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The South Caucasus remains one of the areas most infected with contamination by landmines and other unexploded remnants of war in the world. Last year, the Regional Campaign “Landmine Free South Caucasus”, declared 30th November as a Day of Solidarity with the victims of landmines and other unexploded remnants of war in the South Caucasus. The day is not just a memorial, but a call to humanitarian action. Thousands of people have been killed or injured across the region over the last three decades. The impact of the tragedies on families and communities is high, and the mechanism to alleviate the suffering, very weak. This is not yesterday’s problem. Last year once again saw hundreds killed or injured. The impact on communities is huge and affects tens of thousands of innocent people. In 2022/2023 the campaign focused its work to awareness of the impact of landmines and other remnants of war on individuals and communities across the region. Overall, the Regional Campaign Landmine Free South Caucasus objective is to mobilise support for a landmine free South Caucasus by 2030. As we mark the Day of solidarity with the victims of landmines and other remnants of war in the South Caucasus, we call for resolute action to eradicate the problem of landmines and other unexploded remnants of war from the South Caucasus once and for all. This will require the political will of the three governments, and the support of the international community.

Criminal networks take advantage of people's desperation, and this abuse often leads to loss of life. Migrant smugglers squeezing hundreds of people onto unseaworthy boats, resulted in a staggering humanitarian toll of over 28 000 people having drowned or missing in the Mediterranean Sea since 2014. The main beneficiaries are the criminals, the smuggling networks in countries of origin, transit and destination. The current legislative framework is the Facilitators Package from 2002. Under the Facilitators Package, any person who intentionally assists the unauthorised entry, transit, or residence of a non-EU national into the EU, or, for financial gain, to reside there is to be sanctioned unless they are doing so for humanitarian reasons. On Tuesday (28 November), the European Commission proposed new legislation to prevent and fight migrant smuggling. The Commission has also launched a Call to Action for a Global Alliance to Counter Migrant Smuggling, at an International Conference hosted this week in Brussels. The Commission will ensure that the Global Alliance to Counter Migrant Smuggling will work at bilateral and multilateral level as well as through the work of the UNODC. Regular stocktaking at political level will be ensured, with the first event taking place in Copenhagen in the spring 2024. The Conference will be the first such opportunity to take stock of the achievements of the Global Alliance. Migrant smuggling is a criminal activity that disrespects human life and the dignity of people in the pursuit of financial or other material benefits. Smuggling networks make substantial profits from their criminal activities, ranging between EUR 4.7 – 6 billion worldwide annually.  The modi operandi of smuggling networks change rapidly, adapting to circumstances and responses by national authorities. This is why the Commission is increasing its efforts to tackle this crime at a global scale.

The UK and Türkiye, on Friday (25 November) agreed to work more closely together to help bring greater stability, security and prosperity to both nations. UK Defence Secretary, Grant Shapps, signed a Statement of Intent on defence co-operation, with his Turkish counterpart, Minister of National Defense, Yaşar Güler. This will provide the framework for closer working to deliver additional activities that will benefit the security and prosperity of both countries and, in so doing, enhancing national, regional and international security. Following the signing, activity will see closer collaboration between both countries’ defence industries, the identification of possible joint training exercises in the Mediterranean, and the exploration of security support around North Africa and the Middle East. As well as discussing the need for de-escalation in the Middle East, the British Defence Secretary thanked his counterpart for utilising Türkiye’s influence as the gatekeeper to the Black Sea to enable the export of millions of tons of Ukrainian grain to nations who need it most. There was strong agreement on the need to keep focused on our collective support for Ukraine in the face of Russia’s continuing aggression.

All transport and communication lines in the South Caucasus remain closed. This failure can largely be attributed to the shift of connectivity from a concept intended to build trust to one tied up with security arrangements in the post-2020 era. "Instead of fostering closeness between the parties, concepts that were supposed to enhance cooperation were perceived as threats to territorial integrity and sovereignty", writes Shujaat Ahmadzada in this op-ed for commonspace.eu. "One should not overlook the fact that the November 10 statement and many of its components have been fundamentally and operationally Russia-centric, implying that the Armenian-Azerbaijani disagreements have to be settled around a third party – albeit not an ordinary one but one with hegemonic ambitions."

It may appear that the primary obstacle to the signature of a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan is the different views of the sides on where to resume and finalize the process. Armenia wants to do that in Western platforms, while Azerbaijan wants to return to the Russian platform, use the 3+2 format, or have direct negotiations without any mediators. In this op-ed for commonspace.eu Benyamin Poghosyan says that "in reality, the roots of the current situation are more profound than simple geopolitical choices of venue."

This month marked the third anniversary of the ceasefire statement that was meant to end the second Karabakh war. In retrospect, it might be more appropriately considered a continuation of the first conflict of the early 1990s given that the ceasefire then was hardly implemented too, leading to a new war 26 years later. Meanwhile, hopes that Baku and Yerevan could sign a peace agreement are fading. In this op-ed for commonspace.eu Onnik James Krikorian says that "a deal was possible by the end of the year, both sides pronounced in 2022 and again throughout 2023, but that sounded as vague and sometimes disingenuous then as it does now. Instead, an uncanny sense of deja vu hangs over the process, reminiscent of earlier failures by the now defunct OSCE Minsk Group."

The foreign ministers of the 27 EU member states held an informal video conference on Monday (20 January) to hear from the EU High Representative for foreign and security policy, Josep Borrell, the results of his recent visit to the Middle East. Borrell travelled to Israel, Palestine, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Jordan from 16-20 November. A statement from his office in Brussels at the start of the visit said that “the visit will take place against the background of the war against Hamas and the deepening humanitarian crisis in Gaza, following the 7 October Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel, and in the context of EU’s regional outreach, following-up to the latest European Council and Foreign Affairs Council.”Since the Gaza crisis erupted in October, the European Union has appeared to be confused and undecided.  Deep divisions in the position of many of the member states became evident in somewhat contradictory statements by leaders of the various EU institutions in the early days of the crisis, with some rushing to express solidarity with Israel, whilst others reminding of the long-suffering of the Palestinian people. The problem became more acute as the humanitarian crisis in Gaza escalated sharply following the launch of an Israeli military offensive. The divisions within the EU reached a climax at a vote at the UN General Assembly session on 28 October with some EU members voting for and others against a resolution on Gaza, whilst others simply abstained. Many saw this as a low point in the process of developing a “common foreign and security policy” for the EU, whilst others contemplated the damage that current EU positions were having on future relations with Arab and Muslim countries. The situation improved somehow following a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council, where some sort of compromise position emerged. Borrell is constrained in having to reflect not only his position, and that of the European External Action Service, which he leads, but also the view of all the other European institutions and all the 27 member states. No mean task. None of them however appear to fully comprehend the sense of anger and frustration in the Arab and Muslim world at ongoing events in Gaza. As one young Arab commentator put it, the time the EU spoke from the moral high ground has gone, and will not come back. If the EU wants to communicate with the Arab and Muslim world in the future it has to find a new language. Borrell has taken a step in this direction through his visit and his op-eds, but it is just a small step in what promises to be a long and unpleasant journey.