemned the protests.

There are two early 20th-century tunes that mark foreign attempts to occupy and “pacify” Yemen. The Scottish tune “The barren rocks of Aden” marks the mobilisation of Highland soldiers, enlisted to be deployed to the Yemeni port of Aden, that in 1837 became the last colony to be incorporated into the British Empire. The tune talks of the harshness of the terrain, but is celebratory, It was even played as a farewell tune to Sir William Luce at the parade in Sharjah celebrating his end as “British Viceroy” in the Middle East in 1966. The second tune is an Anatolian lament. As Ilker Sezer reminded us this weekend, in his weekly feature on “Turkiye Today”, it “mourns the tragic fate of Ottoman soldiers dispatched to the harsh, remote deserts of Yemen during the fall of the empire, young men who marched away from their villages and never returned home. Most of their names, and numbers, were never recorded. Yet, their fate left a mark on the Turkish psyche.” Subsequent invaders have discovered that Yemen is a grave that cannot be overcome by the strength of modern technology, and that whilst Yemeni society is splintered and divided, building a reliable alliance with Yemeni factions is difficult. These are the harsh lessons facing Saudi Arabia, as the Kingdom faces its biggest challenge in its modern history. The leadership of the Kingdom now has to respond decisively. At stake is their very credibility. This is likely to be a long and messy conflict. Saudi military objectives need to be focused: to box in the Houthis rather than destroy them. This is likely to include: (a) regaining territory lost on the Red Sea coast; (b) control over Bab el Mandeb Strait; (c) some kind of cordon sanitaire on the Saudi-Yemeni border; and if things go well (d) the capture of Sanaa. All this would not eliminate the Houthi problem, but it will contain it. In the end the Saudis will have to continue managing Yemen with a mixture of carrot and stick. For the moment, the stick is likely, but the carrot cannot be forgotten either. (click the image to read the Monday Commentary in full)