As Georgia marked the 5th anniversary of the August 2008 Georgia-Russia War, our correspondents Joseph d'Urso and Marion Kipiani visited the State Chancellery in Tbilisi to meet Ketevan Tsikhelashvili, Deputy State Minister for Reintegration of Georgia, who is also a member of the Georgian delegation to the Geneva Process. Tsikhelashvili talked at length about the efforts of the new Georgian government to reach out to Abkhaz and Ossetians, of some of the frustrations of the Geneva Process, and at how the Georgian side has been trying to change the paradigm of the negotiations by not saying "no" to everything as in the past, but often saying "yes".
How has your office attempted to tackle issues differently to the previous administration? Are there policy differences?
There are many differences in the approaches, yet there is some continuity as well, where relevant. Firstly, we are explicitly committed to peace, and peaceful conflict resolution. On March 7th this year, the Parliament of Georgia adopted an important resolution which reaffirms the unilateral non-use of force pledge of Georgia that was first made by President Saakashvili in his address to PACE in July, 2010.
We refrain from confrontational rhetoric which existed before and did not help the peace process. Neither are we oriented at public relations' wins but rather on actual progress in the peace process, as we appreciate the sensitivity of the issues we deal with. Thus, we avoid giving PR spin to many things we do in order not harm the delicate discussions. Yet, at the same time, we are much more open, reachable and accessible to the general public, civil society and the media. When it comes to continuity, we are still guided by the same State Strategy for Engagement and Action Plan from 2010, which was a product of SMR work with over 30 independent experts, including my Minister as well. Firstly, putting aside political terminology, there are some positive elements and ideas in this document. Secondly, as I said, we are oriented on progress and not PR. Thus, instead of posting up a new beautifully written-up strategy that may win applause of some, yet get neglected by important stakeholders, we go step-by-step to solid, feasible and workable solutions.
Our government inherited a very difficult legacy when it came to power. Hence, we aim to bring dynamics to the nearly stalled peace process that got more fragile than ever in recent years, especially in the aftermath of the 2008 August war. Not only do we stand ready, but we made a few constructive steps unilaterally, aimed at more engagement, pragmatism and considerations of mutual humanitarian interests. Those first attempts sadly were not always duly reciprocated. Moreover, to some extent we encountered what seems like a self-isolation attempt by the Abkhaz and the Ossetians, including by hindering access for international organizations and diplomatic missions in these territories. Sadly, this attempt goes as far as physically cutting off these territories from the rest of Georgia through massive constructions, entrenchments, barbed wires. However, we hope that may change over time and rational considerations will prevail. Well, we all know there is an overwhelming Russian dimension to this conflict and we need to deal with this. In brief, we hope the terrain will become clearer after the Sochi Olympics, which is used and misused as a pretext or reason for some of the developments on the ground.
How have things changed?
We have made some progress on some of the issues that have lacked a solution for many years, including from the Georgian side. For example, we have consented, and made a realistic offer to restore gas supply to the Akhalgori district; likewise, we genuinely progressed with the investigation of the cases of missing Ossetian persons, we have released prisoners, etc. Importantly, we put a lot of effort into making projects that benefit both communities run smoothly on the ground.
Thus, the difference with previous policies is quite big. Our policy is exclusively peaceful, it is more engagement orientated, less confrontational, more considering the interests of others, reconciliatory and rational. And last but not least, as Prime Minister Ivanishvili has very clearly stated recently, we are ready for direct dialogue with the Abkhaz and Ossetians in the hope we will find common solutions based on common interests and work towards the common future. We are putting a lot of effort into projects that are of mutual interest, and there are a lot of things in the pipeline. Again, as I said, unfortunately we cannot ignore that there is an overarching dimension of the conflict, that is Russia. So obviously we need to take that into account too.
What are your impressions of the format of the Geneva talks? Some feel that the Abkhaz side in particular has been trying to disrupt the negotiations. Could you share your thoughts about where the process is going?
The Geneva Discussions is the only international peace mechanism at our disposal, because all previously existed fora collapsed after the August War. When it comes to Geneva it is important to keep in mind the what way it was created, and for what it is tailored. It is based on the EU-brokered six-point ceasefire agreement and its implementation mechanisms, where Russia is a party. Thus, first and foremost Geneva is a Georgia-Russia format with important international engagement. It has a clear mandate and a format. It is the only framework for discussions on conflict-related issues between Georgia and Russia. We do not have diplomatic relations and cannot have as long as Russia occupies and claims the independence of Georgia's regions. Georgia's attempt to nevertheless normalize relations with Russia through the special representative targets a wide range of other areas, such as trade, culture, people-to-people contacts, etc. Hence, there is no other space than Geneva to address the issues that are being discussed there with Russia.
In terms of what Geneva was created for, first and foremost, it is security; it is ensuring the non-use of force pledge, and addressing the humanitarian consequences of the conflict. Geneva is also tasked with working towards international security arrangements but so far we do not see a lot of enthusiasm from the Russian side to develop this theme.
Had there not been the prevalent attempt to utilize this format of talks for political purposes, sometimes even for non-achievable goals, Geneva could have potentially delivered more. Many things (e.g. gas supply to Akhalgori) about which Geneva participants were used to hear "No" from the Georgian side, have now changed to "Yes" in the last three rounds where our government took part. Actually, this shift offered a change to the whole paradigm and even, it seems to me, created some initial confusion among other participants about what 'counter-strategies' to pursue. Our suggestion is clear - let's focus on the issues of real concern for Geneva and those issues having implications for the daily lives of people, instead of positioning for the status or format change all the time. So far, sadly, I observe that the second working group, instead of genuine discussion of humanitarian issues that it is tasked for, is largely instrumentalized for causing turbulences for the whole Geneva process, and for the first first working group on security. We keep telling participants: you cannot ignore human rights violations; you cannot ignore the rights of displaced people; you cannot ignore people's rights to move unrestricted, whatever the pretexts are. Communities and families are separated, people are barred from their land, grave-yards are cut off with barbed wires and separated from the relatives of those buried in them ; healthcare is hindered; local people are losing the only source of income as trade is affected too. Hence, this is a reality which is causing great suffering on both sides of the divide, regardless of ethnicity. We need to focus on those things that affect people in their daily lives, and see what we can do to alleviate people's sufferings. We put pragmatic, constructive proposals on the table, some proposals are tabled by international partners as well, and we are ready to engage in finding solutions.
Sometimes the Abkhaz and Ossetian sides threaten to leave the talks, but in fact I think this process, as a unique forum with a broad international engagement, is important for them as well. As you know, the EU, UN and OSCE are co-Chairs of the talks and the US too is a participant.
It may be that the Russian side attempts to somewhat step away from its own responsibilities, to remodel its role and say, 'you guys now talk amongst each other'. We had a similar statement from Medvedev recently, saying the barbed wire fences along the administrative boundary lines of the Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia have nothing to do with Russia. Everybody knows this is not true. So, again, as I said, Geneva is first and foremost about the Georgia-Russia dimension, and the responsibilities that stem out of its founding document - the ceasefire agreement.
Does this newfound flexibility and appetite for conciliation mean the Georgian side is ready to make further concessions?
First of all, direct dialogue with the Abkhaz and the Ossetians has always been central to the strategy of the Ivanishvili government. It was already in the pre-election program. But hopefully, the recent clear messages of our government will further open up some more space for more pragmatic reciprocity in this regard. Of course, Georgia's red lines, its key principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty, are quite well known to everybody and largely supported internationally. These principles set a framework. When we say we're flexible and constructive, that means that within that framework we are ready to use the space flexibly. Constructive approach and pragmatism guide our principled strategy at large. We are sometimes faced with provocations, such as the continued build-up of the artificial fences around South Ossetia, for example. Yet, we hope in the end common sense will prevail.
So what are your future policy goals?
People who remain in the territories surrounded by these ugly, shameful barriers are isolated. This hurts people on both sides. We, as the government, take care of the population we can reach on one side, in an attempt to alleviate the humanitarian burden. But we very well understand that the problems our population face on the other side of the fence are the same, if not worse in fact. This is not a sustainable way to go.
Hopefully, the objectives of our policies will be appreciated for they really are: normalising relations, and understanding and explaining that this country is not about creating a threat to regional security, but about ensuring its stability.
I think our bold decision to participate in the Sochi Olympics, to be proactive with the security agenda, demonstrate that we want to be a reliable partner for the west, we want to be reliable for our neighbours, we want to be and actually are peaceful. Just give us some room for peaceful, independent and unthreatened development. That is where all our aspirations come, from and we want to follow those aspirations for these purposes, namely our European and Euro-Atlantic agenda. This is all we want.
Peace is a process, and when it comes to conflict and peace it cannot be only a one-way street. At some point, we hope it builds up into something else to which all sides contribute.
How do you see the role of the EU, especially in the process of peace building and conflict resolution?
The EU is the most important actor now. It always has been, but this is especially the case since 2008. In fact we are even calling for a bigger, stronger mandate for the EU and for its Monitoring Mission (EUMM). What goes on now with the building of these barbed wire fences - this is totally against the philosophy of what the EU is based on. Europe remembers the Berlin wall.
We are interested in the normalisation of relations with Russia and all our western partners welcome this; yet we need continuous help to make it work. We think it is possible to have normal relations with Russia and follow the European integration course at the same time. The western world and international community thinks it is possible. But do Russians think so? Do they appreciate it as mutually compatible? We need international support to make this paradigm work.
What is important is Georgia's continued European integration and our progress on that road. The current Association agenda, visa liberalisation action plan, free trade prospects, all offer very powerful potential incentives for the entire process of conflict resolution. Georgia is ready to make available all the benefits of these processes to its entire population, including those living in those two regions. The European course of Georgia not only creates incentives but offers a real alternative for what is going on in Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions.
Moving onto the EUMM and their role, do you foresee a possibility to restart the Incident Prevention Mechanism along the Abkhaz Administrative Boundary Line?
We hope so. We expect it would happen when the new Head of Mission is appointed, but this does not depend on us.
What are the future challenges to finding a solution?
The Russian side says now the problem for security is Sochi. I cannot understand what the villages around South Ossetia have to do with Sochi, it's ridiculous. When a fence runs through the backyard of a poor farmer, he cannot believe that. He asks why is it important to have this fence between my trees? What does it have to do with Sochi?
We hope the Russians will do what we did, and issue unilaterally a non-use of force pledge. This is a very important step, and we hope that they will reciprocate.
Jospeh d'Urso and Marion Kipiani interviewed the Georgian Deputy Minister for Reintegration, Ketevan Tsikhelashvili at the State Chancellery in Tbilisi on 9 August 2013.
photo: Ketevan Tsikhelashvili (Picture courtesy of the State Ministry of Reintegration)
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