South Caucasus

All transport and communication lines in the South Caucasus remain closed. This failure can largely be attributed to the shift of connectivity from a concept intended to build trust to one tied up with security arrangements in the post-2020 era. "Instead of fostering closeness between the parties, concepts that were supposed to enhance cooperation were perceived as threats to territorial integrity and sovereignty", writes Shujaat Ahmadzada in this op-ed for commonspace.eu. "One should not overlook the fact that the November 10 statement and many of its components have been fundamentally and operationally Russia-centric, implying that the Armenian-Azerbaijani disagreements have to be settled around a third party – albeit not an ordinary one but one with hegemonic ambitions."

It may appear that the primary obstacle to the signature of a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan is the different views of the sides on where to resume and finalize the process. Armenia wants to do that in Western platforms, while Azerbaijan wants to return to the Russian platform, use the 3+2 format, or have direct negotiations without any mediators. In this op-ed for commonspace.eu Benyamin Poghosyan says that "in reality, the roots of the current situation are more profound than simple geopolitical choices of venue."

This month marked the third anniversary of the ceasefire statement that was meant to end the second Karabakh war. In retrospect, it might be more appropriately considered a continuation of the first conflict of the early 1990s given that the ceasefire then was hardly implemented too, leading to a new war 26 years later. Meanwhile, hopes that Baku and Yerevan could sign a peace agreement are fading. In this op-ed for commonspace.eu Onnik James Krikorian says that "a deal was possible by the end of the year, both sides pronounced in 2022 and again throughout 2023, but that sounded as vague and sometimes disingenuous then as it does now. Instead, an uncanny sense of deja vu hangs over the process, reminiscent of earlier failures by the now defunct OSCE Minsk Group."

It has been a roller-coaster sort of week for EU relations with the South Caucasus. It started on Wednesday (8 November), with the decision of the European Commission to recommend that Georgia be recognized as a Candidate Country, opening the way for eventual membership. By Tuesday, (14 November) the Foreign Affairs Council was considering providing military assistance to Armenia through possible assistance from the European Peace Facility. In the days in-between relations between the EU and Azerbaijan appeared to have dipped to their lowest point in a decade, with Azerbaijan accusing the EU of inciting separatism. Except that on Wednesday (15 November), the Azerbaijani presidential foreign policy aide surfaced in Brussels where he was told that Azerbaijan was an important partner for the EU in the South Caucasus and that the EU will continue to support the Armenia-Azerbaijan normalisation process to advance a peaceful and prosperous South Caucasus. One would like to think that all this was part of some grand strategy. Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov seems to think so, accusing the EU of trying to oust Russia out of the South Caucasus (and Central Asia). But a closer look at this week’s events suggest that the EU is doing, what it often does: muddling along, reacting to events and situations rather than fulfilling some grand strategy. This is risky, and the EU needs to develop a strategic framework for dealing with the South Caucasus. There is an urgent need for the European Union to develop a strategic perspective towards the region that is based on realism, and that has enough support from different stakeholders – Commission, Member States; Parliament – for it to be credible. Developing a comprehensive EU strategy will take time and will require an alignment of different views and interests that may take months, if not years, to achieve. In the meantime however, the EU should have the ambition to publish by early Spring 2024 a short but ambitious statement of intent with its vision for the region that may provide a framework around which different ad hoc policies and initiatives can be organized. The first half of 2024 may offer a window of opportunity for this to happen.

The European Union is increasingly worried about Armenia, and attempts to destabilise it both internally and externally. The matter was discussed by the foreign ministers of the 27 member states meeting in Brussels in the format of the Foreign Affairs Council on Monday (14 November). Briefing journalists after the meeting, EU High Representative, Josep Borrell said "The October European Council discussed how to strengthen our cooperation with Armenia and support its democratically elected authorities, its resilience, its security and the continuation of reforms in the country. We decided to beef up our mission in Armenia: more observers and more patrols in sensitive areas of the border.   And we will explore a possible support to Armenia under the European Peace Facility and options for visa-liberalisation for Armenia.  We have to be very much vigilant for any attempts of destabilisation of Armenia, internally and externally. And our message to Azerbaijan has been clear: any violation of Armenia’s territorial integrity will be unacceptable and would have severe consequences for the quality of our relations.   We call for the resumption of negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan and on the work done by the President of the [European] Council [Charles Michel]. We need a peace treaty to be concluded and we are committed to continue our mediation role.   We decided to invite the Armenian Foreign Minister [Ararat Mirzoyan] to join us in the margins of the next, maybe the next, Foreign Affairs Council, it has to be decided - but an upcoming Foreign Affairs Council." In a statement this morning the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected Borrell's statement and accused the EU of inciting separatism.