Over the last few weeks, the president of Azerbaijan, and the prime ministers of Armenia and Georgia, have made separate calls for regional co-operation among the three South Caucasus countries, highlighting the benefits that can come out from such co-operation. This is a big shift in positions, especially for Azerbaijan. There is no doubt that regional co-operation can bring great benefits to the three countries and the wider region. The three leaders need to get together and ideally sign some kind of joint declaration outlining their regional vision. Work on this should start at senior diplomat level as soon as possible. There is an alternative vision to the trilateral regional co-operation, and this is the idea of adding to the core three South Caucasus countries, the three regional neighbours: Russia, Iran and Turkey. Meetings in this format, with the Georgians absent, have taken place in Moscow and Tehran. Those pushing for this format, whether consciously or unconsciously, are trying to destroy the idea of South Caucasus regional co-operation between the three core countries. Most things that can be done between the three (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia), cannot be done between the six. The 3 + 3 – useful only once the Georgians join, can be a talking shop. No doubt someone will come up after with the idea of the 3 + 2 – providing a forum between the three South Caucasus countries and the EU and US that can be yet another talking shop. But realistically, neither can form the basis of regional co-operation. It is clear that in the South Caucasus three is a company but six is a crowd.

For decades, Russia has tried to protect its interests in the South Caucasus following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. But Russia had nothing to offer to the countries of the region, be it for their economic and political challenges, or even more importantly for the process of restoring peace in the region after it slid into conflict at the end of the Soviet era. There was however one thing that it could do, and that was to spoil any efforts for peace and reconciliation, if these efforts did not originate and were managed by Russia itself. This way it could maintain it primordial position in the region, and as much as possible, keep everyone else out, whilst often presenting itself as an exemplary peacemaker. This grotesque situation has played itself out in front of everyone’s eyes since 1992. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have for most of the time had no choice but to play along with the Russian masquerade, and the international community, most of the time distracted by other issues, generally played along, being content to be seen offering some kind of balance to Russian posturing. Russia never had, and certainly does not have now, any interest in working genuinely with international partners to support peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. If a dialogue with Russia is necessary so that Russia will not be a spoiler, than that dialogue is futile because Russian objectives are not the same as those of the West. Russia’s gloating when Azerbaijani president Aliyev failed to turn up for a crucial summit in Granada last week is a case in point. We are now already seeing Russian rhetoric increase as preparations for the long-expected meeting between Aliyev and Pashinyan, with Michel, scheduled for later this month, intensify. Russian pressure on Armenia and Azerbaijan ahead of the Brussels meeting is also increasing both overtly and covertly. There is an argument that Armenia and Azerbaijan simply cannot afford to be seen agreeing with each other, under the auspices of Brussels, without the Russians being part of the story. Thus there has been in recent weeks some frantic discussions about how that could be done, including by having the final lap of any discussions in Tbilisi, without any outside mediators. Such ideas have also found favour in Tehran and Ankara. A wonderful idea, but one that has many flaws. Any agreement will need to be somehow underpinned by some kind of international patronage. And “ownership” will also determine who is going to pick up the bill for post-conflict reconstruction and other costs of erasing the scars of the conflict from the region, including for example demining. Still, Tbilisi may be a venue that more or less can be acceptable to both the Russians as well as to the Europeans and the Americans. In the end, the location of the symbolic finishing line must not turn out to be the most important issue. All focus, and all efforts must be concentrated on getting Armenia and Azerbaijan to agree to finally put an end to this long painful episode in their history, that has taken the lives of tens of thousands, displaced hundreds of thousands and costed billions. And that would be just the end of the beginning because translating a written agreement into concrete actions that would ensure lasting and durable peace will be a much longer and more difficult endeavour.

The dramatic events of the last days in Karabakh brought to a climax decades of political crisis, confrontation and war that, since 1989, has resulted in tens of thousands of people dead, even more, injured, and hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced people. Armenians and Azerbaijanis fought a war in the early 1990s that resulted in an Armenian victory, and another one in 2020, that resulted in an Armenian defeat. In between, and since, there were many skirmishes, and untold animosity that expressed itself in all sorts of ways. The Karabakh conflict has destabilised the entire South Caucasus region, preventing regional cooperation, frustrating economic development and exposing the region to the manipulation of outside forces. On 19 September, Azerbaijan appeared to finally put an end to the problem through a short but sharp military operation that essentially wiped out the military capability of the Karabakh Armenians. Yet again hundreds died on both sides, and the world is now watching the latest wave of South Caucasus refugees on the move, as almost the entire Armenian population of Karabakh seeks refugee in Armenia. Many consider that the problem has not been resolved – it has simply changed. To understand why events unfolded as they did, and why efforts over decades by the world’s leading countries and statesmen failed to find a solution to this problem it is essential to understand that Karabakh is not one issue, but three: each with its own narrative, and quite persuasive justification. The big question however remains, will there be Armenians living in Karabakh going forward, and under what conditions? Conditions need to be created for Karabakh to become a multi-ethnic community within Azerbaijan. Its specific Armenian linguistic and cultural characteristics should be preserved. All those displaced since 1989 should have a right to return to build together this community. The onus now depends on Azerbaijan to create the right conditions for this to happen, and they will be well-advised to work with credible international partners in doing so. Karabakh is never going to be peaceful, and it is never going to be complete, until its Armenian and Azerbaijani populations are back and living together in peace and prosperity.

Despite the sweltering heat, officials in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia appeared to have taken little if any vacations this summer. The usual exodus to the beaches, or to cool mountain resorts, sometimes stretching from mid-July to mid-September, simply did not happen. In one capital, one observer commented that officials were at their desks throughout the summer. An air of uncertainty prevailed over the region. Low-intensity border clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan threatened the fragile peace process. More dead and injured were added to the long list of victims of this conflict. Azerbaijan’s decision to assert its control over the Lachin corridor that connects the Armenian population of Karabakh to Armenia created hardships for the Karabakh Armenians, who on their part refuse to be supplied through alternative Azerbaijani routes. Inside Karabakh the political turmoil finally ended the fate of the de facto president, Arayik Harutyunyan, who resigned this week, adding to the instability. A meeting of the UN Security Council on 16 August discussed the Lachin issue. Concern was expressed by UNSC members, and most called on Azerbaijan to restore unhindered movement across the Lachin Corridor. But there was no consensus on a resolution, or even a Statement. In Georgia, summer ended as it started, with a permanent stand-off between the governing “Georgian Dream” party and the fractured opposition. The issue of whether or not Georgia will get EU candidate status before the end of the year continued to dominate the political discourse. Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili, whose constitutional powers are mostly ceremonial, defied government advice and travelled to Europe at the beginning of September for talks with European leaders, who rolled out the red carpet to her. But in Tbilisi, the governing party started impeachment proceedings against her. They are likely to fail because the government is not able to muster the necessary votes needed in the parliament. Some simply dismiss the summer shenanigans as part of the usual South Caucasus political fare. Unfortunately, there is more to it than that, and the restless summer may be the harbinger of a very difficult autumn.

On Saturday, 15 July, the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan once again met in Brussels, under the auspices of the president of the European Council Charles Michel, to discuss the future of the relations between their two countries after years of war and conflict. Those who hoped for a dramatic breakthrough in the past in the process of Armenia - Azerbaijan normalisation, may have been disappointed at how slow the process moved. Yet progress is being made, and yesterday, speaking after the meeting in Brussels, European Council president Charles Michel summed it up, saying "We are going through one of the most comprehensive and vigorous stages of negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan". Those who still think that peace is a "moment" are mistaken. It is a process that needs to develop step by step. The meeting in Brussels this weekend was certainly a step in the right direction.

European Union diplomacy is often criticised for not giving enough attention to the countries of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC). In a signal that things are about to change, in June it appointed its first Special Representative for the region. The EU has a number of these Special Representatives, know as EUSRs, usually dealing with regions or topics that cannot be addressed through the bilateral delegations that the EU has in most countries of the world. But the announcement that the EU was going to appoint former Italian Prime Minister, Luigi Di Maio, as its first EUSR for the Gulf countries came as a bit of a surprise. Too senior, some said; too much political baggage from his time in Italian politics, said others. But after a brief moment of hesitation the 27 member states finally agreed Di Maio's candidature. This week he finally arrived in the Gulf on his first visit in this role, ahead of an important EU-GCC foreign ministers meeting expected to take place in Oman in October. “I think that the world is changing and there are new partnerships to build,” Di Maio said during an interview on Thursday with the Saudi newspaper Arab News, that touched on topics ranging from the Russia-Ukraine conflict to the economic empowerment of women and young people in the Kingdom.

Another summit between Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan, and Azerbaijani president, Ilham Aliyev will take place later this month in Brussels, facilitated by the president of the European Council Charles Michel. The region is currently abuzz with diplomatic activity as the international community urges the sides to bring their negotiations to a successful conclusion. At the end of June in Washington DC the foreign ministers of the two countries met under the auspices of US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken. A read out of the meeting indicates that progress was made but substantial disagreements on key issues, such as the future of the Armenian community of Nagorno-Karabakh, remain also. It is likely that some tough discussions will take place over the summer. Time is now against those who want a peaceful solution. The momentum for peace in Baku and Yerevan is already fragile, and unless a breakthrough can be registered, even maintaining this momentum will become very difficult. The summer brings with it several challenges. Reducing incidents on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border and in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone most surely now be a priority. Serious negotiations should not be taking place with violence in the background. Instead building up the momentum for peace through various track 1.5 and track 2 initiatives is hugely important.

In the chancelleries of Europe diplomats are preparing to go on their annual summer holidays. There are a number of files they would like to neatly close before they do so. The South Caucasus is one of them, writes commonspace.eu in this editorial. "Hard luck. There is no chance that any of the major issues facing the region can be brought to a conclusion yet, and it promises to be a long summer full of surprises. But on a number of issues an end game is approaching. The region is in one of those defining moments which everyone agrees will have a deep and long term impact on the future. People are hoping for the best, but worried about the worst. First, there is Georgia. By October, it should be clear if the country will get candidate status for EU membership, a hugely symbolic step that would make the possibility of Georgia becoming an EU member state within a decade a reality for the first time [...] Then there is the business of war or peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Both sides appear not convinced its going to be either one or the other. The foreign ministers of the two countries are meeting in Washington this week under the watchful eye of Antony Blinken. They may register progress, but it is unlikely to be enough."