Central Asian leaders have been busy the last month, forging new ties in a changing geopolitical landscape. The presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan travelled to the White House to meet with U.S. President Donald Trump in the C5+1 format. The format, established in 2015, aims to deepen U.S. collaboration with Central Asia, emphasising security and economic cooperation. The U.S. is not the only power looking to maintain its influence in the region. The European Union, Russia, China, and increasingly, India, have all shown their interest in securing economic cooperation and inking energy and trade deals, recognising Central Asia’s strategic position as a key energy and transfer hub situated between East and West. Central Asian states are keenly aware of their leverage and have not only engaged in multi-lateral diplomacy with all of the aforementioned external actors but also adopted a pragmatic regional approach to increase cooperation amongst themselves and taken concrete steps to foster a more unified ‘Central Asian Community’. This was evident by last weekend’s Seventh Consultative Meeting of Heads of State, also known as the C5, where Central Asian leaders officially admitted Azerbaijan as a full member, effectively transforming it into the C6. However, although Central Asia has the unique opportunity to multilaterally engage with all of the world’s biggest economic and security powers, while continuing to shape regional politics and cooperation on its own terms, new security and economic issues are arising that may well reshape Central Asian states’ connections to external actors and potentially strain intra-regional relations.
Regional Cooperation
During the Seventh Consultative Meeting of Heads of State in Tashkent, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev proposed to transition this meeting mechanism into a more formal regional body called “Community of Central Asia”. The C5 format, initially set up in 2018 to create a space for dialogue on security and confidence-building between the Central Asian nations, was meant for leader-level exchanges between the states after several years of stagnating communication. Azerbaijan’s regular presence since 2023, allowed Baku to evaluate the suitability of its own connectivity and energy agenda with the broader Central Asian initiative, and has now culminated in the group officially expanding to include Azerbaijan as a full member. Furthermore, President Ilham Aliyev emphasised Central Asia and Azerbaijan as “a single geopolitical and geo-economic region whose importance in the world is steadily growing”, citing developments in Azerbaijan’s section of the Middle Corridor and cross-Caspian energy links.
Another overlapping regional forum for cooperation and political dialogue is the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), whose twelfth summit was hosted last month and attended by the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Türkiye, and Turkmenistan, with Hungary and Northern Cyprus participating as observers. Once again, security and connectivity topics took centre stage, as the OTS member states agreed on the importance of having a collective Turkic effort towards peace and stability in the South Caucasus, following the Joint Declaration signed between Armenia and Azerbaijan on August 8 2025. Defence cooperation and intelligence sharing were also highlighted as important areas of collaboration to improve the security situation of the region. Finally, connectivity and transport projects also took centre stage, such as the Trans-Caspian International East-West Middle Corridor and the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway.
Security
The U.S. has long been a significant security partner for the Central Asian region, starting after the collapse of the Soviet Union to ensure regional stability and prevent nuclear proliferation, to shifting towards a more counter-terrorism focused form of security cooperation in the wake of September 11, 2001. This was further exacerbated by the U.S. Afghanistan campaign, requiring significant infrastructure in Central Asia to ensure the deployment of troops and materiel to Afghanistan. Terrorism remains a critical security issue in the region and a top priority in U.S.-Central Asian security cooperation, especially after the Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow, March 2024, by Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) militants. However, although the Trump administration is still clearly interested in maintaining influence in the region, some of its actions, such as the slashing of parts of its federal budgets and USAID, have also severely impacted its dominance in the information space. The dismissal of around 1,300 State Department personnel focused on Central Asia, along with the almost complete elimination of USAID, has not only depleted funding for key news outlets, such as Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, but also reduced the capacity to combat disinformation, in particular from Russia.
On the other hand, Russia’s historically strong security cooperation with Central Asia has often been described as being on the decline, due to needing to divert attention and resources to the Ukraine-Russia war, since the start of the 2022 invasion. However, Russia continues to be the main security provider in Central Asia, leading the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), stationing roughly 7,000 troops in Tajikistan, and maintaining several bases throughout the region, such as the Russian Joint Military base in Kyrgyzstan, the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan, and the 201st Military Base in Tajikistan. Furthermore, Russia remains the largest weapons provider to the region, even after 2022, and Central Asian officers undergo significant lengths of their training at Russian military universities and academies. Additionally, Russia, China and Central-Asian states also regularly hold combined military exercises under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), adding another security cooperation dimension to the fold.
Although the threat of terrorism from groups such as ISKP remains a salient issue, the security situation in the region has the potential to become more precarious following the border clashes between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The cross-border fighting, initially between the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the armed forces of Pakistan, has escalated into a broader conflict, reigniting tensions on the Durand line, involving both Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban government. For Central Asian nations, particularly Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, who share a border with Afghanistan, these developments are worrying. If the Afghan Taliban refused to, or were unable to, control the militant groups within their country and prevent them from attacking Pakistan, will these Central Asian countries face a similar threat from Afghanistan in the future? It is worth remembering that Pakistan was the longest and most extensive supporter of the Afghan Taliban during the 20-year War in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the contested nature of the Durand Line between Afghanistan and Pakistan, a lasting issue still stemming from the colonial time, also applies to Afghanistan’s borders with Central Asia. In fact, there have already been recent border clashes between Afghanistan and Tajikistan, reportedly revolving around disputes over water diversion from the Amu Darya river, an issue that may be further exacerbated in the future as water scarcity becomes a critical issue for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The potential security threats emanating from Afghanistan may put Central Asian nations’ multi-faceted and multi-lateral approach to security to the test. The situation in Afghanistan is a prime example of a regional security threat and begs the question: will Central Asian nations break from history and look to tackle the issue unilaterally or through their regional mechanisms and frameworks? Or will they revert to relying on external partners, as last seen by Russian intervention into Kazakhstan in early 2022 through the CSTO?
Connectivity, energy, infrastructure
Despite the potential security issues emanating from Afghanistan, Central Asian states seem committed to integrating the war-torn nation and its fledgling government into the region. This summer, all five Central Asian countries were looking to increase cooperation, trade, and connectivity with Afghanistan. Better relations and economic integration were seen as key drivers to improve regional stability and security. This also involved four out of the five countries (except Tajikistan) officially recognising the Taliban government, being some of the first countries to do so. However, full integration and deepening of economic ties have stagnated, as terrorism, cross-border trafficking, and now Afghanistan’s ongoing conflict with Pakistan continue to hamper cooperation. Some Central Asian states seem more eager to continue Afghanistan’s integration despite all the recent developments, as Uzbek Energy Minister Jorabek Mirzamahmudov confirmed that Uzbekistan will continue to deliver electricity supplies to Afghanistan throughout 2026, and that there will be continued commitment to joint energy infrastructure projects within Afghanistan, such as high-voltage power lines and substations. Furthermore, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev continuously emphasised the importance of supporting the Afghan people and fostering the country’s development, both at the 80th U.N. General Assembly and the recent C6 Summit. However, at the same time, Tajik-Afghan relations remain relatively cool in comparison. Tajikistan is continuing to carry out deportations of Afghan refugees and only has limited engagement with the Taliban government, the status of which is now unclear following the border clashes 3 weeks ago.
Central Asian states have shown their affinity to leverage their strategic location and energy exports to forge meaningful relationships with powerful global actors in both the East and West, while at the same time continuously engaging in regional dialogue and pushing for greater connectivity and security cooperation throughout Central Asia. Central Asian governments now have a multitude of regional and international forums and mechanisms they can engage with. However, Afghanistan now presents itself as a regional security issue that has the potential to become a critical concern for the region in the near future, especially now that most Central Asian nations have begun integrating Afghanistan into the regional economy. The problem creates an interesting dilemma that Central Asian governments will need to respond to and may indicate what the region’s dominant security approach will be going forward. Will Central Asian governments' security posture vis-à-vis Afghanistan be defined through unilateral actions, regional cooperation, or calls for support to China, Russia, or the U.S.?
source: This commentary was first published in the Briefing Section of Central Asia Concise, on 20 November 2025
photo: In Tashkent, on 13 November 2025, the C5 became C6 when Azerbaijan formally joined the group.
